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This report provides an analysis and evaluation of incident analysis methods and practices applied by
the Finnish regulator Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the two Finnish nuclear
power plant operators Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum). The
study was conducted in 1998–99. The research material was based on tape-recorded interviews as well
as internal directions and event investigation reports provided by the three participating organisations.
A framework for analysis and evaluation was developed as part of the study on the basis of referenced
root cause analysis and operating experience review methods, selected (foreign) inspection reports,
scientific papers and research literature. Well-known inspection methods and principles, such as
ASSET and MTO/HPES, provided important guidance to this work.
This study shows that although all the evaluated organisations had rather comprehensive incident
analysis arrangements, more focus and priorisation is needed. Deficiencies were identified mostly in
the areas of recording, assessment and classification of new events and observations, use of existing
operating experience data, utilisation of information technology based tools, and allocation of work and
resources. In general, the direct causes of identified events can be detected and removed, but more
emphasis should be given to the prevention of recurrence. This requires a more efficient feedback loop
that can be created and maintained by focusing on the root causes of significant events, tasks and
activities in which the originating errors occurred, and weaknesses of defensive barriers, and by
implementing periodic operational experience reviews. A strategy document for the operating experi-
ence feedback process, and firm procedures for the initial assessment of new events and the carrying-
out of data analyses would help.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
This study has been initiated due to an assign-
ment from the Finnish regulator, Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), to the Technical
Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The study rela-
tes to the IAEA Coordinated Research Programme
“Investigation of Methodologies for Incident Ana-
lysis”. The IAEA programme aims at investigating
what kind of methods and practices are being used
for analysing operational events in nuclear power
plants today, how do they work, and how to impro-
ve in the future. Special attention is paid to root
cause analysis methods and their application in
the IAEA member countries.
Today there is a great number of different
methods and approaches for investigating opera-
tional events. Methods like HPES, MTO and AS-
SET—together with dozens of other more or less
widely known techniques—are being used within
the nuclear industry. It is generally recognised
that different techniques are necessary for differ-
ent applications e.g. depending on the characteris-
tics of the events to be investigated. For instance,
the significance of the event or the amount of
available information may have a major effect on
how the investigation ought to (or can) be carried
out. As a result, it is important to know the
strengths and limitations of existing methods in
relation to different investigation needs.
In addition, also the characteristics of the in-
vestigation process itself as well as prevailing
operational preconditions do have an impact on
the outcome of the process. For instance, person-
nel workloads, management support or inspectors’
acquaintance with the method to be used may
significantly influence the overall reliability of
achieved results. This is why the IAEA pro-
gramme emphasizes i.a. investigation team issues
such as team composition, resources and training,
and on-site investigation practices.
The IAEA programme was initiated in 1997
and is envisaged to continue until the year 2001.
The overall objectives of the IAEA programme are
as follows:
1. to explore feedback of operating experience,
especially on event investigation (root cause)
methodologies and techniques in current use,
2. to review and analyse existing root cause meth-
odologies and techniques, and determine their
applicability areas and evaluate their strengths
and limitations,
3. to develop “tool boxes” of root cause meth-
odologies/techniques for particular application
areas emphasizing the multiple cause determi-
nation concept with corresponding definitions
and the classification of direct and root causes.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this study is to provide
STUK with an evaluation report on the adequacy
and reliability of incident analysis methodologies
and practices currently applied by STUK itself
and the two Finnish utilities Teollisuuden Voima
Oy (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (For-
tum) at their nuclear power plants. The study will
focus on the investigation of safety significant ope-
rational events. In addition, the study aims at pro-
viding a broad overview of the whole organisatio-
nal framework to support event investigation
practices in the three participating organisations.
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1.3 A systems approach to
incident analysis practices
1.3.1 Nuclear power and organisational
reliability
Nuclear power plants are industrial facilities with
an important societal function. In many countries
they produce a significant part of the total electri-
cal power supply around the year, 24 hours a day.
Due to their societal role they have many obliga-
tions. First of all, they are supposed to maintain
high levels of performance and service to meet
public expectations. Secondly, they are also requi-
red to maintain high levels of operational safety
and reliability to be allowed to continue their ope-
ration. As well, as commercial enterprises power
companies will have to meet the business goals of
their owners. In other words, they must cope with
an ensemble of different kinds of, and sometimes
conflicting, requirements and expectations.
Many organisations i.a. in the fields of civil
aviation, chemical industry and armed forces are
also dealing with similar challenges. One of them
is their need to manage demanding safety critical
operations on day-to-day basis. Such organisa-
tions have been called high reliability organisa-
tions (HROs) in the sense that instead of relying
on good fortune or the vagaries of probability they
have assumed a pro-active risk management ap-
proach to pursuing safety and operational reliabil-
ity (Rochlin, 1993).
In the field of nuclear power safety is para-
mount. One could claim, however, that the ever
increasing stature of safety issues within the
nuclear community partly stems from the fact
that people have become more risk conscious.
Media pays a lot of attention to all nuclear power
related incidents and hazards, and the notion of
risk or an impending danger is nowadays the
driving force behind most media stories (e.g.
Hawkes, 1999). Risk sells, and that is something
the Nuclear Managers will have to cope with. It is
obvious, therefore, that one just cannot run a
nuclear power plant without assuring the public,
the media, and the regulator that safety will
always come first.
Needless to say, this is just another side of the
coin. For most people working in nuclear facilities,
as well as for the nuclear organisations them-
selves, safety is not just a trick to ensure public
acceptance. Safety is an important value per se
although there are different interpretations of
what does it mean or require in practice to operate
safely. Safety is also rational from the economic
point of view. It is evident, for instance, that in the
long run safety does correlate with plant reliabili-
ty and utilisation rates. This means that sound
safety investments are likely to result in good
economic performance, too, whereas the outcomes
of an indifferent safety policy may be quite re-
verse indeed (consider e.g. the case of Ontario
Hydro, described by Andognini, 1998). In conse-
quence, safety has undoubtedly become a matter
of organisational survival and an operational im-
perative for all (commercial) nuclear facilities.
As part of the promotion of operational safety
and reliability both utilities and regulatory bodies
stress the importance of preventing nuclear safety
significant incidents in operating nuclear power
plants around the world. Pro-active safety related
measures are of utmost importance to all HROs
simply because most of them cannot really “af-
ford” major failures. For this particular reason
they cannot solely rely on the practice of learning
by trial-and-error, either (Rochlin, 1993, p. 16). As
a result, most HROs must mainly enhance their
safety performance by other means, e.g. by the
utilisation of sophisticated risk assessment meth-
odologies, application of advanced design concepts
and defence-in-depth principles, and by fostering
personnel commitment to safety (e.g. Rasmussen,
1993). Eternal vigilance and the application of
efficient pro-active analysis methods are thus pre-
requisites for successful operation for most HROs
(Rochlin, 1993). Nevertheless, even the most relia-
ble organisations tend to fail sometimes.
1.3.2 Improving through learning from
experience
Many nuclear organisations have established
event investigation practices to monitor and ana-
lyse operational events and incidents at their faci-
lities. The very idea of the event investigation
practice and the whole operational experience uti-
lisation process is to learn from existing experien-
ce (e.g. incidents and failures) and to use that
information for the promotion of plant safety and
operational reliability. The primary objective of
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
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the practice is the prevention of the occurrence or
recurrence of operational events, process tran-
sients and latent failures of safety systems..
The operational experience utilisation process
consists of several subprocesses or activity areas.
Typically it includes procedures for the monitor-
ing and recording of both internal and external
operational events, assessment and classification
to determine their safety significance and further
inspection needs, and the actual inspections of
(safety significant) incidents and accidents. Also
the processing and implementation of proposed
corrective actions can be mentioned in this context
since sound investigation results alone do not lead
to improvements in plant operations. In addition,
the acquisition and storage of operational event
data, and the carrying-out of comprehensive oper-
ating experience data analyses to identify impor-
tant failure types, such as recurrent failures and
common cause failure mechanisms in safety sig-
nificant systems and equipment, can be regarded
as important subprocesses of the operational ex-
perience utilisation process (Fig. 1).
Another question is, however, what are the
best possible practices for carrying them out, and
how do they depend on various contextual factors,
e.g. the existing political and economic situation,
or the type and history of the concerned organisa-
tion. These are difficult questions without certain
and simple answers. The main point is, however,
that organisations have to be able to learn from
their experiences and transfer that knowledge
into practical and effective enhancements. Such
learning is largely based on a profound under-
standing of how and why the incidents really took
(or are taking) place. That in turn calls for an
identification of the actual root causes or the
major contributing factors of those incidents and
decisions on corrective actions and remedies. The
identification of root causes ought to be done by
means of a reliable and comprehensive root cause
analysis method.
Root cause analyses are used for the in-depth
assessment of selected operational events. A root
cause analysis is generally (or shall be) conducted
for operational events which have, or may have,
specific safety significance and whose causes are
not obvious. In addition to safety, also economic
reasons, e.g. the possibility to avoid production
losses, equipment damages and personnel inju-
ries, will initiate the inspection process.
There are dozens of different kinds of root
cause analysis methods. Their techniques and
concepts may significantly differ from each other
partly because they have been designed to tackle
different problems, and partly because they are
Figure 1. An overview of an operational experience utilisation process: major subprocesses and their
mutual interconnections.
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based on different thinking and theories. Many
methods have a lot in common, however. The
following list itemises some general objectives that
are typical of many root cause analysis methods:
• to explain what happened and to illustrate the
course of events from the very beginning of the
incident to the consequential failure at the end
of the event chain,
• to provide a better understanding of how dif-
ferent causal factors actually contributed, or
may have contributed, to the incident initiation
and propagation,
• to explain why the incident was not prevented
from happening i.a. by evaluating the adequa-
cy and effectiveness of existing technical and
administrative barriers,
• to shed light on what else might have hap-
pened under different conditions, and to assess
the general reliability and adequacy of plant
systems and control procedures,
• and to issue recommendation for further ac-
tions to prevent the recurrence of similar and
corresponding events in the future.
In practice, operational event reports contain a lot
of plant specific information (e.g. log files, graphs,
process computer recordings, specifications etc.)
needed in evaluating the safety importance of the
case in question. Moreover, their content is being
regulated by the national reporting directions
which usually comprise extensive requirements
for reports’ coverage and thoroughness (see ch.
4.2.1). General requirements for event investigati-
on and reporting practices formulated as part of
this study are given in full detail in Chapter 2.3.
1.3.3 The anatomy of an incident
Although the concept of “root cause” is quite well-
established and commonly used throughout the
nuclear community, its precise meaning is by no
means clear. For instance, it is not quite obvious
whether it stands for the “initial occurence” that
launched the course of events, or for the “major
factor” that (most) significantly contributed to the
outcome of the process. The same applies to the
vast majority of the professional jargon used in
this field, including such terms as direct causes,
contributing factors, event sequences and missing
barriers, just to mention some of them. In the
absence of clear definitions it is sometimes rather
difficult to convey as well as catch the very essen-
ce of the message. However, the problem does not
solely relate to those linguistic considerations. It
is the inherent complexity of the organisation and
its influence mechanisms that makes it so difficult
to describe what, how and why had happened, and
consequently, to find applicable and unambiguous
concept for that purpose.
On the one hand, many operational events or
incidents result from a combination of several
contributing factors at different stages of opera-
tion. For example, human errors committed dur-
ing the processes of systems specification or de-
sign may remain undetected and progress through
the stages of inspection and commissioning and
finally result in a major systems failure several
years later. Detection failures are possible be-
cause single errors do not necessarily have any
immediate deteriorating impact on the work in
progress. The outcome of an erroneous action at
one stage may also lead to another (human or
technical) failure at the next one.
In consequence, it might be very difficult to
differentiate between the underlying causes of the
event, the event itself and its outcome (Hollnagel,
1998). Therefore, the outcome of one specific event
may be the “root cause” of the next one in a long
chain of subsequent events and failures. This is
called a horizontal influence mechanism (Fig. 2).
On the other hand, an incident may also result
from a combination of several contributing factors
at different levels of the organisation. According to
Reason’s (1995) model of organisational accident
causation most event chains are actually initiated
at the highest level of the organisation by inade-
quate policies and inefficient or unreliable admin-
istrative processes. They lay the foundations of
error and violation-producing conditions at the
workplace which increase the likelihood of indi-
vidual errors and violations at the “sharp end” of
operation. Inadequate safety management prac-
tices and insufficient understanding of the safety
implications of operation are also likely to result
in missing or unreliable barriers.
This vertical influence mechanism from the
upper echelons of the whole operating environ-
ment to the sharp end of the system is rather hard
to tackle since the upper you go the weaker the
connections come. In consequence, the identifica-
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
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tion of root causes is very much dependent on the
scope and thoroughness of the analysis.
Contributing factors may be either active or
passive, and stem from individual, organisational,
environmental as well as purely technical origins.
According to OECD/NEA coding and reporting
propositions they can be divided into two catego-
ries: causal factors and actual root causes (NEA/
CSNI/R(97)15/PART1 1998), of which the latter
refer to the initiating events, measures or defi-
ciencies that significantly contributed to the oc-
currence of the incident.
According to the official position of STUK a
root cause is “such a common or systematic (not
random) failure, deficiency or drawback that has
significantly contributed to the occurrence of the
analysed event”. It is also characteristics of a root
cause that “the licence-holder can influence it by
appropriate measures. A root cause thus cannot be
a law of nature or actions, or modes of action, of
an individual who is not a member of the compo-
nent manufacturer’s or licence-holder’s staff”.
STUK also emphasizes incidents’ and organisa-
tions’ systemic nature by stating that “a root cause
is not a single human error or the failure or
breaking of a component”. This is also the view of
the authors of this study. (YVL 1.11, p. 5.).
Figure 2. Horizontal and vertical influence mechanisms contributing to event initiation and propagation
(modified from Reason, 1995, p. 1710).
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2.1 Research procedure
This study was carried out as a joint research
project of VTT Industrial Automation (Espoo) and
VTT Risk Management (Tampere). Altogether six
researchers with different areas of expertise par-
ticipated in the project. VTT Industrial Automati-
on was responsible for the project management
and assumed the main responsibility for the work.
The project was started in November 1998 and
completed at the end of July 1999.
2.1.1 The framework for analysis and
evaluation
The project was carried out in five major stages
(Fig. 3). At the first stage a framework for analysis
and evaluation was compiled on grounds of se-
lected scientific papers and expert task group re-
ports, selected reference methods and examples of
their use for event inspections and existing sub-
ject matter expertise at VTT. The framework spe-
cified the scope of the analysis and issued require-
2 METHODS
Figure 3. The research procedure.
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ments for event investigation practices and met-
hods. The framework is described in Chapter 2.3.
Referenced inspection methods as well as other
important information sources that have been
used for drafting the framework are specified and
justified in Chapter 2.2.
2.1.2 Organisational framework and
investigation practices
The second stage resulted in an analysis and ge-
neral description of the organisational framework
of the event investigation practices in the three
participating organisations. The analysis was con-
ducted from the organisational reliability point of
view and focused on the managerial framework,
investigation procedures, and operational precon-
ditions. The analysis was mainly based on avai-
lable instructions and procedures, semi-structu-
red interviews as well as information system de-
monstrations on site. The formal documentation
was selected and the interviewees were nomina-
ted by the concerned organisations.
Altogether six people were interviewed at
Olkiluoto NPP, two at Loviisa NPP and two at
STUK, the Finnish regulator. All the interviewees
had substantial experience in the field of nuclear
safety and their current tasks related to event
investigation activities. More than half of the
interviewees held a position of a section head or
equivalent in their organisations. The interviews
took usually from 90 to 120 minutes. Interviews
were tape-recorded and transcribed.
Preliminary versions of the analyses of the
interviews were submitted to the representatives
of the three organisations for commentation. In
connection with redrafting the analyses the repre-
sentatives of Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs were
interviewed over the phone. According to the au-
thors comprehension a consensus was achieved on
most of the remaining open questions. The analy-
ses are reported in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
2.1.3 Inspection methods and selected
inspection reports
At the third stage applied inspection methods and
their application were analysed on the basis of
selected incident cases and related inspection re-
ports. The cases were selected from the bulk of
recent inspection reports provided by the object
organisations for evaluation. They as well as their
selection criteria are itemised and justified in
Chapter 2.4. In the nuclear power plants special
attention was paid to the special and root cause
analysis reports, and at STUK to the so called
TAPREK incident reports. The evaluation focused
on the contents, structure and coverage of the
inspection reports, characteristics of applied
inspection methods and treatment of the particu-
lar cases (operational events and a bulk of them)
in question. The particular cases were subjected
for a new follow-up analysis of the information in
inspection reports supplied by the utilities and
regulatory body. The results of the analysis and
evaluation are presented in Chapter 7.
2.1.4 Evaluation of applied methods and
practices
At the fourth stage a comprehensive and summa-
rising evaluation of applied investigation practi-
ces and methods in the three participating organi-
sations was produced. The evaluation was con-
ducted on grounds of the two analyses and the
evaluation criteria (i.e. requirements and ideal
models) specified in the framework paper (Chap-
ter 2.3). Equal attention was paid to the identifica-
tion and reporting of good practices as well as
weaknesses. However, due to the extent of the
problem area and possible limitations of the se-
lected analysis cases, many important and inter-
esting issues may remain uncovered and remained
beyond systematic assessment. The results of the
evaluation are presented in Chapter 8. The main
conclusions and recommendations are given in
Chapter 9.
2.2 References for analysis and
evaluation
2.2.1 Organisational framework
There are numerous studies to show that in addi-
tion to strictly technological issues the reliability
of any complex and demanding process is also de-
pendent on an ensemble of individual, organisa-
tional and environmental performance shaping
factors. With respect to nuclear power, compre-
hensive lists can be found e.g. from Jacobs & Ha-
14
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ber (1994), NUREG/CR-6093 (1994) and NEA/
CSNI/R(98)17, Vol. 1 (1999). Especially manage-
ment issues have been shown to be of great impor-
tance to reliability and efficiency in nuclear power
plants, as indicated e.g. by the studies of Andogni-
ni (1998), Reason (1995) and Dahlgren & Skån-
berg (1993). There are similar findings also in the
areas of civil aviation (Reason, 1995), and chemi-
cal industry (Shrivastava, 1992).
It can be assumed that a NPP event investiga-
tion practice is no exception of this rule. It is a
complex, demanding and time-consuming process,
and its outcome is dependent on individual and
organisational contributions over a long period of
time. Therefore, the question is not just about the
theoretical competence of applied methodologies
and procedures but also the availability of ade-
quate control and support functions that provide
those activities and individuals with necessary
direction and resources. As a result, also the
prevailing organisational framework needs to be
analysed and evaluated in a way that reflects its
relative importance to the reliability and effective-
ness of the whole process. That is why this study
has been conducted from an organisational relia-
bility point of view.
Organisational reliability, as we would like to
define it, refers to the degree to which organisa-
tions have managed to define, acquire and/or
adhere to such policies, structures, processes, re-
sources and knowledge that are necessary to guar-
antee an acceptable level of performance. On the
basis of existing empirical evidence it is argued
that they can be created and maintained by delib-
erate management decisions and procedures only,
and that reliability has a systems nature in the
sense that it cannot be reduced to, or solely
explained by the attributes of a single employee or
a particular function or device. This is what we
call a systems approach to organisational reliabili-
ty. A good description of its utilisation in the area
of safety assessment can be found (in Swedish)
from Wahlström and Gunsell (1998, pp. 89-112).
This analysis is divided into two parts of which
the first one (covering Chapters 4, 5 and 6) pro-
vides an overall description of the organisational
framework of the three participating organisa-
tions in relation to their operational experience
utilisation processes. It has been further divided
into three themes called managerial framework,
investigation practices and operational precondi-
tions as shown in Figure 4. The second part
(Chapter 7) focuses on the analysis of applied
inspection methods on the basis of their use on
selected cases and related (e.g. special and root
cause analysis) reports.
Figure 4. The organisational framework of the operational experience utilisation process.
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The major reference for the analysis and evalu-
ation of the organisational framework is “Success-
ful health and safety management” (HSG65,
1998), a guide produced by the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE). It is mainly aimed at
health and safety directors, managers and profes-
sional to provide practical guidance to managing
safety related activities. In general, the guide
describes the principles and management practic-
es which provide the basis of effective health and
safety management, sets out the issues which
need to be addressed, and provides guidance to
the development of improvement and self-assess-
ment programmes. In this study, those principles
and practices have been used to produce a list of
topics (i.e. practices, procedures, instructions etc.)
to be addressed in the analysis of the organisa-
tional framework, and to provide guidance to
drafting the general evaluation criteria for the
concerned areas. The key elements of successful
health and safety management, as presented in
HSG65, can be found from Appendices. A detailed,
but concise, description of the UK approach is
given in (NEA/CSNI/R(98)17, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 28-
31). However, the scope of the analysis and evalu-
ation framework formulated as part of this study
is not limited to HSG65 or any other single study,
guide or source of information.
2.2.2 Inspection methods
Two internationally recognised event inspections
methods were selected as reference methods. The
first of the methods MTO (Man-Technology-Orga-
nisation) analysis is a root cause analysis method
developed in Sweden and used by most Nordic
utilities. The second is ASSET (Assessment of Sa-
fety Significant Events Team) which includes both
an assessment method of single incidents and a
periodic operating experience review of the bulk of
incidents. ASSET is launched by the IAEA (Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency) serving here as
the world’s intergovernmental forum for scientific
and technical co-operation for the nuclear safety
and power branch.
The MTO method is based on the HPES meth-
od (Human Performance Enhancement System)
which was developed for the U.S. NASA space
programs. Later on, INPO (Institute of Nuclear
Power Operators) started to apply HPES for root
cause analysis in nuclear power plants. Today a
large number of U.S. utilities use the HPES meth-
od. Also the large Canadian Ontario Hydro and
French EDF utilities use the HPES method. One
benefit of the MTO root cause analysis method in
Finland is that its use can be benchmarked and
trained with Swedish utilities (Bento 1990, Rol-
lenhagen 1998). The most important aim of the
MTO method for analysis of events is to search
weaknesses in performance of a utility to prevent
recurrence (0-S-O-23/1).
The parts of the MTO method are event and
cause analysis, deviation analysis, barrier analy-
sis and consequence analysis. In Figure 5, a prin-
cipal extraction of a block diagram combines and
represents in a structured way the event sequence,
deviations from normal conditions, causes and the
broken or failing defensive barriers.
Although the MTO analysis is rather resource
consuming, it is also suitable for root cause analy-
sis of technical incidents that have significance
potential although they not exhibit directly hu-
man errors or organisational weaknesses. The
graphical presentation of the events and causal
factors in an informative chart is particularly
useful for complex and complicated situations,
and is much more meaningful than long narrative
descriptions. In addition, the probable causal fac-
tors become evident as the chart is developed
(HPES 1992).
The objective of ASSET self assessment is to
answer thoroughly seven basic questions with a
view to enhance event prevention. The questions
are numbered and summarised in Figure 6.
The starting point of ASSET is detailed screen-
ing and follow-up analysis of the past operating
experience. The bulk of the operational incidents
that have occurred during past five years (during
operation and plus all failures during periodic
testing/inspections). A standard follow-up event
analysis report is prepared for each incident in-
cluding safety impact assessment, the logic tree of
failures, the root causes of each failure, the safety
culture assessment and the action plan.
In addition the aim of the periodic review of
the operating experience is trending of good
events (identified by surveillance) versus bad
events (failures), trending of safety relevant
events versus the whole population, trending of
recurrent failures, trending of the ten indicators
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Figure 5. A  MTO event and cause diagram (0-S-O-23/1).
of safety impact and trending of three indicators
of safety culture according to the IAEA definition
(ASSET 1998).
The starting point of the ASSET peer review is
the plant self assessment report. This requires
from the plant clear and thorough answers to the
above seven basic questions in the self assessment
report on plant safety performance, safety prob-
lems and safety culture.
The final result of the periodic operating expe-
rience review is a conceptual ranking of the pend-
ing safety problems and specification of the re-
maining corrective actions (equipment, personnel,
procedures) still to be implemented at the plant.
The ASSET peer review report has also the task to
present an evaluation of the management capabil-
ities to prevent occurrence and recurrence of fail-
ures by either repairs or remedies during opera-
tion.
Although the standard event analysis reports
of ASSET are aimed at conducting a follow-up
analysis at both single incident and past incident
population, the ASSET format and tools seem also
to be practical for analysis of new single events
and incidents.
However, the evaluation of the inspection
methods and reports used in Finland is not limit-
ed to the comparison of the method guides of MTO
and ASSET with the actual outcome at the plants
and regulatory body. The insights acquired and
contributions done in the forums for scientific and
technical co-operation such as the Task Forces of
the OECD/NEA/CSNI/PWG 1 (The Principal
Working Group for operating experience and hu-
man factors), independent NKS (Nordic Nuclear
Safety Research) and KTM (Ministry of Trade and
Industry) research programs on operational and
reactor safety, and the IAEA co-ordinated research
programmes were also used as an input and
references contributing to the evaluation and com-
parison (NEA/CSNI/R(98)17, Vol 1, 1999), (NEA/
CSNI/R(97)15/PART1, 1998), (NEA/SEN/SIN/WG1
(98)17, 1998), (NEA/CSNI/R (97)5, PARTS 1 & 2,
1997), (SKIFS 1998:1), Laakso, Pyy & Reiman
(1998), Bento (1997), (NKS/SIK-1, 1994), and
Laakso (1984). The international, Nordic and
Finnish case and task force studies and their
selected examples of well analysed and clearly
documented inspection and operating experience
reports have provided references and valuable
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
17
insights on specific inputs and requirements for
the ideal model construction for the following
framework of the analysis and evaluation.
2.3 The framework for analysis
and evaluation
The framework comprises four analysis areas and
five ideal models. The analysis areas are manage-
rial framework (ch. 2.3.1), investigation practices
(ch. 2.3.2), operational preconditions (ch. 2.3.3),
and inspection reports (ch. 2.3.4). The ideal mo-
dels present good practices and requirements for
the structure and phasing of the event investigati-
on procedure (ch. 2.3.5) and the operating experi-
ence feedback loop (ch. 2.3.6), and for the scope
and characteristics of event inspection methods
(ch. 2.3.7), follow-up analyses (ch. 2.3.8), and peri-
odic operating experience reviews (ch. 2.3.9). In
connection with the analysis areas both the scope
of the analysis and the area specific requirements
have been defined under corresponding subtitles.
The ideal models are “ideal” in the sense that they
present target states against which licensees’ and
STUK’s methods and practices are compared. The
framework description has intentionally been left
concise to enhance readability and to allow flexibi-
lity in identifying successful and effective practi-
ces and methods for event investigation and the
operating experience feedback loop.
2.3.1 Managerial framework
Scope of the analysis
• Goals and policy
• Performance indicators
• Organisation and liabilities
General requirements
• Goals have been defined and documented
• Goals are explicit and unambiguous
• Goals are generally known and understood
• A pro-active approach towards safety is being
emphasised
• Prevention of the occurrence and recurrence of
events is of top priority
• Indicators for effectiveness have been defined
and are in use
• The plant management knows what is going on
at the plant
• Liabilities have been clearly defined
• Each key process or activity has an owner
• The event investigation practice has enough
integrity and independence
2.3.2 Investigation practices
Scope of the analysis
• Monitoring and recording of operational events
• Assessment and screening of operational
events
• Analysis of safety significant incidents
• Initiation
• Team composition
• Inspection procedures and methods
• Experiences
• Utilisation of investigation results
• Safety assessment
• Processing and implementation of
recommendationsFigure 6. The ASSET procedure for plant self as-
sessment of safety performance.
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• Data administration and analysis of the bulk
of investigation data
• Reporting
• Self-assessment on strengths and weaknesses
General requirements
• There is a procedure for each key process and
activity
• Practices comply with approved procedures
• Current monitoring practice has potential for
detecting all safety significant events
• Current monitoring practice has potential for
detecting recurrence
• Operational experience from other plants is
being monitored and assessed
• All events and observations that have, or may
have, safety significance are recorded
• All such events and observations are assessed
and classified in a systematic way
• There are clear criteria for determining what
kind of further inspections are needed
• All safety significant events are thoroughly
inspected
• Inspections are carried out by competent and
knowledgeable personnel
• Remedial actions are recommended for the
prevention of recurrence
• Inspection results are assessed in a systematic
way from the safety point of view
• The processing and implementation of recom-
mended actions is under supervision..
• ...and achieved results are identified and com-
pared with acceptance criteria
• Operational event data is stored in a systemat-
ic way and made easily available
• Operational event data is subject to systematic
reviews (or periodic data analyses)
• Reporting to the regulator is conducted in
accordance with the reporting requirements
Specific requirements
• The event investigation practice comprises the
main components of ideal model A (ch. 2.3.5)
• Operational experience is being systematically
utilised as shown in ideal model B (ch. 2.3.6)
• Applied event inspection methods fulfil the
requirements given in ideal model C (ch. 2.3.7)
• Each significant event is subject to a follow-up
analysis according to ideal model D (ch. 2.3.8)
• Operational event data is subject to periodic
reviews according to ideal model E (ch. 2.3.9)
2.3.3 Operational preconditions
Scope of the analysis
• Human resources and training
• Manuals and instructions
• Information systems support
• Management support
• Reviews and development activities
General requirements
• Adequate resources have been assigned to each
key process and activity
• There are competent personnel who can con-
centrate on event investigations
• A good understanding of the functional fea-
tures of the plant is available
• Human and organisational factors expertise is
available and being used
• Technical expertise is available and being used
• Attention is paid to personnel training and
succession planning
• Instructions are available, clear, useful and up-
to-date
• The potential of information technology is be-
ing utilised to the extent it is practical
• Existing information systems are generally
considered usable and useful
• Upper management provides concrete support
for the event investigation practice
• The event investigation practice is subject to
regular performance reviews
• External and independent evaluators have reg-
ularly participated in/conducted reviews
• Major deficiencies have been recognised and
are subject to development activities
2.3.4 Inspection reports
Scope of the analysis
An in-depth analysis of selected cases (i.e.
operational events) and related inspection reports
from the three participating organisations was
carried out as part of this study. Selected cases
and reports as well as criteria for their selection
are itemised in Chapter 2.4.
General reporting requirements
• Reports are clear, illustrative and unambigu-
ous
• They focus on systemic deficiencies and causes,
individual anonymity is maintained
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• There is a clear distinction between fact and
speculation
• Information sources are identified, conclusions
are justified
• Reference to applied methods is given, selec-
tion of the method is justified
Specific reporting requirements
• According to ideal model C
2.3.5 Ideal model A: General framework
for the event investigation practice
• All events and observations that have, or may
have, safety significance are identified and
recorded (see Fig. 7).
• All such events and observations are assessed,
described and classified in a systematic way.
The initial classification and screening is based
on significance and further inspection, action
and reporting needs.
Figure 7. Ideal model A. General framework for the event investigation practice.
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• Each significant event is analysed by an appro-
priate method. Minor (technical) defects and
failures are passed through the work order
(and data collection and analysis) procedure.
Other interesting events are submitted for con-
sideration to the persons, teams or organisa-
tional units that are responsible for the con-
cerned matter and/or could benefit from the
information. Events and observations classi-
fied as non-significant are filed.
• Each significant event is reanalysed after a
certain period of time. The original inspection
report is updated to reflect the latest knowl-
edge, actions and understanding.
• Operational event and failure data are subject
to regular and comprehensive reviews. The
recurrent failures, and pending plant level
safety and operability problems are identified
and an action plan for improvement is com-
piled.
• Investigation results are always taken into
account in an appropriate way. They result in
learning and decisions on corrective and reme-
dial actions.
2.3.6 Ideal model B: Operating
experience feedback loop
• Operating experience is gathered, recorded and
administrated in a systematic way (see Fig. 8).
• Records of events and failures are easily avail-
able and widely utilised.
• Classifications and decisions are based on ex-
isting knowledge and approved objectives.
• The effectiveness of applied policies and result
of implemented remedial actions is being fol-
lowed.
• Inefficient or inappropriate policies and meas-
ures are detected and corrected.
2.3.7 Ideal model C: Requirements for
event inspection methods
General requirements
• The inspection procedure is initiated as soon as
possible
• Inspections are carried out in a no-blame at-
mosphere
• The concepts of “direct cause” and “root cause”
have been explicitly defined
Figure 8. Ideal model B. Operating experience feedback loop.
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• Both initiating events (transients, defects) and
latent failures are addressed
• The method has potential to reveal all major
failure modes and safety significant issues
• The stopping criteria have been defined
• The inspection report has a clear structure,
format and contents
• The report suits for utilisation of information
technology and periodic operating experience
review.
Specific requirements concerning the issues
to be covered
The following list comprises specific requirements
for inspections that have been initiated due to an
initiating event (e.g. process transient) or a latent
failure (e.g. unavailable standby safety system):
• ID information: unit, date, time, descriptive
title, inspectors etc.
• Immediate consequences of the incident
• Affected systems, equipment and structures
• Operational conditions and major process pa-
rameters prior to the incident...
• ...and explanatory process and computer re-
cordings to illustrate its progression
• Means of detection and the situation in which
the incident was discovered
• The course of events (event sequence from the
origin up to and including recovery actions in a
chronological order)
• Problems encountered in managing and con-
trolling the situation
• Use and adequacy of approved procedures and
instructions
• Direct and root causes of the incident (the
cause-effect chains explaining the case)
• In case of a human failure, the work task in
which the error occurred (the failure origin)
• Common cause failure (CCF) mechanisms, ori-
gins and interconnections to other systems
• Efficiency and adequacy of both technical and
administrative barriers...
• ...and in case of a technical failure, the adequa-
cy of operability verification activities
• Evaluation of historical recurrence (both local
repair actions and root causes)
• Availability of important safety systems
• Incident’s significance in terms of nuclear, per-
sonnel and radiation safety
• Necessary immediate and long term corrective
actions and their expected effects
• Event recording and classification system (the
event report is completed with classification
for searches and periodic operating experience
review purposes)
• Reference to other related investigations, such
as work orders and failure reports
Although the above list of specific requirement
issues for incident inspection that have been initi-
ated due to an initiating event or a latent failure
is the same, differences in the thoroughness of the
analysis and reporting of the issues depend on
event classification and significance.
2.3.8 Ideal model D: Requirements for
the follow-up analysis
• Important operational events shall be reana-
lysed within a certain period of time
• Certain period = after the causes and failure
mechanisms have been substantiated and the
remedial measures have been identified and
decided
• The follow-up analysis shall be based on the
utilisation of the plant information system
• Signs of historical recurrence, CCF mecha-
nisms and latent failures are checked
• Status of proposed corrective measures is
checked
• Effects of already completed enhancements are
evaluated
• Evaluation of the event’s safety significance is
substantiated (or changed)
• If necessary, new action proposals are issued
• Findings of the original inspection report shall
be updated to reflect the latest knowledge
• The updated report and new findings shall be
brought to a responsible person’s notice
• In general, the follow-up analysis should result
in a report that supports periodic operational
experience reviews and trend analyses as well
as possible.
Examples of different follow-up analysis reports
or their features can be found e.g. in the Swedish
final reports of safety related occurrences (Erics-
son, 1999), in TVO’s analysis summaries of single
events (TVO ASSET, 1998), in detailed TAPREK
event reports of STUK, in the PSALO human fai-
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lure reports (see Appendices), in the description of
regulatory body uses of trend analysis of incident
data (NKS/SIK-1, 1994) and in the plant distur-
bance follow-up analyses carried out by Laakso
(1984).
An example of a follow up analysis of a human
common cause failure studied at root cause level
can found in Appendices.
2.3.9 Ideal model E: Requirements for
periodic operational experience
reviews
The bulk of event investigation data shall be re-
viewed on a regular basis. One way of doing that
is a comprehensive review carried out once every
five (ASSET assessment period) or ten (IAEA’s
recommendation) years to cover all the operatio-
nal events and significant failures that have been
recorded and analysed since the previous corres-
ponding assessment.
However, it is proposed that instead of such
“non-recurring” exercises reviews should be based
on an annual sliding assessment of the past five
(or more) years’ operating experience reports.
Such a review could be carried out in two phases
as follows:
1. A follow-up analysis of operational events iden-
tified and inspected during the preceding (cal-
endar) year in accordance with ideal model D.
2. Classification of the new event data resulting
from the follow-up analysis, updating of statis-
tics, review of the event inspection and failure/
maintenance data acquired during at least the
past five (1 + 4) years period, and compilation
of a review summary report.
The main objective of the review is to identify and
rank the pending safety problems and to come up
with concrete and well justified recommendations
for enhancing the effectiveness of incident preven-
tion. The review shall thus address / take into
account following issues:
• All relevant operating experiences and failure
history data (including those that remained
below the official reporting threshold)
• Dominant event and failure types, related sys-
tems, equipment and structures
• Recurrent events and failures, trend analyses
• CCF mechanisms
• Direct and root causes of those events and fail-
ures
• Status of proposed and approved corrective
and remedial actions
• Effects of completed enhancements and modi-
fications
• Systematic comparison and benchmarking be-
tween the plant units and with other plants
• Identification and ranking of the pending safe-
ty (and other) problems
• Prioritisation of necessary corrective and re-
medial actions based on their expected effects
• The review report and new findings shall be
brought to responsible persons’ notice.
Other proposals:
• Take full advantage of existing follow-up anal-
ysis reports
• Aim at developing a clear and useful classifica-
tion system for events and their causes
• Address specific themes such as particular
systems, activities and procedures, too
• Try to identify operational events from the
maintenance history data (e.g. CCF mecha-
nisms).
Examples of periodic operating experience reviews
or their features can be found in e.g. the TVO self
assessment report of safety performance, safety
problems and safety culture on the basis of opera-
tional events (TVO ASSET, 1998), in the report on
systematic identification and analysis human com-
mon cause failures (Laakso, Pyy & Reiman, 1998),
in the analysis of MTO related events in Swedish
nuclear power plants 1994-1996 (Bento, 1997), in
the description of regulatory body uses of trend
analysis of incident data (NKS/SIK-1 1994), in the
ageing study of the Loviisa power plant plant pro-
tection automation (Simola & Maskuniitty, 1995),
in the report of Experience Based Reliability Cen-
tered Maintenance of MOV drives (Hänninen &
Laakso, 1993), in the CCF analysis of high redun-
dancy systems (Mankamo et al., 1992), in the
trend analyses of LERs and reactor trips at the
Forsmark 2 nuclear power plant (Brolin, 1988 &
1987) and in the report of systematic feedback of
plant disturbance experience in nuclear power
plants (Laakso, 1984).
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2.4 Selected cases and reports
The needs of the operating experience feedback of
the two Finnish nuclear power plants and their
four operating units have resulted in a large
amount of incident inspection reports during their
present life of about 20 calendar years. Due to the
vast extent of available information and rather
limited evaluation resources, the assessment had
to be focused on a smaller number of suitable ca-
ses that could be more thoroughly investigated. In
addition, the sample had to be a representative
one to provide a sound basis for further evalua-
tions. Therefore, an adequate criteria for selection
was needed.
The criteria for the selection of cases for a
detailed review are given below together with
related justifications:
• information on the incident is available, be-
cause the reviews were conducted as follow-up
analyses of selected cases and were not limited
to the structural characteristics of related re-
ports
• in addition to technical problems, also human
and/or organisational factors were involved,
because this study was based on the presump-
tion that the treatment of human and organi-
sational factors is of significant importance to
the quality of investigations
• the event has been investigated according to
valid procedures, because one important objec-
tive of this study was to pay attention to the
strengths and weaknesses of different event
investigation methods and techniques
• the procedures represent “mainstream” inves-
tigation activities in evaluated organisations,
because the main objective of this study was to
evaluate those incident analysis methods and
practices that were actually being applied by
the participating organisations
• the regulatory body has performed an own
investigation of the event, because this was
considered to most feasible way evaluate the
regulator’s methods and practices and to make
comparisons between the utilities and the reg-
ulator.
As a result of an initial screening the following
cases and reports were selected to be thoroughly
assessed:
2.4.1 Olkiluoto NPP cases and reports
• TVO 1. Neutron flux trip limits left too low
after isolation valve capacity test. Dates of
detection: 24.05.1994 and 05.06.1994. Related
documents: Root cause analysis 1-TR-R1-2/94,
Special report 1-TR-R7-1/94, Reactor trip re-
port 1-KK-R6-1/94, ASSET Event Analysis Nos.
27 + 28, STUK TAPREK report 111/ 28.11.1996.
• The ASSET self-assessment and peer review
for operational events occurred during the five
year period of 1993-1997 at Olkiluoto power
plant. Related document: TVO ASSET 1998.
• TVO 2. Oil leakage and fire initiation. Date of
detection 29.1.1998. Related documents: Plant
disturbance report 2-KK-R4-1/98, STUK
TAPREK report 149/25.9.1998.
The ASSET report was selected to avoid bias in an
evaluation in which only a very limited sample of
single event inspection and refined inspection re-
ports were thoroughly assessed. Due to the extent
of the ASSET periodic operating experience re-
view report it was however less thoroughly analy-
sed than any specific event case according to the
requirements of Chapter 2.3. In addition, the rese-
archers got acquainted with a large number other
operational and failure events as well as annual
operating experience utilisation reports that were
compiled during the period of 1993-1998 at Olki-
luoto NPP. This was done to establish a good over-
view of TVO’s investigation and reporting practi-
ces and to avoid the risk of losing an integrated
perspective. That ensemble of reports was howe-
ver not subjected to a rigorous follow-up analysis
and assessment according to the requirements of
Chapter 2.3.
During the course of this study it was observed
that the follow-up analysis of selected cases and
related inspection reports took more time and
resources than originally anticipated. In conse-
quence, TVO’s third case (oil leakage and fire
initiation) was deliberately excluded from the anal-
ysis and cannot therefore be found in Chapter 7.1.
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2.4.2 Loviisa NPP cases and reports
• LO 1. Common cause failure of TL 22 air fans
to start due to incorrect connection diagram.
Date 23.09.1997. Related documents: Opera-
tional Event Report KT 47/97.
• LO 2,1. Unallowed disconnection of back-up
emergency feed-water pump for preventive
maintenance during power operation: Date of
detection: 14.01.1997. Related documents: Root
cause analysis LO1-K863-6, LO2 special report
1/97, KT report 01/97, STUK TAPREK report
134/ 11.06.97.
In addition, the researchers got acquainted with a
large number other operational event, failure, QA
theme inspection as well as annual operating ex-
perience utilisation reports that were compiled du-
ring the period of 1995-1998 at Loviisa NPP. This
was done to establish a good overview of Fortum’s
investigation and reporting practices and to avoid
the risk of losing an integrated perspective. That
ensemble of reports was however not subjected to
a rigorous follow-up analysis and assessment ac-
cording to the requirements of Chapter 2.3.
2.4.3 General
Before case evaluations were started the utility
representatives were asked to comment on the se-
lection criteria and proposed cases. To the revie-
wers’ question “Do these cases and connected
inspection reports provide a true and comprehensi-
ve conception of the inspection of operating events
at your plant?” both utility representatives answe-
red “yes”.
The selected approach facilitated also a com-
parison of the contents of the inspection reports
prepared by the utilities and the regulatory body
on the same incident cases and commenting on
advantages and weaknesses of all parties’ inspec-
tion reports and incident analysis practises. Re-
sults of the analysis and evaluation of the selected
cases are presented in Chapter 7.
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3.1 Finnish nuclear power plants
Finland’s nuclear power plants are located on the
south and west coast of Finland. The state-owned
Fortum Power and Heat Oy, founded in 1998 as a
merger of two Finnish power companies Imatran
Voima Oy and Neste Corporation, operates two
488 MWe VVER-440 type pressurised water reac-
tor units, Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, near the city of
Loviisa. On the west coast of Finland Teollisuuden
Voima Oy (TVO) operates two 840 MWe ASEA-
ATOM type boiling water reactor units, Olkiluoto
1 and Olkiluoto 2, in Eurajoki. Both utilities have
been involved in the process of increasing the
electrical output of their stations over a period of
last four to five years, and the plant modifications
related to the power increase were mainly comp-
leted at the time of this study. The first unit, Lo-
viisa 1, was connected to the national grid in 1977,
and the fourth, Olkiluoto 2, in 1980. These four
reactors generate about 30 % of Finland’s annual
electricity output.
3.2 Finnish nuclear regulation
Regulation of the use of nuclear energy and radia-
tion in Finland is based on the Nuclear Energy Act
(990/87) and the Radiation Act (592/91). Further
requirements are given in Nuclear Energy Decree
(161/88) and the Decision of the Council of State
“General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Po-
wer Plants” (395/91). According to the legislation
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
sets safety requirements and verifies compliance
with them. STUK has in this respect developed a
comprehensive set of safety guides, the so called
YVL-guides, to cover all the major areas of nuclear
power plant operation.
The regulation of nuclear power plants covers
the entire life cycle of each facility, from design to
decommissioning. The primary objective of regu-
lation is to ensure that the reactor remains under
control in all conditions.
The operating organisations have the full and
undivided responsibility for the safety of nuclear
power plants. In accordance with defined inspec-
tion programmes, STUK verifies that their opera-
tions and related support activities are appropri-
ate and in compliance with safety requirements.
STUK emphasises the significance of the users'
voluntary work in ensuring the safety of their
practices. According to STUK’s official position it
would mean failure if shortcomings had to be
rectified by enacting compulsory measures by the
regulator.
3 USE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN FINLAND
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4.1 Managerial framework
4.1.1 Goals, policies and performance
indicators
As part of its supervisory duty the Finnish regula-
tor, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK), follows operational events and event in-
vestigation practices in Finnish nuclear power
plants and conducts its own investigations for se-
lected cases. The general directions regarding the
utilisation of nuclear power plant operational ex-
perience are given in Section 27 of the Decision of
the Council of State (395/91), according to which
operational experience and safety research results
shall be systematically followed and assessed, and
actions to enhance safety on grounds of operatio-
nal experience, safety research and advances in
science and technology shall be implemented. The
decision pertains to the utilities as well as to the
regulator itself. Detailed regulations concerning
the utilisation of operational experiences in Fin-
nish nuclear power plants are given in YVL 1.11
“Nuclear power plant operational experience feed-
back” and YVL 1.5 “Reporting nuclear power plant
operation to the Finnish Centre for Radiation and
Nuclear Safety”1.
The general objective of STUK’s investigation
practice is to support nuclear power plant opera-
tional safety surveillance (YTO 7.4). What does it
mean in practice remained, however, somewhat
vague to the authors of this study. YTO 7.4 did not
contain any additional, more detailed or concrete
definitions, and the representatives of STUK were
not able to give them either during the interview.
In this respect they referred to the content of the
aforesaid Decision of the Council of State as a
basis of their operation.
However, in response to this finding STUK
later provided the authors with the following list
of objectives:
• To maintain guides in relation to event investi-
gation and operating experience utilisation ac-
tivities, and by means of them to support and
direct licensees’ operations in this area without
limiting their own development initiative.
• To ascertain that licensees have adequate prac-
tices for investigating operational events and
utilising operating experiences. This is to be
achieved by inspecting licensees’ event reports
and by comparing their results with the results
of STUK’s own investigations.
• In accordance with licensees’ own objectives, to
identify sufficient corrective measures and to
ensure that events do not recur.
• To find out whether STUK’s activities or their
deficiencies have contributed to the initiation
of occurred events, and to use that information
to improve STUK’s operations.
• To inform the public on occurred events both in
Finland and internationally.
Those goal were not included in YTO 7.4 or any
public document at the authors’ disposal. This was
also admitted by one inspector who also reckoned
that it should be corrected.
The interviewees were also unable to provide a
clear and concise description of STUK’s policy or
approach to pursuing its objectives. On the one
hand, they stressed that instead of “over-regulat-
ing” licensees’ daily activities they would rather
concentrate on setting standards of operation and
identifying major deficiencies to be corrected. On
the other hand, they did not quite seem to rely on
the licensees’ willingness or capacity to take care
of their duties in a proper manner without exten-
4 RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
AUTHORITY
1 Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety is the previous name of the Finnish regulator, STUK, today known as
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. The acronym STUK comes from Säteilyturvakeskus, the Finnish name.
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sive guidance from the regulatory body. These
contradictory findings can be partly explained by
the fact that STUK has got very encouraging as
well as discouraging experiences concerning the
way operational events are investigated and ac-
knowledged in Finnish nuclear power plants. It
can be concluded that this diversity may make it
rather difficult to adhere to any kind of predefined
regulation policy in practice. Nevertheless,
STUK’s investigation activities are based on the
reporting system defined in YVL 1.5, and especial-
ly on the inspection of licensees’ event reports.
The interviewees stressed that the power compa-
nies have the main responsibility for investiga-
tions and the utilisation of investigation results,
and that it is STUK’s duty to make sure that
power companies’ activities comply with the law
and the YVL guides. They also said that STUK
and power companies aim at the same target
although their stake in the investigation process
is different.
STUK does not have any explicit indicators for
assessing the adequacy of its own event investiga-
tion activities. It was reckoned that such indica-
tors could in principle be based on the impact of
STUK’s activities on plant operations but the task
of developing explicit performance indicators was
considered very demanding and difficult by the
interviewees. According to the authors’ conclusion
this difficulty may in part be related to the lack of
specific goals of operation. When this impression
was later presented to the representatives of
STUK they replied that the problem had more to
do with the difficulty of assessing effectiveness by
means of quantitative tools in general rather than
lack of goals. They also claimed that they do have
specific goals of operation although they were not
documented in YTO 7.4.
The interviewees pointed out that in spite of
the absence of explicit performance indicators
STUK is actually paying attention to the influence
of its activities on a more qualitative basis. For
instance, they said that in many cases STUK’s
intervention has resulted in significant and sus-
tainable improvements at plants, and that one
clear sign of such improvements is the degree to
which the utilities engage in new self-initiated
development activities. It was generally agreed
that in the future the indicator system could
possibly be built to measure such enhancements
on site. Another quantitative indicator proposed
in the interviews was the amount of various
clearance requests submitted to the utilities where
a low number of requests would indicate good
performance. Those proposals were, however, not
operational at the time of this study. Neverthe-
less, STUK did monitor the efficiency of its admin-
istrative processes, e.g. handling times for opera-
tional transient reports received from nuclear
power plant.
4.1.2 Organisation and liabilities
STUK’s regulatory activities are organised around
four major departments: Nuclear Waste and Ma-
terials Regulation, Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Radiation Practices Regulation, and Research and
Environmental Surveillance. The Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Department is responsible for monito-
ring the safety of Finnish nuclear power plant
operations (Fig. 9).
The Nuclear Reactor Regulation department
consists of six branches the special areas of which
are reactor and systems engineering, radiation
protection, risk assessment, mechanical engineer-
ing, electrical and I&C systems, and operational
safety. The Operational Safety Branch (KÄY) has
the responsibility for the day-to-day supervision of
plant operations and the investigation of safety
significant operational events.
4.2 Investigation practices
4.2.1 Monitoring and recording of
operational events
STUK monitors operational events at nuclear po-
wer plants by means of resident site inspectors
and a formal reporting system described in
YVL 1.5. In general terms, all operational events
shall be reported to STUK on a regular basis in
daily, monthly, quarterly and annual reports. In
addition, every six months the licensees shall sub-
mit a summary report to STUK on the activities
taken to utilise the operating experience gained at
own and other nuclear facilities. The inspection of
daily reports in on KÄY’s responsibility (YTO 7.4).
On the other hand, the licensees are obliged to
report on all special situations or incidents that
have, or may have, importance to the nuclear,
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personnel or radiation safety. This is done on
event basis by means of special, reactor and tur-
bine scram as well as operational transient re-
ports.
A special report shall provide a comprehensive
description of the incident containing information
e.g. on the operational condition of the plant at the
beginning of the incident, course of events and
their consequences, safety implications, direct and
root causes, and proposed measures to avoid the
recurrence of similar incidents in the future. The
reporting requirements given YVL 1.5 itemise the
following situations as examples of incidents that
necessitate the compilation of a special report:
• plant or general emergency situation,
• violation of the technical specifications or a
shutdown imposed by a requirement in them,
• actuation of the emergency core cooling system
or containment isolation, or unsuccessful
launching of a protective function,
• defect of a system or component characterised
e.g. by increased radioactivity of the reactor
coolant, an exceptional leakage in the primary
circuit, decreased availability of a safety func-
tion, or a repeatedly observed error in an
important instrument related to a safety func-
tion,
• deficiency in safety assessment concerning the
estimated value of the reactor multiplication
factor, the possibility of an unplanned criticali-
ty inside or outside the reactor, or an observa-
tion in an accident analysis which may affect
the safety of operation in some situations,
• radiation incident relating to an uncontrolled
leakage of radioactive substances inside the
plant, individual radiation doses exceeding the
dose limit, or radioactive releases to the envi-
ronment that necessitate corrective measures,
• external incident, e.g. an exceptional natural
phenomenon or other external threat, fire or
explosion on site, or loss of off-site power,
• other incident relating e.g. to a damage of a
fuel bundle, an intentional safety threat to
cause damage to the plant, a significant defect
in the physical protection arrangements, or
defects in the nuclear material accounting,
transportation, storage or disposal.
Figure 9. The organisation of Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority.
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In case of a significant operational event, e.g. an
event classified at INES level 1 or higher, STUK
shall be immediately informed by telephone or ot-
her feasible means (YVL 1.5). Contact persons at
STUK and plants can be reached 24 hours a day.
That information will be submitted to the head of
the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Department, too.
In February 1999 STUK had two resident site
inspectors at Loviisa nuclear power plant and one
site inspector at TVO. An appointment of another
site inspector at TVO took place in April 1999. Site
inspectors spend most of their time on site which
they come to know very well during their long
appointments. The idea of having two inspectors
at each plant is to increase their competence by
allowing them to concentrate on different aspects
of plant operation and equipment. Site inspectors
have a free access to all plant data, and they have
a key role of representing the regulator at plant
during outages and other special situations. Ac-
cording to the interviewees site inspectors’ role in
ascertaining a steady flow of information is of
great importance to STUK’s supervisory practice.
Nevertheless, the monitoring of operational
events is also very much based on plant person-
nel’s own activity on site. Therefore, STUK en-
courages the personnel to pay attention to unusu-
al phenomena and to openly report all safety
significant observations, including errors made in
own work. STUK also stresses the importance of
recording the essential case specific data about
operational events and the conditions during their
occurrence (YVL 1.11).
4.2.2 Assessment and screening of
operational events
KÄY is responsible for the assessment and scree-
ning of operational events in Finnish nuclear po-
wer plants. In principle, all regular reports as well
as operational transient and reactor scram reports
are submitted to STUK as a notice whereas spe-
cial reports need STUK’s approval. The head of
KÄY will read all the reports. Reports are also
distributed to selected offices on the basis of ne-
cessary specialist know-how.
Having received information on an unusual
event KÄY will first assess, together with the
management of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Department, whether there is a need for an imme-
diate intervention and/or other swift measures by
STUK. The main purpose of the initial assessment
of the event it to figure out its immediate safety
implications, and to evaluate its impact on the
possibilities to continue operation or to start-up
the plant again (YTO 7.4). As part of the initial
assessment process STUK may carry out inspec-
tions on site, too. The interviewees were con-
vinced about the competency of the department
management to make sound judgements on the
safety implications of reported events and to de-
cide on necessary measures in a timely manner.
All reported operational events are discussed
once a week in the regular department meeting.
The head of KÄY is responsible for preparing the
presentations for the meeting, and they will be
discussed in the presence of department and other
branch managers. Depending on the characteris-
tics of the event, experts from other branches and
departments of STUK may be consulted (YTO
7.4). According to the normal procedure, a decision
on additional investigations, i.a. the compilation
of the so called TAPREK form, is to be made in
each month’s first department meeting.
YTO 7.4 does not contain any specific direc-
tions for the initial screening and assessment of
operational events: there are no specific criteria
for STUK’s intervention, nor procedure for con-
ducting the initial assessment. It seems, there-
fore, that the reliability of the process is very
much based on the information received from the
plant (provided by the plant organisation as well
as resident site inspectors) and the adequacy of
individual expert judgements at STUK. The re-
porting practices and connections between the
representatives of STUK and the power compa-
nies appear to be well established and reliable.
There is a comprehensive procedure for the
screening and assessment of IRS reports. A nomi-
nated IRS co-ordinator (during the time of the
evaluation an IRS working group was implement-
ed) reads all the reports and submits the interest-
ing ones to a selected group of subject matter
experts. These people in turn will read the reports
and assess their relevance to the Finnish nuclear
power industry. If the findings seem to have
enough relevance, a memo will be prepared and
submitted to the Finnish power companies togeth-
er with the corresponding IRS reports for consid-
eration.
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4.2.3 Analysis of safety significant
incidents
On the basis of a proposal prepared by the Opera-
tional Safety Branch the department management
will decide on the initiation of investigation and
nomination of an investigation team. The nomina-
tion may take place either immediately or later in
the regular department meeting. Especially in
such a case that the power company’s own organi-
sation has not responded to the event according to
confirmed directions or in a proper manner, or
when the event is likely to result in changes in the
plant design (i.e. in systems, equipment or struc-
tures) or documentation (e.g. technical specifica-
tions, operating procedures or maintenance
instructions), an investigation team will be as-
sembled. In addition, the team shall be nominated
whenever the event has been classified at INES
level 1 or higher. (YTO 7.4.)
The main objective of STUK’s inspection team
is to find out the root causes of the incident and to
define necessary corrective measures (YTO 7.4).
The power company is also supposed to carry out
its own studies e.g. to identify how and why the
incident took place, to assess its safety signifi-
cance and rate of occurrence, and to propose
corrective actions. Those results together with all
the necessary supporting documentation and
event data shall be submitted to STUK (YVL 1.11).
STUK’s inspection team will scrutinise the report
and conduct its own inspections on site. The team
will pay special attention to:
• measures taken by the licensee to investigate
the event,
• carrying out of root cause analyses and safety
assessments,
• immediate and long term corrective measures,
• similar events in the past and corrective meas-
ures in relation to those events, and
• impact of the event on STUK’s supervision
(YTO 7.4).
STUK’s incident analysis method is based on the
use of a specific data collection form. The form
was created in 1992 on grounds of “best possible
knowledge, experience and references available at
the time” and it was upgraded in connection with
the introduction of a new computerised event re-
gister database system (TAPREK) in 1996. The
form shall always be completed when the depart-
ment staffing meeting considers the incident to
have specific safety significance and when at least
one of the following six registration principles has
been fulfilled:
• INES level greater than or equal to 1,
• special report has been prepared of the inci-
dent,
• the incident relates to a significant organisa-
tional failure,
• the incident relates to a significant change or
defect in a plant component,
• the incident relates to a significant change or
failure in plant operation, or
• the incident relates to a common cause failure
mechanism (YTO 7.4).
The inspection team will fill the form as part of
the analysis process. The team usually consists of
two or three principal inspectors and one case offi-
cer. Principal inspectors are selected on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account their areas of ex-
pertise and the nature of the incident. The case
officer usually comes from KÄY, and it is on his or
her responsibility to provide the team with metho-
dological support and to make sure that the case
will be adequately completed. One of the main
duties of the case officer is to help inspectors con-
vey their findings in a clear and precise manner
and to make the investigation report readable and
understandable for other members of STUK’s or-
ganisation.
In most event cases there will be no inspection
team but the TAPREK form will be nevertheless
completed. This may be the case e.g. if the causes
of the incident are obvious but there is a reason to
pay special attention to the implementation of
remedial actions and to enter the information into
a computerised database.
The data collection form aims at directing
inspectors’ attention to the essentials of the con-
cerned incident and providing them with a certain
viewpoint to possible influence mechanisms and
performance shaping factors behind the course of
events. Therefore they are supposed to use the
form from the very beginning of the analysis. The
completion of the data collection form is to be done
on the computer, and the system will automatical-
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ly store the information in STUK’s event register
database, TAPREK. Once the form has been com-
pleted, it will be printed and the inspection team
members will sign it. After this the original paper
print will be filed. The results of the study ought
to be brought up for discussion in the Operational
Safety Branch. (YTO 7.4.)
The interviewees were very satisfied with its
present contents and structure. A detailed de-
scription of the data collection form and its use is
given Chapters 7.1 and 7.2 in connection with the
analysis of selected cases and inspection reports.
For an example of the treatment of organisational
factors in the form, see Appendices.
In many cases the power company has already
submitted its own investigation report to STUK
before STUK decides to carry out further inspec-
tions. Therefore, those (operational transient, re-
actor scram, special and root cause analysis) re-
ports are an important source of information for
STUK’s investigation practice. However, the inter-
viewees pointed out that STUK does not take
power companies’ findings and conclusions for
granted but strives for its own interpretation of
the course of events. STUK may also end up with
different conclusions “and often does” as one of the
interviewees reckoned and continued that “a com-
pleted data collection form can by no means be
considered as a copy of previous power company
reports”.
In addition to so called “ordinary” event inspec-
tions based on the use of the data collection form
STUK occasionally conducts comprehensive in-
depth investigations for selected cases. About 10-
20 % of the cases stored in TAPREK have been
subject to that kind of special investigation. The
special investigation usually proceeds in parallel
to the compilation of the data collection form with
no standard method or procedure. According to
the interviewees they present the best possible
know-how available at STUK. In the 1990s STUK
has completed around 20 special investigation
reports.
4.2.4 Utilisation of investigation results
According to STUK’s internal directions given in
YTO 7.4 the incident analysis process shall itemi-
se requirements for corrective measures to be
implemented by the licensee. As part of the inspec-
tion those measures shall be listed in the data
collection form. According to the interviewees the
data file will be kept open while the planning and
implementation of required improvements is in
progress. However, the guide does not provide any
kind of description of the follow-up process to sup-
port and supervise those activities, nor did the
interviewees specify how does it happen in practi-
ce. The licensees themselves are nonetheless re-
quired to have written instructions for the proces-
sing and implementation of proposed recommen-
dations (YVL 1.11).
4.2.5 Data administration and analyses
STUK’s archive contains all the reports prepared
by the two Finnish power companies and sub-
mitted to STUK since the beginning of the Finnish
nuclear program. The computerised TAPREK sys-
tem contains all special reports and operational
events classified at INES 1 or above from the year
1977. In addition, all data collection form based
reports prepared by STUK have been entered into
the system since its introduction in 1992. Special
investigation reports are not in TAPREK because
they comprise drawings, calculations and different
kind of original documentation that are not in
electrical form.
In connection with the processing of a new
operational event the inspection team should
search for indications of corresponding events or
failure mechanisms in the past. Such an indica-
tion should also result in a reassessment of the
event’s rate of occurrence and an evaluation of
previously proposed corrective measures and their
effectiveness. It was estimated that this objective
is met at least to a certain degree, depending on
the case officer’s initiative and personal commit-
ment. However, there is no regular procedure or
practice for analysing the bulk of event investiga-
tion data to identify common case failure mecha-
nisms in a more systematic way. STUK’s internal
directions do not contain any instructions on the
compilation of statistics or the carrying out of
further analyses for recorded failure data, either.
The licensees themselves are, however, required
to have written instructions and adequate ar-
rangements for such procedures (YVL 1.11).
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4.2.6 Reporting
The decision on informing the public and interna-
tional organisations on operational events at Fin-
nish nuclear power plants is made by the manage-
ment of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Depart-
ment of STUK. According to STUK’s directions
INES level 0 events are to be reported on grounds
of a special reason only. Operational events classi-
fied at INES level 1 or higher shall be reported to
the radiation news. All operational events classi-
fied at INES level 2 or higher shall be reported to
IAEA within 24 hours. Events that are to be clas-
sified later due to a need for additional informati-
on and research shall be addressed in STUK’s
Quarterly Report on the operation of Finnish
nuclear power plants. A press release is usually
issued in relation to all safety significant operatio-
nal events, too. (YTO 7.4; YTO 7.5.)
4.2.7 Self-assessment on strengths and
weaknesses
The interviewees told that STUK’s investigation
practice has developed a lot since the foundation
of Operational Experience Branch, the predeces-
sor of the Operational Safety Branch, in 1992.
They were of the opinion that it had had a positive
impact on power companies’ investigation practi-
ces, too, because “the branch forced them to try
harder”. However, the most recent organisational
change at STUK in 1997 may have been an adver-
se movement in this respect. The interviewees
claimed, namely, that the number of their duties
has increased which in turn seems to have re-
sulted in a loss of focus and efficiency. Says a
senior official: “It is another thing to have two
fully competent man to solely concentrate on event
investigation than to deal with one hundred diffe-
rent tasks of which event investigation is just one
among others”. They also estimated that the num-
ber of special investigation reports is about to dec-
rease due to the current division of tasks and du-
ties. The problem is, therefore, that the officials do
not consider to have enough time or possibilities
to conduct ordinary inspections in a proper way.
This, in turn, is likely to decrease the quality of
long-term research activities. On the other hand,
the interviewees pointed out that once an inspecti-
on team is organised it will be granted all the
necessary backing and focus. And they did not
claim that the quality of completed inspection re-
ports had been degraded so far, either.
Another problem reckoned during the inter-
views related to the use of the data collection
form. It appeared that officials working at other
branches than KÄY did not always utilise the
form as efficiently as intended: “... they are filled
out for the bureaucracy’s sake, and supplemented
later”. This was in part attributed to deficiencies
in STUK’s culture and management.
According to the representatives of STUK they
still have a lot to learn in the field of human
factors. They stated that STUK as well as the
power companies do not have enough competence
to analyse human behaviour induced operational
events and failures in a proper manner. A solution
proposed during the interviews was the recruit-
ment of human factors specialists who could fully
concentrate on the issue. So far STUK itself had
relied on engineers in this respect, although under
the recent years a small number of behavioural
scientists have been working on other assign-
ments at STUK.
4.3 Operational preconditions
4.3.1 Human resources and training
Despite the problem of missing focus in the event
investigation practice the interviewees were of the
opinion that they have enough competent person-
nel to take care of their duties. As most nuclear
organisations in the world they also had to cope
with peaking workloads and unexpected assign-
ments which call for an ability to prioritise tasks
and duties.
Learning is mostly based on hands-on training
on the job. New interested inspectors are encour-
aged to join in the investigation practice as team
members. STUK’s inspectors have also attended
MTO and ASSET courses in Finland and abroad.
4.3.2 Manuals and instructions
STUK’s internal directions on operational event
investigation are given in YTO 7.4. At the moment
of this study the guide was under revision, mainly
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
33
due to the previous organisational change. The
guide as well as related YVL-guides were general-
ly considered to be of high quality and adequacy.
The major function of YTO 7.4 is to assist inspecti-
on team members in the compilation of the data
collection. The form and the guide appear to cor-
respond very well to each other.
4.3.3 Information systems support
The basic data concerning safety significant ope-
rational events at Finnish nuclear power plants
together with the investigation results end up in a
computerised event register database, TAPREK.
The first computerised event registration system
was introduced in 1992, and it ran on the famous
VAX computer. The present PC based system was
introduced at the beginning of the year 1996. The
data is stored in a relational database that can be
accessed by a menu-driven graphical user interfa-
ce. The interface supports multiple criteria
queries. At the time of this study the system was
being upgraded to Windows NT operating system.
TAPREK runs on STUK’s local area network
and is accessible from ordinary desktop comput-
ers. All the officials have been authorised to make
queries and read the inspection reports stored in
the database. Inspection team members may
change the contents of their own reports until the
reports have been completed and the correspond-
ing files have been closed. Both open and complet-
ed reports can be retrieved from the database.
In connection with the introduction of the new
system all the officials had an opportunity to
attend special courses. People were sitting in front
of their computers and played with the program
while the lecturer, the main programmer of the
system, provided them with necessary support
and background information. The representatives
of STUK seemed to be rather satisfied with
TAPREK in terms of its functional features and
usability. The interface appeared to be clear and
easy-to-use.
To a certain degree TAPREK does support data
analyses due to its clear user interfaces and the
sophisticated event classification scheme built in
the data collection form. In practice, the search of
common cause failure mechanisms calls for pa-
tience, numerous data retrieval operations and
profound familiarity with the system. It is appar-
ent, however, that instead of the system itself the
absence of well defined investigation result utili-
sation procedures is the main impediment for
better results in this field.
4.3.4 Reviews and development
activities
The first quality manager was appointed to STUK
in 1998. In relation to the emerging quality
assurance function STUK has already evaluated
its instruction maintenance procedures. However,
STUK’s event investigation practice has not been
subject to any deliberate review or audit before
this study.
It appeared that STUK has had some difficul-
ties in its efforts to initiate and foster internal
evaluation programmes. Those difficulties related
e.g. to the functioning of the predecessor of the
Operational Safety Branch, i.e. the Operating Ex-
perience Section, the main duty of which was to
analyse incidents and to pay explicit attention to
STUK’s deficiencies in connection with investigat-
ed cases, too. In particular cases the identification
of deficiencies in other offices’ activities had raised
resistance within the organisation. According to
one interviewee this was one reason for the close-
down of the section and for the introduction of the
latest organisational change.
Criticism is still allowed e.g. by means of the
TARPEK form overlay that has a specific field for
“effects on STUK’s activities” (item 16). However,
in only one report (No. 108/21.11.93) of altogether
17 TAPREK reports reviewed as part of this study
such effects had been identified.
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5.1 Managerial framework
5.1.1 Goals, policies and performance
indicators
The main objectives of Olkiluoto power plant’s (he-
reinafter referred to as TVO) event investigation
practice are to produce information to support
plant operations, to prevent the recurrence of
identified events and failures, and to report to the
regulator (STUK). According to TVO’s internal di-
rections, special attention is to be paid to reducing
the number of operational transients and reactor
trips. In relation to these objectives, TVO empha-
sises the importance of investigating prevailing
practices and existing operating experience, con-
veying the lessons learned to the right persons in
TVO’s organisation, and processing feasible modi-
fication proposals swiftly. (0-S-O-16/2.)
According to the interviewees, TVO’s investiga-
tion policy is based on the principle to carry out
event inspections by subject matter experts in
concerned organisational units to the degree it is
reasonably practicable. This was regarded as a
natural way to integrate the best possible special-
ist knowledge into the investigation practice. In
connection with this objective, both the Operation-
al Safety Branch and the Group for Operating
Experience, i.e. the major stakeholders in the
event investigation and follow-up processes, func-
tion as expert functions to co-ordinate and super-
vise related activities at TVO.
Identified problem areas are to be tackled by
means of specific development campaigns. These
campaigns were introduced as part of efforts to
increase the efficiency of investigation result utili-
sation activities. Usually the question is about an
intensified treatment of pending statement re-
quests in selected offices and branches (see also
ch. 5.2.4).
Because Olkiluoto power plant was designed
and commissioned by ABB-ATOM, TVO works in
close co-operation with Swedish utilities in gener-
al and especially with its sister plants Forsmark 1
and 2. In addition, TVO has been relatively active
with international nuclear energy organisations
such as WANO where TVO is a member. Many of
these joint projects and exercises relate to the
evaluation and development of TVO’s event inves-
tigation methods and practices. An overall impres-
sion is therefore that TVO is in the process of
strengthening its competence in this area.
According to the interviewees, the recurrence
rate of identified failures and defects would proba-
bly be the best measure for the adequacy and
effectiveness of the event investigation practice.
They said that recurrence is an important per-
formance indicator at TVO and that it is being
explicitly followed, too. During the interviews it
appeared, however, that in relation to recurrence
current statistics covered only major plant level
events (such as reactor trips and unplanned pro-
duction losses) while more precise figures on re-
current failure types were said to be missing or
incomplete.
KÄKRY has a specific indicator for its own
operational efficiency. Its value is determined by
the number of new events included into their
follow-up list of open cases, as well as the number
of cases completed (and removed from that list)
during the same period of time, at present one
calendar year. However, the interviewees claimed
that this throughput capacity indicator did not
necessarily tell the whole truth about KÄKRY’s
efficiency. They said that its value was largely
determined by the degree to which the rest of the
organisation was able to proceed with the enquir-
ies and recommendations they had issued in con-
nection with their investigation and follow-up
activities.
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It is probable that e.g. in the long run the
reactor trip rate will be inversely proportionate to
the effectiveness of the operational experience
utilisation process. However, it is the whole organ-
isation and all the activities together, not only the
event investigation practice, that are responsible
for such things as plant performance. Therefore,
and especially from the inspectors point of view
the feedback provided by high level plant perform-
ance indicators may be too general and impracti-
cal to support concrete improvements in event
investigation related activities. This leads to the
conclusion that there are no particular perform-
ance indicators for evaluating the adequacy and
effectiveness of applied event investigation prac-
tices. TVO’s representatives were of the opinion,
however, that it may be very difficult or even
impossible to define a single indicator for that
purpose and that in practice evaluations will have
to be based on several and different kinds of
information sources. In general, both the inter-
viewees and the authors of this study agreed that
performance measurement is a very challenging
topic without clear-cut answers.
5.1.2 Organisation and liabilities
The activities of Olkiluoto power plant have been
organised in three major departments: Producti-
on, Engineering and Finance. Both the Production
and Engineering Departments comprise eight offi-
ces (Power Plant Engineering being a kind of ad-
ministrative unit to co-ordinate the activities of
four engineering offices in the Engineering De-
partment). The Nuclear Safety Office belongs to
the Engineering Department, too. Some offices in
both departments are still divided into smaller
branches. For instance, the Nuclear Safety Office
has specific branches for Operational Safety, Reac-
tor Safety, Reliability, and Radiation Safety. TVO’s
organisation is outlined in Figures 10 and 11.
The major responsibilities in connection with
the operational experience utilisation process at
TVO are held by the Nuclear Safety Office (TR)
and its branches in the Engineering Department,
the Operations Office (KK) and its branches in the
Production Department, and the Group for Oper-
ating Experience (KÄKRY), an inter-departmental
task force involving six members from three dif-
ferent offices in the Production as well as Engi-
neering Departments. The Head of the Nuclear
Safety Office reports to the Engineering Manager,
i.e. his immediate line manager, and also to the
TVO Safety Committee. The Head of the Opera-
tions Office reports to the Production Manager.
Production and Engineering Managers report di-
rectly to the Managing Director of TVO. KÄKRY
reports to the Plant Meeting and the Safety Com-
Figure 10. TVO organisation chart. The Engineering Department.
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Figure 11. The Production Department of TVO.
mittee (0-S-O-16/2). KÄKRY does not have a for-
mal position in the line organisation.
TR has broad responsibilities relating to the
assessment and inspection of operational events
including the examination of identified operation-
al transients and damages, inspection of complet-
ed operational transient, reactor and turbine trip
reports, compilation of special reports, arrange-
ments for the circulation and handling of special
reports at TVO as well as for their submission to
the regulator, co-ordination of root cause analyses,
co-ordination of investigation activities in relation
to external incidents, and introduction of meas-
ures to enhance operational experience utilisa-
tion. Most of these duties are carried out by the
Operational Safety Branch (TRK) of TR. In gener-
al, TR is liable for the safety review of all the
reports that relate to operational transients or
other special situations. (TVO Ordinance, ch. 5.)
The Operations Planning Branch (KKK) of KK
has the general responsibility for the planning
and monitoring of plant operations, supervision of
testing and operability activities in systems and
equipment, identification of LCO related devia-
tions from the Technical Specifications, and super-
vising the implementation of approved modifica-
tions, enhancements and changes in operating
procedures. In addition, KKK co-ordinates investi-
gation activities that relate to TVO’s internal
operational events (TVO Ordinance, ch. 5).
KÄKRY has three representatives from TR
(KÄKRY’s chairman is also the Head of TRK), two
from KKK and one from the Training Office.
KÄKRY is responsible for the handling of signifi-
cant operational events, both internal and exter-
nal, that have been reported and brought to its
consideration. KÄKRY’s main objective is to col-
lect and assess existing operating experiences and
to help transform that information into organisa-
tional learning and practical enhancements by
recommending further actions and following their
implementation. The actual operative responsibil-
ity for the implementation of approved measures
lies in the concerned organisational units. In this
respect KÄKRY has no formal authority. Never-
theless, if they are not satisfied with the progres-
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sion of work they can appeal either to the Plant
Meeting or to the Safety Committee and bring
their concerns up for discussion.
All special and root cause analysis reports and
proposed enhancements related to those incident
reports are handled either in the TVO Plant
Meeting or in the Safety Committee. The Plant
Meeting is responsible for discussing the safety
implications of reported deviations and conse-
quential modification needs to plant systems, pro-
cedures or the Technical Specifications, monitor-
ing ongoing modification projects and issuing rec-
ommendations to the Production Manager. The
Safety Committee concentrates on the drafting,
execution and supervision of general safety and
operating principles by giving recommendations
and statements in nuclear safety and quality
assurance related matters. The recommendations
of the Safety Committee are mandatory and can
be overruled by the decision of the Managing
Director only.
In general, TVO’s management structure in
relation to event investigation activities is rather
decentralised. Responsibilities appear to be de-
fined in great detail, but dispersed in several
branches, groups, meetings and individuals. A
great deal of related progressive failure analysis
responsibilities were assumed by the Nominated
Responsible Engineers (maintenance and opera-
bility foremen) in charge of particular equipment
and systems. Individual accountability was being
emphasized. It was concluded that the practice as
a whole lacked process characteristics and that
the situation posed therefore challenging demands
for the co-ordination of activities and the utilisa-
tion of existing knowledge at TVO. According to
the authors’ impression this view was at least
partly-if not unconditionally-supported by some
representatives of TVO, too. The interviewees
pointed out, however, that the decentralisation of
responsibilities and activities was created by pur-
pose and that the line organisation was neverthe-
less competent of taking care of event investiga-
tions in an appropriate manner as part of its
normal operation.
During the carrying-out of this study TVO
made some changes in relation to its distribution
of liabilities and job descriptions. TVO reappoint-
ed the previous head of TRK who, like his deputy,
also became the Chairman of KÄKRY. The imme-
diate objective of the new Chairman was to as-
sume a larger overall responsibility for TVO’s
event investigation practice and to intensify the
co-ordination of related cross-functional activities.
These most recent measures were clearly aimed
at emphasising the process nature of the practice
and developing the process ownership concept at
TVO.
5.2 Investigation practices
5.2.1 Monitoring and recording of
operational events
According to TVO’s safety and quality policy all
the employees are obliged and encouraged to re-
port on their own failures and other observed devi-
ations on site. This is usually done by reporting to
the immediate line manager. The actual event re-
cording practice consists of different reporting pro-
cedures and tools depending on the nature of the
event.
The Operations Office and its branches have
the major responsibility for the monitoring of
plant operations and reporting on operational
transients. The Operations Branch of the con-
cerned unit (Olkiluoto 1 or Olkiluoto 2) is liable for
the compilation of operational transient and reac-
tor trip reports. Report drafts shall be submitted
to the Heads of KKK and TRK for inspection, and
to the Head of KK for approval (0-KC-00-47/8).
Observations of defects in plant components
(i.e. systems, equipment or structures) that re-
quire repair shall be entered into the computer-
ised Work Order System (TTJ) as notices of de-
fects. Dominantly such defects that do not necessi-
tate formal reporting to the regulator in accord-
ance with YVL 1.5 are entered into the system.
These defects may have and have in a number of
cases also importance to safety or availability It is
characteristic of a defect that it has either result-
ed in a malfunction or breakdown of a device or
structure, or that it has potential for doing so
under certain circumstances (latent failure). TTJ
also contains corresponding work orders, failure
reports and related supplementary clarifications.
Compared to events reported by means of opera-
tional transient, reactor trip or special reports,
failures entered into the TTJ system are numer-
ous and dominantly of minor safety significance.
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If the failure significance is classified as an imme-
diate Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO), the
failure shall be reported in the plant quarterly
report to STUK in an inspection report description
similar to foreign Licensee Event Reports (LER)
after initial notification in the daily report.
In case of a non-technical failure, e.g. a wrong
order or procedure, there are various possibilities
depending on the context or consequences of the
incident or error. Different reporting practices
exist e.g. for process near-misses, labour accident
and protection deficiencies, outage related events,
and deficient instructions. There was no general
purpose form overlay or procedure for the record-
ing or treatment of such cases, except the estab-
lished updating routine of changes in operating
procedures. The process near-miss reporting ap-
peared to be a relatively new practice at TVO.
TVO has two nominated responsible engineers
(NREs) to monitor existing operating experience.
One is responsible for internal (NREI) and anoth-
er one for external (NREE) operational events.
They were responsible for bringing up operational
events and important deficiencies at Olkiluoto
NPP as well as in other nuclear facilities for
discussion in KÄKRY. The NREE was also the
Chairman of KÄKRY and the Head of TRK at the
time of this study.
The deputy Head of TRK told that TVO as a
whole did not have particularly well co-ordinated
or disciplined procedures for the recording of devi-
ations which, in his opinion, made it difficult to
handle all available information. Given the large
number of possible information sources and re-
porting formats his comment did sound under-
standable. However, the Head of TRK did not
share his deputy’s view in this matter2. The au-
thors’ impression is that while important opera-
tional events and “ordinary” technical failures are
likely to be detected and recorded in a reliable
manner, the case with those observations and
events that cannot be easily classified into any
particular category is not that clear. This also
relates to the further assessment of those cases
(see the next Chapter).
5.2.2 Assessment and screening of
operational events
KÄKRY is responsible for the assessment and sc-
reening of operational events at TVO. Most of the
cases discussed in KÄKRY are provided by the
two NREs responsible for internal and external
events. However, anyone at TVO’s organisation
may propose a case of his or her selection to be
considered in KÄKRY.
KÄKRY handles all operational event reports
that relate to internal operational events at TVO
(0-S-O-16/2). They include operational transient,
reactor and turbine trip, special and root cause
analysis reports as well as reports on failures that
have resulted in an immediate LCO situation (i.e.
similar to LERs). All those official event reports
shall be submitted to the regulator. KÄKRY also
handles major defects and failures in plant sys-
tems and equipment on grounds of their assessed
importance to plant safety or availability. Those
failures, including failures that have caused an
immediate LCO situation, are screened from the
TTJ information system by the NREI. In addition,
attention is paid to process near-misses and other
important observations such as outage incidents
and labour protection problems. It was noted that
nowadays more than half of all the cases on
KÄKRY’s agenda relate to such internal events
that remain below the official reporting criteria
specified in YVL 1.5.
With regard to external events, KÄKRY as-
sesses Loviisa power plant’s operational experi-
ence reports and all important foreign incidents.
Special attention is paid to operational events
that have occurred at Swedish BWR plants.
Through the screening, assessment and reporting
services of ERFATOM and KSU3 TVO has access
to all Swedish operational licensee event and
reactor trip reports (the so called RO and SS
2 Both the current Head of TRK and his deputy participated in the interviews which were in different occasions. Since the
results and conclusions of this study are largely based on the information gathered through interviewing key personnel on
site, special attention has been paid to producing a true and comprehensive review of their conceptions. In some cases, e.g.
in the absence of a common position, a more detailed presentation of individual views and opinions has been considered
necessary for justifying the results of the analysis.
3 ERFATOM and KSU are Sweden based NPP operating experience research organisations that co-operate with utilities,
major system vendors, authorities and international nuclear energy organisations.
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
39
reports) as well as to selected NRC reports. In
addition, TVO gets all IRS and WANO reports
(TVO is a member of WANO), and technical infor-
mation from major vendors such as ABB Atom and
ABB Stal. Also STUK submits all IRS reports to
TVO.
In general, TVO’s event recording and assess-
ment practice of internal and external events
appears to consist of three different main tracks:
one operational events such as reactor trips and
operational disturbances, one for technical defects
and component failures, and one for other devia-
tions and “non-technical” events4. KÄKRY is not
responsible for all those activities since also the
line organisation and its offices as well as individ-
ual system and equipment responsible foremen
and technical experts have their stake in the
process.
Internal and external operational events
The NREE nominates a person in charge for each
new external case that is to be taken under
KÄKRY’s surveillance (0-S-O-16/2). His or her
task is to carry out a kind of preliminary scrutiny
by getting acquainted with the case and gathering
more information by consulting personnel that
have a good knowledge of the concerned systems,
equipment or phenomena. In the next KÄKRY
meeting he or she will then present the case to
other KÄKRY members to initiate discussion. ER-
FATOM and KSU report on their findings by me-
ans of weekly and monthly summary reports
which are handled according to the same procedu-
re. A person providing a statement will be ap-
pointed from appropriate organisational unit(s) for
cases that seem to require further processing at
TVO. Most important cases, e.g. major incidents,
are normally presented to the Plant Meeting once
the information has reached KÄKRY.
The main objective of KÄKRY is to scan
through the bulk of events and observations and
to assess their relevance to different technical
disciplines. In practice, KÄKRY operates by hold-
ing meetings and discussing the cases on their
follow-up list, requesting statements and clarifica-
tions, recommending corrective actions and fol-
lowing their implementation. On grounds of exist-
ing evidence it can be reckoned that events on
KÄKRY’s agenda are subject to a systematic
screening, assessment and follow-up activities.
However, this has not always been the case with
novel internal events, e.g. observations of potential
deficiencies or error situations that have not yet
been analysed or reported by means of any formal
procedure (e.g. resulting in an operational tran-
sient report). It was concluded that in this respect
TVO’s data acquisition and analysis activities
lacked systematisation.
Technical defects and failures
There is a clear procedure for the recording and
processing of defects and failures that can be easi-
ly attributed to a particular system, equipment or
structure. Such defects are reported through the
computerised TTJ system, and the necessary ad-
ministrative liabilities in relation to repairing and
reporting practices are described in great detail in
TVO’s procedures (i.a. in 0-KC-00-76/0 and 0-KC-
U3-21/2). Each equipment and system has its own
Nominated Responsible Maintenance Foreman,
and he or she is responsible for the functioning of
the concerned device. They carry out a great deal
of TVO’s data collection and assessment activities
as part of their everyday duties. This decentra-
lised system allows high technical specialisation
but issues challenges for information exchange,
task co-ordination and the conformity of assess-
ment practices and results. The defects and failu-
res that necessitate official reporting to the regu-
lator (e.g. by means of LERs or special reports) are
however brought up for discussion in the KÄKRY
Screening Meeting by NREI.
Other deviations and non-technical events
When it comes to the assessment of other devia-
tions and especially new “non-technical” events,
the situation seems to be more cumbersome. It
was concluded that until recently the reporting
and assessment procedure for observations of po-
tential deficiencies (e.g. inadequate working prac-
tices, planning errors etc.) that do not fulfil the
4 The categorisation reflects authors’ observations and conceptions and is not directly based on TVO’s documentation or
official position. In addition, identified categories are not mutually exclusive, i.e. a technical failure may also result in an
operational event requiring official reporting and always another kind of internal documentation and treatment.
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special reporting criteria, nor relate to any specific
system or equipment (i.e. technical) failure, has
been defective. For instance, TVO’s event investi-
gation instructions reviewed by the authors of this
study did not specify any such practices or pro-
cedures. TVO’s outage and labour protection re-
porting practices have partly compensated this de-
ficiency, but only partly since their applicability
area is rather limited when compared to the ex-
tent and diversification of possible plant level
problems and phenomena (such as organisational
deficiencies etc.). However, the recently imple-
mented process near-miss reporting practice has
potential to become an efficient tool in this respect
provided that it can be properly established into
regular use. All process and labour protection
near-miss reports and outage event reports are
handled in the KÄKRY Screening Meeting.
Summary
In consequence, one could say that instead of one
common recording and assessment procedure TVO
had several concurrent tracks for different events
and deviations. It was difficult to perceive how
those tracks related to each other because there
was no plant level document to illustrate their
mutual interconnections. Identified deficiencies
related mainly to non-transparent and complex
procedures, task co-ordination and the exchange
of information in relation to the assessment of
technical defects and failures, and to the treat-
ment of “non-technical” failures of uncertain safe-
ty importance (although improvement was being
made). However, according to the authors’ impres-
sion the assessment and classification of operatio-
nal events was conducted according to the repor-
ting requirements issued by the regulator in
YVL 1.5.
The representatives of TVO had recognised
some of these problems, too. The deputy Chair-
man of KÄKRY noted that in general the treat-
ment of man-technology-organisation related is-
sues has not been very systematic under the
recent years. With regard to the treatment of
“other deviations” TVO had reacted by developing
a standard form overlay for the recording and
assessment of all process errors and deviations,
including those that do not require the compila-
tion of an official event report. These measures
were taken during the course of this study in 1999
and resulted in the introduction of the process
near-miss reporting practice. The idea was partly
based on their experiences from the recent labour
protection campaigns in which near-miss inci-
dents and safety hazards detected during outages
were recorded by means of a specific data collec-
tion form and analysed afterwards. They also
referred to the experience of Loviisa power plant
in the appliance of so called Operational Event
reporting practice (see ch. 6.2.1 and 6.2.2).
5.2.3 Analysis of safety significant
incidents
According to the official reporting requirements
issued by STUK in YVL 1.5, safety significant ope-
rational events and situations (hereinafter refer-
red to as incidents) are to be investigated and
reported to the regulator by means of special re-
ports. A special report shall be prepared e.g. when
the incident has importance to plant, personnel or
environmental safety, or when the technical speci-
fications have been subject to violations. Examp-
les of such incidents are itemised in Chapter 4.2.1.
Those requirements are mandatory and apply to
all Finnish nuclear facilities.
At TVO, the Head of the Nuclear Safety Office
determines whether there is a need for a special
report. The Operational Safety Branch (TRK) will
have the responsibility for the compilation of the
report (0-KC-00-47/8).
According to the interviewees, inspections are
conducted in teams and their members are select-
ed on case-by-case basis depending on the neces-
sary know-how and authority. Usually at least one
subject matter expert from the Operations Office
participates in the work. He or she can be e.g. one
of the Branch Heads or the shift supervisor who
was in charge at the time of the incident. In case
of a maintenance related incident the co-ordinat-
ing foreman would most certainly be a member of
the inspection team etc. The general objective is,
therefore, to mobilise the front line employees,
foremen and subject matter experts and to make
them conduct the necessary inspections and write
the report to the extent it is reasonable and
possible. TRK concentrates on the co-ordination of
activities and provides the necessary specialist
know-how and support.
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Special reports reviewed during this study ap-
peared to be organised according to the reporting
requirements specified in YVL 1.5. In short, the
reports consisted of a concise summary of the
incident, and sections on event description, safety
assessment, cause analysis, and measures to avoid
recurrence. A detailed analysis of one selected
case and related inspection reports is given in
Chapter 7.1.
Special reports are to be inspected by the Head
of the Nuclear Safety Office (TR) and the Heads of
other “concerned offices” having to do with the
incident in question. Usually they involve at least
the technical offices in charge of affected systems
or equipment, the Operations Office in case of
failures in plant operations or the operating in-
structions, or the Maintenance Services and/or
Modification Planning Offices if the incident re-
lates to, or has resulted from errors in repair,
maintenance or modification works. Finally, the
report is endorsed by the Production Manager.
Each special report must be discussed in the Plant
Meeting and in the Safety Committee. (0-KC-00-
47/8.)
During the interviews special attention was
paid to the identification and treatment of recur-
rent failures and common cause failure (CCF)
mechanisms. According to the Head of TRK the
Case Officer in charge of the report will have to
conduct an assessment on the event’s recurrence.
In case of an operational transient or reactor trip
the shift supervisor is the first one to make an
assessment. If the operational event includes a
deviation from the Technical Specifications the
report shall also contain an assessment on possi-
ble CCF mechanisms involved in the case. The
assessments are to be conducted in connection
with the analysis of related data and the drafting
of the report. The Head of TRK was of the opinion
that the assessment worked sufficiently well.
It appeared, however, that the interviewees did
not share a common view on how recurrence and
CCF mechanisms were being handled at TVO.
According to the authors’ comprehension some
interviewees did not seem to know much about
the issue while others claimed that related activi-
ties were not systematic. TVO’s internal event
reporting instruction 0-KC-00-47/8 did not explic-
itly address recurrence or CCF mechanisms, ei-
ther, and it did not specify those situations in
which a special report shall be compiled (although
a reference to the formal reporting requirements
issued in YVL 1.5 was given5). In consequence, the
authors found it difficult to form a clear picture of
how historical recurrence and CCF mechanisms
were actually being searched for and investigated
as part of TVO’s event investigation activities.
When this impression was later presented to the
representatives of TVO it resulted in two kinds of
comments. On the one hand, it was reckoned that
the issue was indeed unclear for them and that it
resulted from their “inability to detect recurrent
failures whereupon also the need for reporting did
not exist”. On the other hand, it was commented
that “the criteria have been specified in the Tech-
nical Specifications and they are the same as in
YVL 1.5” and that “in consequence, there should
not be any uncertainties”.
According to TVO’s instructions a root cause
analysis shall be conducted for complex incidents
that have specific importance to plant safety, or
relate to significant organisational deficiencies
that have not been sufficiently analysed as part of
other inspection and reporting practices (e.g. spe-
cial reports). The main objective of the analysis is
to find out those deficiencies and weaknesses in
TVO’s operation that need to be corrected so that
the recurrence of identified incidents can be pre-
vented. At the time of this study, MTO was TVO’s
root cause analysis method. (0-S-O-23/1.)
The Plant Meeting, Safety Committee or
KÄKRY may decide on the preparation of a root
cause analysis report. According to TVO’s internal
directions KÄKRY nominates the Case Officer
and other inspection team members for each root
cause analysis project on case-by-case basis. The
Head of TRK will have the main responsibility for
the initiation of the analysis and other adminis-
trative arrangements. For instance, if an external
consultant is to be nominated to the post of Case
Officer, the Head of TRK shall take care of re-
questing tenders and making contracts in accord-
ance with the standard procurement procedure.
(0-S-O-23/1.)
KKK shall have the responsibility for co-ordi-
nating plant operations related investigations.
5 In TVO’s instruction for the treatment of failure and maintenance data (0-KC-U3-21/2) recurrence and CCF mechanisms
were mentioned, however.
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The Case Officer is liable for making sure that the
incident will be properly analysed and reported
within the approved timetable (0-S-O-23/1). Ac-
cording to the deputy Head of TRK there were two
persons at TVO who had a good knowledge and
understanding of the MTO analysis and could
therefore lead the project. Altogether 29 persons
had attended an elementary MTO course.
At the time of this study TVO was in the
process of evaluating and developing its event
investigation practices and methods. On grounds
of the encouraging experiences gained from the
recent ASSET self-assessment (October 1997–Sep-
tember 1998) and peer review (November 1998)
exercises, KÄKRY had decided to bring ASSET
into regular use. The idea was to use ASSET for
the follow-up analyses of completed event inspec-
tion reports and to laying foundations for more
systematic and efficient periodic operating experi-
ence reviews. However, MTO will remain TVO’s
principal root cause analysis method. MTO has
been and will be used for in-depth analyses of
most significant incidents and operational events.
The MTO analysis procedure has been de-
scribed in great detail in the instructions and
includes the following phases:
• data acquisition (i.a. instructions, reports, log
files, flow diagrams etc.),
• interviews,
• task analysis (how were different working stag-
es executed, what were the major problems),
• sequence and cause analysis (the course of
events in a chronological order, direct causes),
• deviation analysis (what are the differences
between the concerned failure and successful
cases),
• barrier analysis (the functioning of both ad-
ministrative and technical barriers), and
• results and corrective measures (0-S-O-23/1,
Appendix 1).
The MTO method has been originally developed
from the HPES method by the Swedish utilities
and KSU. MTO is a method for analysing inci-
dents that involve complex Man-Technology-Orga-
nisation (i.e. MTO) interactions. It is based on the
presumption that the human being is an integral
part of any control system and that many safety
and/or reliability problems result from the fact
that human beings have not been taken into ac-
count in an appropriate manner in systems de-
sign, operation, or maintenance. The MTO analy-
sis focuses especially on the identification of hu-
man and organisational factors behind the inci-
dent and aims at their removal by means of prac-
tical action proposals. The MTO report shall con-
tain a sequence, cause and barrier analysis type of
diagram to illustrate how and why the incident
did take place. The idea is that the inspection
results (event sequences, direct causes, deviations
and breaking barriers) are embedded into the dia-
gram to show the relationships of different contri-
buting factors and their impact on the course of
undesired events.
The Head of TRK reports on the progression of
the analysis to other concerned organisational
units as well as to KÄKRY and sometimes to the
Plant Meeting. Once the root cause analysis re-
port has been completed, it is signed by the Case
Officer, inspected by the Head of TRK, the Head of
the Quality Assurance Office (TQ), and the Heads
of other concerned offices (like in case of a special
report, see above), and finally approved by the
Head of TR. KÄKRY maintains a list of incom-
plete root cause reports. TR is responsible for
archiving the complete ones. (0-S-O-23/1.)
Despite the thorough root cause analysis pro-
cedure investigation practices themselves ap-
peared to be relatively informal. First of all, a
quick review of the most recent root cause analy-
sis reports (since the year 1994) revealed that
they did not contain explicit method descriptions
of how the inspection process had been carried
out. A reference to the MTO methodology was
always given, however. Event descriptions ap-
peared to be clear and informative but often in
writing only since graphical presentations, i.a. the
MTO diagrams, were missing from the most re-
cent reports. In this respect the older ones ap-
peared to be more carefully compiled. When this
remark was later presented to the representatives
of TVO, the Head of TRK-who had personally
participated in most root cause analysis projects
at TVO-commented that from an expert’s point of
view the use of the MTO graphical diagrams does
not necessarily bring in any added value to the
investigation process. He continued that subject
matter experts do not perceive or analyse event
sequences or their causes through such diagrams
but admitted that graphical diagrams in general
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may facilitate teamwork and the transfer of infor-
mation to other parties. In this respect the re-
port’s purpose of use was said to determine its
outfit.
Another interesting issue was the astonishing-
ly low number of completed (MTO) root cause
analysis reports: the latest report at the authors
disposal was dated on June 25, 1997. The inter-
viewees reckoned that since the interviews re-
quired by the MTO procedure are generally re-
garded as “displeasing”, people have not been
eager to resort to the method unless necessary.
Another explaining factor is that one of TVO’s key
persons with a significant stake in the event
investigation practice was on a foreign assign-
ment for one year which resulted in a temporary
shortage of trained analysts. It is therefore specu-
lated that due to the relatively demanding, time-
consuming and delicate inspection process re-
quired by MTO TVO has not carried out as many
root cause analyses as it would have possibly done
had the investigation procedure been a bit more
straightforward and less burdensome. When
asked about the degree to which completed root
cause analyses had been conducted according to
the formal instructions, many interviewees did
not really know. They supposed, however, that the
analyses were most probably conducted “in the
spirit of the MTO procedure”.
In general, the interviewees appeared to be
fairly critical about their investigation practices.
It was reckoned, for instance, that the results of
the MTO analysis were all too much dependent on
the author of the report. One engineer said that
inspection reports have often remained on the
level of “a descriptive record of events” and contin-
ued that the question of incident prevention has
not been sufficiently addressed. He claimed that
“further measures are of superficial nature and
very concisely specified like ‘more training’ or
‘change the instruction’ and that’s it”. He saw
much space for improvement in this respect. One
the other hand, most of the interviewees seemed
to be rather satisfied with the ASSET methodolo-
gy especially because of its clear structure and the
straightforward assessment procedure. They were
excited about the adjoining software package to
support e.g. event classifications and reporting of
pending safety problems. They also said that the
ASSET exercise revealed “all sort of new things
that had not been noticed before”.
The official event reporting practice, i.e. the
compilation of special, operational transient, and
reactor and turbine scram reports, covers the
entire operating life of the plant. Root cause
analyses have been carried out from the year
1992.
5.2.4 Utilisation of investigation results
All internal event reports are to be assessed in the
KÄKRY Screening Meeting. They include opera-
tional transient, reactor and turbine trip, special
and root cause analysis reports and LERs (i.e. re-
ports that are also submitted to the regulator) as
well as reports on other important internal devia-
tions such as process or labour protection near-
misses. The external event reports assessed in the
Screening Meeting include i.a. selected WANO,
IRS and NRC reports, and all ERFATOM and
KSU summary reports that contain information
i.a. on recent operational events and noteworthy
operability, design and operating and maintenan-
ce practice problems detected at Swedish BWR
plants.
All special reports are also presented and dis-
cussed in the Plant Meeting and in the Safety
Committee. Organisational problems that have
been detected during the analyses (e.g. as a result
of a root cause analysis) are handled either in the
Plant Meeting or in the Safety Committee.
An overview of TVO’s investigation result utili-
sation process and KÄKRY’s main responsibilities
are presented in Figure 12. KÄKRY assesses com-
pleted event reports (as described in ch. 5.2.2),
puts interesting ones on follow-up list(s), requests
statements and further clarifications from con-
cerned organisational units (i.e. offices and
branches), recommends corrective actions and fol-
lows their implementation. KÄKRY may also initi-
ate a root cause analysis process on the basis of its
own justification.
KÄKRY’s follow-up lists contain information on
requests and recommendations that relate to
• significant operational transients and events
that require special reporting,
• events that are to be, or have been, investigat-
ed through the root cause analysis procedure,
• defects and functional deficiencies that have
resulted in an immediate LCO situation,
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Figure 12. Utilisation of investigation results at TVO: an overview of KÄKRY’s main duties. NREI and
NREE are Nominated Responsible Engineers for internal and external events, respectively.
• other noteworthy operational experiences (e.g.
outage incidents or process near-misses), and
• significant external operational events (0-S-O-
16/2).
In general, the follow-up lists had a clear and in-
formative structure. Cases were entered into tab-
les with specific columns for case information, ac-
tions, person in charge, responsible organisation,
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dead-line and remarks. The actions column con-
tained information on necessary or already appro-
ved measures but not on their actual implementa-
tion status (the remarks column identified the clo-
sing date of the case but no explicit note on whet-
her the corresponding measures had been actually
completed was given). Events removed from the
active list of open cases were deepened but still
readable.
Enhancement proposals are submitted to the
heads of concerned offices who will decide on the
commencement of work (0-S-O-16/2). Modifica-
tions shall be handled according to TVO’s plant
modification procedure. Modifications in safety
significant systems, plant processes or Technical
Specifications, as well as significant modifications
in the functioning or structure of the organisation
shall also be discussed in the Plant Meeting and
the Safety Committee, and endorsed by the Pro-
duction Manager (TVO Ordinance, ch. 5; TVO QA
Handbook, ch. 10; 0-S-O-23/1). Although KÄKRY
supervises the processing and implementation of
recommended actions, the concerned organisa-
tional units (offices) have the full operational
responsibility for all works. At least four times a
year KÄKRY assembles for a special follow-up
meeting to scan through the cases on their lists
and to update their processing status. In relation
to the most significant issues KÄKRY has initiat-
ed the so called “top 10” list that is also regularly
discussed in the Plant Meeting.
The responsibilities and practices for the eval-
uation of the adequacy and effectiveness of imple-
mented actions and enhancements remained
somewhat unclear, however. According to the in-
terviewees implementation is followed until “there
is no need for additional measures”. They said
that when it comes to a plant modification the
case is usually closed once the corresponding
Modification Proposal (i.e. the so called ME form)
has been completed and approved. They noted,
too, that after this the issue will be addressed
again if the problem recurs whereupon also the
proposed and implemented corrective measures
will be re-evaluated.
It was concluded that the follow-up procedure
was mainly adjusted to support KÄKRY’s own
administration rather than the actual implemen-
tation status or effectiveness of proposed and
implemented actions. The submission of a state-
ment request or an action proposal to a particular
office is clearly a kind of break-point in the proc-
ess because it is here where KÄKRY’s authority
ends. In principle KÄKRY could pay more atten-
tion to the actual implementation process but on
the other hand one can ask if it is really worth the
additional effort in the absence of more influential
means of operation. Decentralised liabilities to-
gether with the lack of efficient procedures for
managing cross-functional activities raise there-
fore questions about the effectiveness of prevail-
ing result utilisation practices at TVO. Recent
theme specific development campaigns have how-
ever alleviated this problem e.g. by providing
means for reducing the backlog of pending re-
quests and action proposals in particular offices
and by providing KÄKRY with a firmer stake in
the process. In addition, the developing process
ownership concept may actually provide a sound
basis for the management and co-ordination of
cross-functional activities at TVO. Within the
framework of this study it was not possible, how-
ever, to evaluate how well these arrangements
work in practice. Anyway, the results of the recent
ASSET exercise suggest that still more emphasis
should be given i.a. to implementing remedial
actions.
5.2.5 Data administration and analyses
According to the formal reporting requirements
issued in YVL 1.5, each licensee shall submit an
annual report on the operation of its plants during
the previous calendar year to the regulator by
March 1 the following year. The report shall in-
clude a description of the licensee’s activities in
relation to the utilisation of operational experien-
ce (e.g. initiated research and development pro-
jects) and safety studies. Such a report is prepa-
red annually by TVO and Fortum, and it is one of
their major instruments for gathering and analy-
sing their existing operating experience.
At TVO the data analysis process (i.e. the
process to analyse the bulk of investigation data)
can be roughly divided into two activity areas: the
analysis of failure data and the analysis of exist-
ing operational event data. In this context failure
data refers to the information that is mainly
stored and retrieved by means of the computer-
ised TTJ system. It contains information (e.g.
46
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
notices of defects, work orders and failure reports)
on all kinds of technical failures.
The failure reports are to be systematically
followed by persons that are responsible for plant
equipment and systems. According to TVO’s inter-
nal directions they shall meet in their quarterly
meeting to analyse the reports and to prepare a
memorandum on their findings and proposed fur-
ther clarifications and corrective measures. In
addition, the processing status of previously re-
quested clarifications and proposed measures
shall be covered and entered into the memoran-
dum. Special attention is to be paid to human
errors as well as to the analysis of latent and
recurrent failures. The memorandum shall be
inspected by the Head of the Maintenance Servic-
es Office and the branch head(s) of the concerned
technical office(s), and finally returned to the
Production Services Office where it is filed (0-KC-
U3-21/2). The former Head of TRK noted, howev-
er, that although the procedure has already been
drafted “the reality and the instructions do not
quite meet so far”. He continued that they were in
the process of putting the procedure into practice.
Twice a year failures in selected systems and
components are transferred to the Nordic TUD6
failure information database maintained by Swed-
Power AB (formerly Vattenfall Energisystem AB)
in Råcksta, Sweden. In addition to TVO, also
Barsebäck, Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals
(i.e. all the Swedish NPPs) enter their failure data
into the system. TVO has utilised the system to
support various data analyses, e.g. in relation to
the identification and assessment of CCF mecha-
nisms in diesel generators, pressure relief valves
and control rod actuators. It was concluded, how-
ever, that such analyses had been so far based on
particular investigation needs rather than a regu-
lar practice.
The TUD system would provide a good basis
for regular and comprehensive failure data re-
views. For instance, every 2–4 years the Swedes
process the failure information into a form of an
equipment reliability handbook, or the so called T-
Boken, that contains information i.a. on compo-
nents’ average failure frequencies and repair
times, and their uncertainty distributions. TUD
database is equipped with a graphical user inter-
face to support data retrieval, classification and
presentation operations, and it can be accessed
directly from TVO over the Internet.
The practices to analyse the bulk of existing
operational event data stored by means of opera-
tional transient, reactor and turbine trip, special
and root cause analysis reports were not as clearly
described as those relating to the analysis of TTJ
failure data. For example, the procedure for the
treatment of operational event reports (0-S-O-16/
2) did not directly refer to any systematic follow-
up analyses or periodic reviews. In practice the
treatment appeared to be based on the compila-
tion of various summary reports such as the
annual operating experience utilisation report. In
addition, TVO has prepared concise periodic sum-
mary analysis reports on reactor trips for internal
working group use and identification of recur-
rence.
Another question is, however, to what extent
possible recurrent or common cause failures can
be identified by those arrangements. According to
the Head of TRK the arrangements were suffi-
cient. However, it must be emphasized that
KÄKRY concentrates on the analysis of single
event reports once they have been completed and
brought to its handling-not report archives or
databases-although in connection with particular
operational events and technical failures KÄKRY
had also analysed historical recurrence. Secondly,
periodic summary analysis reports were not con-
ducted on a regular basis, nor comprised any
follow-up analyses (i.e. additional studies to up-
grade the earlier event reports). Thirdly, TVO’s
operational event reports did not include any
formal classification model for identified conse-
quences, their causes or involved systems, and
many interviewees did not consider that neces-
sary, either. The authors’ view is, however, that an
adequate classification system would enhance the
efficiency of data analyses by contributing to the
identification of recurrence and CCF mechanisms,
and for identification of remedial action needs,
especially when the report archive grows larger.
The recent ASSET mission was however a
major step forward. For the first time a large and
comprehensive ensemble of completed event re-
ports were subjected to a systematic review at
6 TUD comes from Swedish words Tillförlitlighet, Underhåll och Drift = Reliability, Maintenance and Operation.
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TVO. TVO has also announced its intention to
apply the method to the follow-up analysis of all
operational experience reports brought to
KÄKRY’s consideration, and to conduct similar
operating experience reviews also in the future.
ASSET will enhance TVO’s capabilities to detect
and investigate recurrent causes and common
cause failures mainly because of its support to
event classifications and quantitative data analy-
ses.
Some of the interviewees tended to agree with
the authors’ comprehension of the current situa-
tion, too. The deputy Chairman of KÄKRY con-
firmed that “KÄKRY does not usually analyse
historical or concurrent recurrence” and continued
that he did not know whether somebody else was
doing it, either. He said that in the absence of a
systematic practice recurrent events have been
mainly identified randomly in particular situa-
tions. Another interviewee told that “we are still
waiting for a more systematic follow-up proce-
dure. In case of an event one usually knows
whether there has been similar events in the past
but they are not subject to any regular scrutiny”.
The conclusion is therefore that until recently
TVO has not had well-established and systematic
practices for the identification of CCF mecha-
nisms or recurrence in the operational experience
data. Attention is paid to recurrence, too, but
mostly in connection with particular operational
events, not by means of comprehensive data anal-
ysis methods. In this respect the introduction of
ASSET will however change the situation. A for-
mal procedure for analysing the existing failure
data did exist at the time of this study, although it
was not yet fully operational and did not include
detailed instructions for CCF detection in practice
(recurrent causes and CCF mechanisms were
however addressed in the procedure). In connec-
tion with the treatment of failure data the prevail-
ing information technology based tools (such as
TTJ and TUD) appeared to work well.
5.2.6 Reporting
Reporting to the regulator, STUK, is done in ac-
cordance with the general reporting directions gi-
ven in YVL 1.5. The main characteristics of the
Finnish reporting system are outlined in Chapter
4.2.1.
5.2.7 Self-assessment on strengths and
weaknesses
The interviewees identified weaknesses in diffe-
rent areas of TVO’s event investigation practice.
The Head of TR said for instance that they could
be better in recording deviations and bringing
them to a systematic assessment. In addition, he
concluded that also the inspections themselves
could be more thoroughly conducted. Another defi-
ciency related to the recognition and analysis of
recurrent failures and common cause failure
mechanisms. The interviewees told that they did
not have systematic processes for combining the
existing failure data. Thirdly, the interviewees
were of the opinion that the organisation’s capabi-
lity to respond to KÄKRY’s enquiries and pro-
posals was not very good: “others do it very effi-
ciently, others won’t respond at all”. This results
in delays in the implementation of recommended
enhancements. It was reckoned that this may ac-
tually mean that “people do not understand what
the fundamental objectives and the value of the
operational experience utilisation process actually
are”.
When it comes to the strengths of the prevail-
ing situation, the interviewees said that the re-
cent ASSET mission went well and that IAEA was
satisfied with the self-assessment report. They
seemed to be fairly satisfied with their experienc-
es and the prospects of introducing the method for
a regular use. In general, we were told that
KÄKRY was functioning quite well and that it had
got the necessary respect to take care of its duties
and to get through important measures. “If the
load factor remains high year after year then we
are certainly doing something right.” The deputy
Chairman of KÄKRY concluded that “in principle
the system works but more attention will have to
be paid to smaller events. In addition, the re-
sponse times to enquiries and statement requests
need to be shortened”.
5.3 Operational preconditions
5.3.1 Human resources and training
When asked about their human resource situation
the deputy Chairman of KÄKRY said that their
workload was not “that devastating”. KÄKRY’s
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workload was said to be quite even because
KÄKRY did not directly participate in event
inspections as a team (while some of its members
did). On the other hand, inspectors’ workloads
were sometimes peaking because they had to react
on a short notice whenever something happened.
In addition, they had their regular duties as well
because there were no full-time employees at TVO
who could solely concentrate on conducting event
inspections and/or the further processing of
inspection results. Therefore, a lot depends on
resource allocation and prioritising.
To judge how well TVO had succeeded in this
respect was not possible within the framework of
this study. On grounds of statements like “I don’t
even know whether the event investigation prac-
tice has been assigned any specific resources or
action plan” it was concluded that at least from
the practitioners’ point of view the practice lacked
focus and resourcing although they claimed to be
able to manage their duties (see the previous
Chapter). For instance, the compilation of special
reports was regarded as a part of TR’s normal
routine. According to the interviewees some help
was provided by the possibility of buying services
from abroad. It was estimated that the data ad-
ministration and analysis services purchased from
KSU and ERFATOM equal to one or two man-
years each year.
Nevertheless, TVO has invested in the devel-
opment of human factors expertise on site. The
deputy Chairman of KÄKRY was also the Head of
a Group for Human Errors. The group was found-
ed in 1997 and consists of five relatively young
employees from different offices. At the beginning,
the group carried out a review and analysis of
selected internal and external operational event
data. The analysis focused on the characteristics
of identified human errors. The group met several
times and produced training materials for inter-
nal use. Nowadays they arrange training courses
for other units on a voluntary basis. The general
objective of the courses was not to train new
inspectors but to reduce the number of human
errors by helping people perceive the potential for
errors and failures in their own job. The challenge
is to tell people what a human error is, how they
are generated, and where to look at in the immedi-
ate environment. Special attention was paid to
enhancing prevailing working practices.
So far TVO has hired no academically trained
behavioural scientists, however. In practice, few
engineers have got acquainted with the field as
part of their other duties. On special occasions
TVO relies on few external human reliability
consultants who know the plant well.
There is a responsible person for both MTO
and ASSET methods, and they usually participate
in inspections in which the concerned method is
used. However, the current trend seemed to be
towards ASSET. According to the deputy Chair-
man of KÄKRY, TVO had a dozen employees who
were familiar with the ASSET software package.
5.3.2 Manuals and instructions
The general impression about TVO’s instructions
is that they are clear, concise and easy-to-read.
They concentrate on the definition of liabilities,
process descriptions are rare. We were told that
this has also been the purpose. Descriptions of
personal responsibility were considered very im-
portant while precise procedures were not.
When it came to the use of prevailing instruc-
tions, the interviewees’ message was clear: there
is no firm connection with TVO’s formal instruc-
tions and the actual event investigation activities.
According to the interviewees they have “separat-
ed from each other”: either activities develop first
after which “the instructions will be written
around them”, or the instructions function as
“descriptions of activities or their target states”.
The deputy Chairman of KÄKRY compared event
investigation instructions to the Technical Specifi-
cations and reckoned that while latter are being
respected and complied with, the former are not
so rigorously followed. He continued, however,
that those two instruction are not at the same
level of hierarchy at all, nor need to be either.
One of the interviewees stressed that the pre-
vailing instructions themselves were of high qual-
ity and continued that the problem had more to do
with their implementation. Another problem re-
vealed during the interview related to the difficul-
ty of knowing “where the instructions are and
what do they include”. The discussion indicated
that there was a need for a kind of document
management system to contain entries to all rele-
vant instructions and to support simple data re-
trieval operations, such as “list all the instructions
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that relate to the control of the operational experi-
ence utilisation process”. One of the instructions
reviewed as part of this exercise appeared to be
under revision, and it was not clear to what extent
its requirements were effective in spring 1999
(instruction 0-KC-U3-21/2 for the recording and
analysis of failure data). The Head of TRK later
specified that there has been a corresponding
procedure since 1981, that it has been recently
revised and that amended procedures have been
commissioned. The overall conformity and cover-
age of TVO’s instructions remains an open ques-
tion since their assessment was not within the
scope nor resources of this study.
TVO was not particularly happy with the re-
quirement of YVL 1.5 according to which a special
report shall be submitted to STUK within two
weeks of an incident. They said that the special
report is the most demanding one of all official
event reports (excluding root cause analysis re-
ports) and that in practice two weeks is just not
enough for a sound treatment of such cases.
5.3.3 Information systems support
Special, operational transient, reactor scram as
well as root cause analysis reports are archived as
separate (Word) files. Word’s Find function sup-
ports keyword searches but in the absence of a
developed database solution a lot of manual work
was required. However, notices of defects, work
orders and failure reports are stored in the com-
puterised Work Order System (TTJ) which sup-
ports elaborate multi criteria queries through a
graphical user interface and a specific reporting
tool, Business Objects. TVO has also a direct ac-
cess to ERFNOVA and TUD databases maintained
by KSU and SwedPower AB.
TTJ is linked to other systems that contain
information on preventive maintenance and peri-
odic testing operations. Together they form a sys-
tem called the Maintenance Information System
(KUPI). When asked about the utilisation of exist-
ing information systems the interviewees said
that notices of defects and failure reports are to be
checked as part of the event inspection procedure.
It was admitted, however, that existing informa-
tion systems were not always utilised in a system-
atic and efficient way and that a lot was based on
employees’ and inspectors’ “gut feeling” and per-
sonal experience.
All the interviewees were of the opinion that
the introduction of the ASSET programme would
be a leap forward. They were especially interested
in the possibility of producing KÄKRY’s follow-up
analysis reports with the ASSET software pack-
age, and to have an efficient tool for classifying
the operational events on grounds of identified
causes and consequences. Some of the interview-
ees also noted that if also official event reports
could be produced by using ASSET the system
would save a lot of time, too.
Since the TTJ system did not emphasise opera-
tional events, it was concluded that prior ASSET
there has not been efficient information technolo-
gy based tools to support the analysis of existing
operational event data at TVO.
5.3.4 Management support
In general, the management was conceived to sup-
port the event investigation practice. However, ac-
cording to the interviewees that support has not
resulted in sufficient resources. Prioritisation and
resource allocation were seen as the major prob-
lems of the practice, and to depend on the upper
management decisions. Some of the representati-
ves of TVO seemed to think that in the present
situation the quality of their work was not at the
best possible level because they had to portion out
their time among several simultaneous activities.
The general impression was, therefore, that the
upper management was expected to provide the
inspectors with greater focus and possibilities to
concentrate on fewer important issues at a time.
5.3.5 Reviews and development
activities
The recent ASSET mission completed at the end
of 1998 and the forthcoming WANO peer review
(to be carried out in autumn 1999) were seen as
the most important audit projects for the time
being at TVO. Prior to the ASSET mission TVO’s
practices for the investigation of operational
events and the utilisation of operational experien-
ce had been reviewed e.g. by the Finnish regulator
in 1996 (Ruuska & Rannila, 1996), and by a Swe-
dish root cause analysis expert who is also the
author of TVO’s current MTO guide. An abridged
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and translated version of the guide is a part of
TVO’s root cause analysis procedure.
When it comes to regular reviews, the follow-
up report on the utilisation of operating experi-
ence is compiled annually. In addition, TVO’s
event investigation practice is subject to an inter-
nal QA audit every four years.
TVO’s objective is to commission the ASSET
method and to bring it to a daily use at the plant.
This would significantly facilitate periodic operat-
ing experience reviews and provide a basis for a
regular practice. At the time of this study, the
ASSET procedure was being translated into Finn-
ish. The interviewees said, too, that their inten-
tion was to try to apply the procedure for the
analysis of equipment defects, erroneous instruc-
tions, and human failures.
In general, and on grounds of the recommenda-
tions of the ASSET peer review, the interviewees
told that TVO aims at adjusting its investigation
practices and (internal) reporting criteria to cover
a greater part of such minor events that do not
necessarily require the compilation of an official
event report (according to the ASSET peer review
report the reporting criteria for procedural and
personnel failures were not comprehensive, TVO
ASSET p. 17). It must be noted, however, that e.g.
in 1998 more than half of all the cases on KÄKRY’s
agenda related to events and failures that re-
mained below the formal reporting criteria speci-
fied in YVL 1.5 (in 1998 altogether 73 cases were
addressed of which only 23 required official re-
porting to STUK). In addition, they aim at paying
more attention to recurrent failures and to analys-
ing the bulk of operational event data. Says an
engineer: “we want to recognise and analyse the
failures before their recurrence necessitates offi-
cial reporting”. “The problem is”, he continued, “to
recognise recurrence.” In connection with this
objective the deputy Head of TRK said that they
were aiming at introducing a weekly Assessment
Meeting in which all new failure reports as well as
possible new significant events would be discussed
and assessed by the representatives of safety,
operations and maintenance functions. This was
considered necessary because the current practice
was too much dependent on individual activity.
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6.1 Managerial framework
6.1.1 Goals, policies and performance
indicators
The prevention of the recurrence of identified
problems was defined as the main objective of Lo-
viisa power plant’s (LPP) investigation practice.
In relation to this objective, the responsible orga-
nisational unit, the Plant Safety Branch, aims at
being the “collective memory” of the plant. LPP’s
internal directions aim at ensuring that operatio-
nal experience is utilised and observed operatio-
nal deviations are taken into account in a syste-
matic way.
The concept of “deviation” is widely used in
LPP’s instructions. According to the official defini-
tion, a deviation is a significant defect, failure or
deficiency in instructions, practices, systems,
equipment, structures or the functioning of the
organisation that has a degrading impact on sys-
tems availability or plant safety. It is characteris-
tic of a deviation that operations, equipment or
structures fail to comply with confirmed specifica-
tions, or the result of an operation does not fulfil
given requirements. (82-12/M2.)
LPP’s event investigation policy is based on co-
operation between different organisational units.
The interviewees pointed out that people respon-
sible for the investigation practice avoid assuming
the role of a judge or a policeman, partly because
of the feedback received from other countries and
nuclear facilities. Instead, the guiding principle is
to decentralise activities in the organisation in a
way that the people having the best possible
knowledge and understanding of the concerned
event and related technical challenges could join
in the investigation process. This was considered
a feasible way to proceed partly because of the fact
that personal involvement is also likely to create
better commitment to the implementation of pro-
posed improvements. In addition, participants will
have an opportunity to learn more and the investi-
gation practice can get a good complement to its
limited resources. Generally speaking, the inter-
viewees stressed the importance of a thorough
examination of operational events and the identi-
fication of factors that contributed to those events.
It was concluded that LPP’s Plant Safety
Branch, the body in charge of investigations, aims
at developing its role towards “an internal con-
sulting service” to provide the rest of the organisa-
tion with investigation management expertise and
support in relation to inspection methods, making
conclusions and communicating the lessons
learned. Their way of operation was clearly based
on an idea to strive for sustainable improvements
by influencing people’s patterns of behaviour.
LPP does not have comprehensive performance
indicators for the effectiveness of its event investi-
gation activities although the current practice did
produce valid statistical information to support
such assessments. The quantification was said to
be the biggest challenge in this respect. WANO
indicators were reckoned to provide some indirect
feedback on the effectiveness of the whole opera-
tional experience utilisation process e.g. in the
form of unplanned production losses.
Most departments and functions are subject to
periodic quality assurance assessments in which
the recurrence of defects, failures and deficiencies
is one of the major topics. Special attention is paid
to equipment and components that have to do
with safety important systems and functions, such
as the diesel emergency power system. Regular
deviations of similar kind are regarded as clear
indications of operational deficiency and ineffi-
cient or inadequate corrective measures. It was
concluded that this information was being gath-
ered and utilised in a relatively systematic man-
6 FORTUM POWER AND HEAT OY
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ner, although not processed into explicit indicators
of operational excellence as noted above. The
interviewees told that LPP keeps track on the
number of special, operational transient and oper-
ational event (KT) reports but they did not believe
those statistics to be of significant benefit to the
development of a proper and reliable quality indi-
cator for the investigation practice.
The interviewees were of the opinion that it is
rather difficult to define what would it actually
mean to have an efficient investigation practice.
In addition, they reckoned that the results of their
practice are not likely to be detectable (or influen-
tial) in the short term, either. Nevertheless, they
considered their efforts successful if investigation
results are efficiently utilised to support develop-
ment activities and if they result in a decreasing
number of previously common defects and fail-
ures.
6.1.2 Organisation and liabilities
Loviisa nuclear power plant is run by Fortum Po-
wer and Heat Oy, a subsidiary of a state-owned
energy company Fortum Corporation (Fig. 13). At
the plant activities are organised in five depart-
ments: Operation, Maintenance, Technical, Office,
and Training Groups. Their managers report di-
rectly to the General Manager of the plant (Plant
Manager). Technical Group consists of the follo-
wing branches: Plant Safety, Radiation Protection,
Reactor and Fuel, Quality Assurance, Chemical
Laboratory, and Computer Services. Responsibili-
ty for the investigation of operational events be-
longs to Plant Safety Branch (PSB). The head of
PSB, usually the senior member of the branch,
reports to the head of Technical Group (Fig. 14).
There are four Safety Engineers working in
PSB and they have their own spheres of responsi-
bilities. One Safety Engineer has a primary re-
sponsibility for the event investigation practice
(hereinafter referred to as SEE). He is liable for
the screening, documentation, assessment (i.e. in-
itial classification) and investigation of operation-
al events. In connection with the event investiga-
tion practice, the Safety Engineer collects infor-
mation on identified human errors for PSA stud-
ies. He is also responsible for making sure that
produced action proposals are acknowledged in
the concerned organisational units. In addition,
he has the general responsibility for assessing the
Figure 13. Fortum Corporation organisation chart.
Figure 14. Loviisa power plant organisation chart.
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effectiveness of the operational experience utilisa-
tion process at Loviisa power plant. (82-12-001/
M5.)
Quality Assurance Branch (QAB) is liable for
storing the operational event data, supervising
the implementation of action proposals that result
from the investigation process, and evaluating the
adequacy and effectiveness of implemented en-
hancements (82-12-001/M5).
Enhancements proposed in root cause, special
and operational transient reports are discussed
and approved in the Quality Assurance and Safety
Meeting, chaired by the Plant Manager. The meet-
ing also nominates project managers and confirms
dead-lines for approved measures and modifica-
tions. The actual operative responsibility for the
implementation of approved measures lies in the
concerned units. Every six months QAB provides
the meeting with a follow-up report on the imple-
mentation status of the work in progress. (82-12-
002/M2; 82-12-001/M5.)
According to LPP’s directions the SEE has the
general responsibility for the whole operational
experience utilisation process (82-12-001/M5). In
practice, different groups and branches are re-
sponsible for different activities. “There are [relat-
ed] activities all over the organisation”, reckoned
one interviewee and continued that “work is being
done in parallel, and in part simultaneously in
different groups”. Also the SEE wondered whether
they had too much redundancy but assured that
the prevailing situation had its advantages, too.
For instance, he was of the opinion that such
redundancy was likely to contribute to the inde-
pendence of investigations because many related
activities were actually carried out by more than
just one group or team. The SEE concluded that
their “possibilities to stay independent are as good
as they can possibly be for a function that is
located inside the organisation”.
Liabilities appeared to be well defined, howev-
er. The interviewees also pointed out that PSB
may freely decide on the subject of its activities
and intervene in any operation or event on the
basis of its own consideration. They admitted that
their position was in that respect in little bit
problematic but assured that possible problems
were mostly attributable to personal relations
instead of the organisation itself.
6.2 Investigation practices
6.2.1 Monitoring and recording of
operational events
According to LPP’s Quality Assurance Handbook
(82-12/M2) all the employees are required to re-
port on identified problems and deviations in a
timely manner. Supervisors are explicitly suppo-
sed to contribute to the development of a working
climate that encourages such behaviours on site.
Group managers must provide their units and
employees with adequate reporting procedures
and supervise compliance with them. In general
terms, observed defects, failures or deficiencies
are to be reported directly to the SEE in charge of
the event investigation practice, or to the imme-
diate line manager who in turn shall convey that
information to the SEE. Reporting can be done
either verbally or in writing (82-12-001/M5).
The representatives of PSB were of the opinion
that it is almost impossible to build a “general
trap” to catch all operational events. Major defects
won’t cause any specific problems in this respect
since they usually result in work orders and
permits which end up in the Loviisa power plant
information system, LOTI. There are, however,
numerous minor “happenings” that do not necessi-
tate repairs or any kind of reporting. The inter-
viewees also reckoned that significant events do
not necessarily emerge from routine reports, ei-
ther, and continued that their recognition usually
calls for “something extra”. According to the inter-
viewees important information was mostly con-
veyed in meetings or by means of direct contacts
from the line organisation. In case of operational
transients the control room was mentioned as an
important source of information. In consequence,
plant personnel’s activity was considered to be of
great importance to the monitoring and recording
of operational events at Loviisa power plant: “peo-
ple will just have to tell about them”, as one
Safety Engineer summed it up.
At LPP both the recording as well as initial
classification of operational events are done si-
multaneously during the first stage of the event
investigation process called “assessment” (see also
the next Chapter). The recording of the event is
done by compiling a specific Operational Event
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Report, i.e. the KT report. This first stage is very
important since it usually determines the amount
of attention the event is likely to receive in the
future. For instance, the KT report comprises an
event classification section for the determination
of necessary follow-up reporting and investiga-
tions, and the section is to be completed at this
early stage.
LPP does have specific directions for the fur-
ther processing of operational events but the con-
cept of “operational event” itself remains unspeci-
fied. The problem is that there is no explicit
procedure for the identification of an operational
event although the reporting requirements them-
selves appear to be comprehensive, well docu-
mented and in compliance with the official in-
structions given in YVL 1.5 and YVL 1.11. In oth-
er words, in order to come recorded and properly
assessed an event (e.g. an observation concerning
an organisational deficiency or failure) needs to be
first classified as an “operational event” while
clear and explicit classification criteria are miss-
ing.
The interviewees admitted, too, that the con-
tent of the term operational event “is not unam-
biguous at the plant” and that explicit classifica-
tion criteria did not exist in writing in any paper
or document. The SEE noted, however, that the
definition of such criteria would be a rather diffi-
cult task because “you will easily end up with a
very simple and superficial document that dis-
cards many relevant and includes many irrelevant
events, or a very complex set of conditional crite-
ria that are difficult to use in practice”. Therefore
the best “criterion”, according to the view of the
SEE, “is a knowledgeable person who classifies
the events on grounds of his or her engineering
experience and-if need be-after consulting other
subject matter experts”. He continued that in this
respect the prevailing organisational culture had
a very important role in guaranteeing sincere
exchange of information on site.
According to the interviewees operational
events are identified by their practical relevance
to plant operations: “it is characteristics of an
operational event that it causes real or potential
harm to the plant, that it is worth an intervention
or that one can learn from it”. They emphasized
that in addition to the event’s significance to plant
safety the classification may also be based on its
impact on economics, availability or personnel
safety. Common cause failures are always opera-
tional events. In 1998 altogether 66 deviations
were classified as operational events at Loviisa
power plant.
In case of an identified operational event a
specific KT report shall be prepared. The report
shall contain a short description of the event
together with some basic information i.a. on the
operational state of the plant, influenced systems
or equipment, and necessary corrective measures.
An example of a KT report can be found from
Appendices.
6.2.2 Assessment and screening of
operational events
The SEE is responsible for the assessment and
screening of operational events at Loviisa NPP.
This is done in co-operation with the representati-
ves of concerned organisational units. The assess-
ment shall result in a completed KT report to iden-
tify further reporting and investigations needs. In
relation to further actions there are five different
tracks to be followed depending on the severity of
the event:
• no further clarifications needed,
• additional clarification,
• notice (internal, to STUK, and/or to WANO),
• official event report (special report, operation-
al transient report or reactor scram report), or
• root cause analysis report (82-12-001/M5).
The decision is largely based on the reporting di-
rections given in LPP’s internal guide 82-06-006/
M3 “Loviisa 1 and 2 operational event reporting”.
The guide specifies the events and situations that
necessitate the compilation of an official event re-
port. The requirements correspond to those issued
by the regulator in YVL 1.5. In case of an event
calling for “a comprehensive handling and analy-
sis” a separate root cause analysis shall be con-
ducted. An additional clarification is to be con-
ducted for those operational events that do not
require the compilation of an official event or root
cause analysis report but that have relevance to
operational safety, availability, plant economics,
training, or the development of the quality
assurance system (82-12-001/M5). The main pha-
ses of the assessment and screening of operational
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events at LPP are presented in Figure 15.
Anyone working at the plant can come up with
a proposal for preparing an additional clarifica-
tion. Proposals are to be submitted to the immedi-
ate line manager, or directly to the SEE. The SEE
will decide on the preparation of the clarification
together with a nominated contact person respon-
sible for the system, equipment or area of opera-
tion in question. Additional clarifications are not
subject to formal requirements. The SEE and the
nominated contact person may therefore define
the extent of the study on case-by-case basis.
Additional clarifications may be carried out either
by the SEE himself, or another person in the
concerned organisational unit. Necessary correc-
tive measures, persons responsible for proposed
measures as well as timetables shall be specified
in the clarification, or in the corresponding KT
report. (82-12-001/M5.)
As part of the initial assessment the SEE tries
to identify such operational events that have been
caused by a human failure. The work is based on
the review and further assessment of the events
covered by existing KT reports. For the SEE this
is a kind of “side-line duty” to be done without any
additional resources or specialist support. Having
found such an event the SEE will classify the
event i.a. in terms of its detection, consequences,
and probable causes. The findings will be regis-
tered into a specific human failure report, and its
event classification scheme appears to be much
more elaborated compared to that of a regular KT
report. Human failure reports provide data for
LPP’s PSA function. For an example of a human
failure report, see Appendices.
The interviewees reckoned that it is very much
up to the people in charge of the assessment how
things proceed. They have a significant personal
responsibility for the adequacy of the initial as-
sessment process since apart from the formal
Figure 15. Assessment and screening of operational events at Loviisa power plant.
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reporting requirements there are just few other
formal arrangements to support their work. On
the one hand, the Plant Meeting may decide on
the compilation of a KT report e.g. on the basis of
information provided by the SEE. This is not the
regular practice, however, because the weekly
Plant Meeting mostly concentrates on the admin-
istrative side of plant operations. On the other
hand, the matter may be discussed in the LPP
Quality Assurance and Safety Meeting provided
that it emerges in connection with the processing
of some other event or measure already on the
agenda. The LPP Quality Assurance and Safety
Meeting is more substance oriented than the Plant
Meeting, but not directly responsible for initial
assessments or classifications, either. As a result,
additional support is to be acquired by means of
more informal patterns of co-operation between
the PSB staff and subject matter experts.
Operating experiences gained at other nuclear
facilities are assessed by Operational Experience
Group of Fortum Engineering, an independent
research and development arm of Fortum Corpo-
ration. LPP participates in its activities through
nominated representatives.
6.2.3 Analysis of safety significant
incidents
Safety significant operational events and situa-
tions are to be investigated and reported by me-
ans of special reports. The reporting directions
given in YVL 1.5 apply to all Finnish nuclear po-
wer plants. Therefore, Fortum’s special reporting
practice bears in this respect much resemblance to
that of TVO. YVL 1.5 defines the situations in
which a special report shall be prepared as well as
the contents of the report.
The Plant Manager, Group Head, Operations
Engineer or Safety Engineer may decide on the
compilation of a special report and the initiation of
investigation. The Operations Engineer has the
main responsibility for the work. The Safety Engi-
neer is liable for assessing the safety implications
of the incident (82-06-006/M3).
The special report is based on a standard form
overlay which is to be supplemented with neces-
sary attachments, i.e. plotter graphs, computer
log files, PI diagrams and complementary analy-
ses. The report is organised according to the
requirements specified in YVL 1.5 and 82-06-006/
M3, LPP’s corresponding instruction. In short, the
special report includes a concise summary of the
incident and clarifications on the course of events,
safety assessment, causes of the incident and
measures to avoid the recurrence of such inci-
dents in the future.
All special reports are subject to a circulation
before they are submitted to the regulator. The
circulation shall always include “safety” and “op-
erations”. Other functions are to be determined
according to the case. During the circulation, the
report shall be inspected and approved by nomi-
nated representatives of the concerned functions.
In addition, all special reports shall be presented
and discussed in Loviisa Nuclear Safety Commit-
tee (LYTT) which assembles for its regular meet-
ing six times a year. (82-06-006/M3.)
A root cause analysis may be conducted for
safety significant incidents that require special
reporting and whose root causes can not be ade-
quately identified or analysed as part of the regu-
lar inspection procedure. However, independent of
the safety significance of the case, the Plant Man-
ager, Group Head, or LYTT may decide on the
preparation of a root cause analysis report. The
decision may be based e.g. on perceived deficien-
cies in the functioning of the organisation, com-
mon cause failure mechanisms or recurrent de-
fects in some system or equipment that could
possibly result in a safety significant incident or
considerable economic losses (82-12-002/M2). In
consequence, a root cause analysis may also be
conducted for such events or phenomena that do
not fulfil the reporting requirements given in
YVL 1.5 and which therefore do not necessitate
the preparation of an official event report to the
regulator.
Root cause analyses are carried out by a spe-
cial task force, or investigation team, nominated
by the Plant Manager or his deputy. According to
LPP’s internal root cause analysis instructions the
team shall primarily consist of persons who know
the case and who have been trained to conduct the
analysis. Special attention shall be paid to their
experience, understanding of plant behaviour,
technical know-how, human factors expertise, co-
operative skills, and impartiality. The investiga-
tion team will usually include
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• one Safety Engineer, usually nominated as the
head of the team,
• two subject matter experts from appropriate
functions, and
• one methods expert, or an external subject
matter consultant (82-12-002/M2).
The division of tasks and duties within the team is
to be done on case-by-case basis. In case of a signi-
ficant incident more than four members may be
nominated to the team. Also the Plant Manager
may participate because in such a case “the team
must have enough authority to decide on necessa-
ry corrective measures”, as one interviewee
pointed out. In case of a minor event of no particu-
lar safety significance, the Safety Engineer may
conduct a more limited analysis by himself. (82-
12-002/M2.)
The main objective of a root cause analysis is to
minimise the possibility for the recurrence of the
identified incident. Therefore, the analysis shall
result in the specification of corrective measures
by aid of which identified defects, failures or
exceptional phenomena are to be removed. The
feasibility and adequacy of proposed actions, e.g.
in terms of necessary and available resources,
shall be considered separately after the comple-
tion of the analysis. (82-12-002/M2.)
In LPP’s root cause analysis instructions the
analysis shall include the following phases:
• acquisition and verification of necessary infor-
mation,
• event reconstruction and cause clarification by
means of an adequate analysis method,
• identification of corrective measures,
• verification of proposed corrective measures,
• compilation, inspection and endorsement of the
root cause analysis report (82-12-002/M2).
There is no specific method or procedure for con-
ducting root cause analyses at LPP. The idea is
that the investigation team will choose its tools
and methods according to its needs and the nature
of the case. The most commonly used root cause
analysis method is a modification of HPES that
has been simplified to fit in LPP’s needs. Another
is the so called “path method”, a technique develo-
ped in collaboration with LPP and IVO Power En-
gineering (currently Fortum Engineering) several
years ago. Applied methods and the course of the
investigation procedure ought to be specified in
the resulting analysis report. The interviewees
stressed the importance of a clear and informative
reporting practice.
Root cause analysis reports are based on team
consensus. Once all the investigation team mem-
bers have approved the report it will be submitted
to the Plant Manager for a final endorsement (in
case the Plant Manager has not personally partic-
ipated in the investigation as a team member).
Applied practices appear to be relatively infor-
mal. For instance, LPP’s root cause analysis re-
ports reviewed in this exercise do not provide the
reader with any precise method descriptions, nor
references to any other methods or manuals ac-
cording to which the investigations could have
been carried out. However, the most recent re-
ports since 1997 usually comprise HPES type
diagrams to illustrate event sequences and the
impact of identified causal factors on analysed
incidents. The interviewees told that a lot of time
and efforts are invested in interviews and docu-
ment reviews, and this also seems to be the case
on the basis of the root cause analysis reports
assessed in this study. An in-depth analysis of
selected cases and related special and root cause
analysis reports can be found in Chapter 7.2.
The interviewees were mainly satisfied with
the current incident analysis practices. They said
that existing tools are sufficient, provided that
they are utilised in a proper manner. According to
the interviewees the identification of individual
and organisational performance shaping factors
and root causes has been one of the main issues in
the development of existing analysis methods. For
the time being they thought they had been fairly
successful in solving such cases although not
always: “every now and then you have a feeling
that you did not quite find out all the essentials,
but that is something you really cannot avoid”.
Prevailing methods and practices were told to be
subject to constant re-evaluation: “they are being
tested again and again” as part of the regular
investigation practice.
The official event reporting practice, i.e. the
compilation of special, operational transient, and
reactor and turbine scram reports, covers the
entire operating life of the plant from the late
1970s to the present. Root cause analyses have
been carried out from the year 1992. The KT
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reporting practice was introduced in 1994 for
recording outage events, and has been in regular
use in its present form since 1995.
6.2.4 Utilisation of investigation results
Enhancements proposed in root cause, special,
operational transient, and reactor and turbine sc-
ram reports are to be discussed in the LPP Quali-
ty Assurance and Safety Meeting. The meeting
may endorse them as proposed, decide on comple-
mentary studies or measures, or discard the pro-
posed enhancements on the basis of its own justi-
fication. The meeting also nominates project ma-
nagers and sets dead-lines for confirmed measu-
res and modifications. QAB is liable for supervi-
sing their processing and implementation in the
concerned organisational units, and evaluating
the adequacy and effectiveness of implemented en-
hancements (82-12-001/M5). An overview of LPP’s
investigation result utilisation activities is given
in Figure 16.
Root cause and special reports are also submit-
ted to LYTT for a safety assessment. LYTT may
propose additional recommendations which shall
be taken into consideration according to LPP’s
internal direction 82-03-003 “Handling of Loviisa
Nuclear Safety Committee’s recommendations at
Loviisa power plant”. (82-12-001/M5.) . In general,
the requirements concerning the treatment of
reported events appeared to be rather comprehen-
sive and precise.
Nevertheless, descriptions concerning the
processing and utilisation of investigation results
are limited to the administrative side of the issue
and do not comprise concrete guidelines e.g. for
learning from identified deficiencies. For instance,
the extent to which human failure report data is
being utilised remains an open question since
excluding PSA neither the interviewees nor LPP’s
internal directions assigned any other objectives
for the practice. The absence of more substantial
guidelines together with overlapping responsibili-
ties of PSB and QAB raise questions about the
Figure 16. Utilisation of investigation results at Loviisa power plant.
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 6 0
59
effectiveness of prevailing information manage-
ment practices at LPP. The SEE assured, however,
that the feedback loop from QA was functioning
very well and that he could take full advantage of
their work and results. Within the framework of
this study it was not possible to evaluate how
efficiently investigation results were actually be-
ing utilised.
6.2.5 Data administration and analyses
In addition to annual follow-up reports on the uti-
lisation of operational experience, the Quality
Assurance Branch, QAB, has the responsibility for
the preparation of an annual Quality Assurance
and Safety Meeting report. According to the inter-
viewees these practices in part aim at the identifi-
cation of common cause failure (CCF) mechanisms
by means of a systematic review and analysis of
existing operational event data. Moreover, the
SEE personally considered the search and identi-
fication of CCF mechanisms to be his main duty.
Nevertheless, LPP’s CCF detection activities ap-
peared to be fairly inconsistent.
Both Safety Engineers were of the opinion that
“whenever something happens, one should go and
see whether there are signs of other similar inci-
dents in the past” and that “also other people have
such responsibilities to ... conduct continuos anal-
ysis”. They admitted, however, that “for the time
being, it does not happen in reality” and that
“while some people do it, others do not”. In addi-
tion, access to the LPP Nuclear Event Register, a
database for both internal and external operation-
al event, was limited. This led us to a conclusion
that depending on the type of the event and
affected systems the event is likely to receive a
very different treatment when the search for CCF
mechanisms is concerned. Nevertheless, the SEE
assured that all significant operational events as
well as failures involving defects in important
safety systems or equipment (covered by the Tech-
nical Specifications), were subject to a systematic
and continuous screening process. In case of root
cause analysis, special, operational transient and
KT reports this had to be carried out manually
(see ch. 6.3.3).
It is worth mentioning that LPP’s internal
directions do not say anything about the recogni-
tion of CCF mechanisms, although an identified
common cause failure has been mentioned as an
example of such an incident that may require the
compilation of a root cause analysis report (82-12-
002/M2). A logical conclusion is that there is no
formal procedure for the identification of CCF
mechanisms at LPP although some employees and
units appear to have assumed a personal respon-
sibility for taking care of the job. However, there
are formal processes to support the identification
and monitoring of the historical recurrence of
deviations. This is done e.g. by means of regular
Quality Assurance audits that cover all the main
functions of the organisation.
6.2.6 Reporting
Reporting to the regulator, STUK, is done in ac-
cordance with the general reporting directions gi-
ven in YVL 1.5. The main characteristics of the
Finnish reporting system are outlined in Chapter
4.2.1.
KT reports are mainly designated for internal
use, not for official reporting to the regulator.
However, the resident site inspectors have an
unlimited access to all plant data, and may there-
fore acquaint themselves with completed KT re-
ports on request. This was considered a very
important principle to guarantee a sound working
climate since people command different attitudes
towards the exchange of confidential information
and supervision. The SEE himself was an advo-
cate of “open-doors policy” and in favour of a
transparent inspection and reporting practices.
6.2.7 Self-assessment on strengths and
weaknesses
In general terms, the interviewees were relatively
satisfied with LPP’s investigation practice. The
current custom of mobilising the line organisation
in event investigations was considered to work
well and to be of great importance to the practice.
Major weaknesses were identified in the areas of
quantitative performance evaluation, information
systems support, and the utilisation of existing
investigation results and plant data.
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6.3 Operational preconditions
6.3.1 Human resources and training
The interviewees were of the opinion that they
had enough competent personnel to take care of
their duties. During outages peaking workloads
put strain on the system but compared to many
other facilities their situation was regarded as a
rather good one.
The PSB staff train plant personnel to contrib-
ute to event investigations. Since 1995 more than
100 employees have participated in the compila-
tion KT reports at LPP, and all the foremen have
had an opportunity to participate in a way or
another. As a result, there is a large pool of people
having at least a modest acquaintance with event
investigation activities. With the support of these
people the Plant Safety Branch, PSB, may assume
responsibilities well beyond the capacity of its own
limited resources. The major challenges for this
kind of on-the-job type training were attributed to
the layman’s attitude towards the use of formal
models and methods. The Safety Engineers think
they have succeeded fairly well so far although “it
has not been very easy”.
The Safety Engineers have attended several
WANO courses since the year 1995. IAEA and the
Finnish regulator, STUK, have provided them
with ASSET training. The representatives of the
plant have also participated in international peer-
reviews on other nuclear power plants, and that
experience was conceived as an useful additional
plus for LPP’s own investigation practice. Accord-
ing to their own impression the Finnish know-how
is of high calibre and well comparable with inter-
national standards.
In connection with the annual refresher course
in Operations, Maintenance and Technical Groups
the SEE gives presentations on selected opera-
tional events. The issues are usually picked and
chosen from previous year’s reports and experi-
ences, or on the basis of the feedback received
from the line organisation. It was concluded that
such signs of personnel initiative-provided that
they are common and well rooted to the everyday
life of the plant-may significantly increase the
overall effectiveness of LPP’s investigation prac-
tice.
6.3.2 Manuals and instructions
Instructions were generally given a good degree in
terms of their adequacy and applicability. The pre-
sent tendency is towards more practical instruc-
tions. Before people were “frightened” by thick
manuals such as the original path method pro-
cedure for conducting root cause analyses. Nowa-
days, the procedure is light and the idea is to
provide the necessary guidance as part of the in-
vestigation process. The general impression is
that LPP’s instructions are clear, concise, and
easy-to-read. The overall conformity and coverage
of LPP’s instructions remains an open question
since their assessment was not within the scope
nor resources of this particular study.
The YVL-guides were considered to be of prop-
er content and itemisation. The SEE noted that
the guides did not impose disturbing constraints
on LPP’s activities and that they had enough room
for their own initiative, too. Occasional disagree-
ments between the plant and the regulator e.g. on
the correct interpretation of given instructions, or
the safety significance of particular operational
events, do not directly relate to the YVL guides
themselves.
6.3.3 Information systems support
There are several information system for different
purposes at Loviisa power plant. The operational
event data recorded by means of KT reports end
up in a computerised Nuclear Event Register. It
also contains information on selected external in-
cidents. Special, operational transient, reactor sc-
ram as well as root cause analysis reports are
archived as separate files. Information on appro-
ved measures and modifications in relation to pre-
viously identified and analysed incidents are sto-
red in a computerised follow-up system (SELMA).
The bulk of identified defects and failures of mi-
nor safety importance are stored in the Loviisa
power plant information system (LOTI).
All operational events result in a separate KT
report based on a standard form overlay in MS
Word. The SEE fills in the form and stores the file
in a predefined folder on the network hard disk.
After that another person is responsible for trans-
ferring the data from the completed file to the
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Nuclear Event Register. The database can be
accessed by a graphical user interface. The inter-
face programme supports some simple data re-
trieval operations, such as browse and search by
event name, but it does not support elaborate
multi criteria queries nor free text searches. Com-
pleted KT reports may also be accessed from LOTI
by event name, but not on the basis of their
contents. Only Safety and Quality Assurance En-
gineers have been authorised to use the LPP
Nuclear Event Register.
In KT reports operational events are classified
in different categories on the basis of further
reporting and investigations needs. They are not
(formally) classified according to their consequenc-
es or identified contributing factors. Such a formal
classification scheme can be found from special
reports but they exist in writing only. This means
that the introduction of a more developed data
retrieval function would call for significant modifi-
cations in both the existing computer system and
the prevailing event reporting practice itself. In
consequence, data analyses have to be carried out
manually and they require “a lot of work and the
prophet’s gift”, as the SEE summed it up. When it
comes to the search of common cause failure
mechanisms the conclusion clear: there is no effi-
cient information technology based tools to sup-
port such activities at LPP. However, in case of
minor defects and deviations the LOTI system
seems to provide the plant personnel with a much
better support.
The interviewees were well aware of the afore-
said limitations. They admitted they have had
system integration problems and that they have
not succeeded in solving them so far. The goal is
one integrated system and one common database
for all plant data, including KT as well as old
operational transient and special reports. At the
time of this study such development activities
were already in progress.
6.3.4 Management support
The Safety Engineers were satisfied with the cur-
rent status of PSB. They felt they can make them-
selves heard and let the management know what
they are thinking. They were of the opinion that
since the new Plant Manager was earlier in char-
ge of the Maintenance Group, and because the
new Head of Maintenance used to work as a Safe-
ty Engineer in PSB before his present appoint-
ment, the situation was likely stay good, or even
get better, in the future.
6.3.5 Reviews and development
activities
All the main functions of Loviisa power plant are
subject to periodic Quality Assurance Reviews.
They aim at detecting potential deviations from
the LPP’s quality system and identifying its defi-
ciencies and development needs. The reviews fo-
cus on functions that are of specific importance to
the safety or reliability of plant operations (LO1&2
FSAR, ch. 13.5). Identified deviations, deficiencies
and development needs are recorded in a QA
inspection report which comprises the following
sections:
• scope of the review,
• implementation status of corrective measures
resulting from previous reviews,
• identified deficiencies to be corrected,
• other observations to be taken into account,
• assessment of internal operational events and
their historical recurrence, and
• evaluation of the effectiveness of proposed and
implemented corrective measures.
The reviews are carried out and the inspection
reports are prepared by the Quality Assurance
Branch, QAB. Each QA inspection report is
brought up for discussion in the Quality Assuran-
ce and Safety Meeting (LO1&2 FSAR, ch. 13.5). In
1998 altogether twelve QA inspection reports were
completed. According to the SEE all groups and
branches are to be reviewed “annually or semi-
annually”. On grounds of a closer examination of
the concerned reports it seems more probable that
the review has been scheduled to take place every
second year (the preceding review for all the bran-
ches reviewed in 1998 had been carried out in
1996). The Plant Safety Branch has been subject
to the QA inspection practice since April 1999.
Both the Finnish regulator, STUK, and Fortum
Corporation’s external inspectors conduct audits
on site. In 1997 LPP’s technical functions, includ-
ing the operational experience utilisation process,
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were audited by a Canadian expert on assignment
of Fortum Power and Heat Oy. According to the
SEE the findings have been useful, although “by
no means always positive”.
The major development activities relate to the
utilisation of the line organisation as part of the
event investigation practice, and the specification
of a new computerised information system. With
regard to the investigation practice, the question
is about proceeding along the current track and
developing the patterns of co-operation with other
organisational units even further. In addition,
their intention was to hire a student to prepare a
master’s thesis on the development of the existing
human failure reporting practice currently run by
the SEE. When it comes to the new information
system, the timetable was still open.
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An in-depth analysis of selected cases (i.e. opera-
tional events or incidents) and related inspection
reports from the three participating organisations
was carried out as part of this study. Selected ca-
ses and their inspection reports, as well as the
criteria for their selection, were itemised in Chap-
ter 2.4.
The ideal model C: Requirements for event
inspection methods, is the basic framework for the
analysis and evaluation of selected cases. The
main emphasis is put on the specific requirements
concerning the issues to be covered in event in-
spections and related inspection reports. However,
also the requirements given in ideal models D:
Requirements for the follow-up analysis, and E:
Requirements for periodic operating experience
reviews, are taken into account to the degree they
are applicable in the following “renewed” follow-
up analyses of the selected cases.
Therefore, in addition to the coverage of signif-
icant issues, also thoroughness of the analysis,
clarity of the describing text as well as the outlin-
ing format and structure of the reports (see 2.3.4)
are important. Moreover, issues such as event
classification to clarify and outline what, how and
why had happened, action proposals for the pre-
vention of recurrence, suitability of the report
format and the classification scheme for periodic
event data analysis needs, and the connections
between different reporting systems are noticed in
the compilation of the evaluation comments.
In order to make the presentation of the follow-
ing case based reviews more logical and under-
standable, the “follow-up analyses” of the incident
cases, including detailed comments to the utility
reports, are presented here in the Chapter 7. After
this incident case specific review, the compiled
evaluation comments to both STUK’s and utilities’
inspection methods and reporting practices are to
be found in the Chapters 8.1.2, 8.2.2 and 8.3.2.
7.1 Teollisuuden Voima Oy
The first case study comprises both an initiating
event and latent failures to be inspected. The eva-
luators’ detailed comments, improvement pro-
posals or questions are given in italics in the follo-
wing analysis.
Case: Olkiluoto 1. Neutron flux trip limits
left too low after isolation valve capacity
test.
TVO reports:
• Root cause analysis TVO 1-TR-R1-2/94,
• Special report 1-TR-R7-1/94,
• Reactor trip report 1-KK-R6-1/94,
• ASSET Event Analyses, No. 27 and No. 28,
• Work orders, No. TL 1941183 and No. TL
5003032.
ID information: unit, date, time, descriptive
title, inspectors, report date:
• Unit: TVO 1;
• Dates of detection: 24.05.1994 reactor scram
SS 10 F/F at 20.04 o’clock; and 05.06.1994
protection channel trips 531K951H8 at 11.13
o’clock
• Inspectors: OHa, JuS, MiK, PNo, BCH.
• Root cause report date: 29.11.1994.
STUK TAPREK report (the incident data
base of the regulatory body) :
• 111/ 28.11.1996
Immediate consequences of the incident:
The case comprises two interrelated incidents:
• 24.05.1994: The first part of the cascade event
sequence lead to reactor scram (SS10) prior to
R194 because the trip limits to be lowered for a
test were wrongly defined.
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• 05.06.1994: The second part of the event se-
quence lead to one neutron flux scram channel
(SS101) to trip repeatedly during the start-up
from R194 because the limit settings had re-
mained too low.
• Affected systems, equipment and structures:
531K951-954 H6 F/F (SS10, E4); 531K951H8
(SS101, E41), K952-K954
Operational conditions and major process
parameters prior to the incident:
• 24.05.94: An exceptional steam isolation valve
capacity test requiring plant-start up prior to
the refuelling outage R194, Thermal power
raised to 28,6 % as the reactor scrammed.
• 05.06.94: Plant start-up after the refuelling
outage R194. Reactor power 56 % as single
channels tripped.
...and explanatory process and computer re-
cordings to illustrate its progression:
Computerised disturbance recordings and
alarm lists included in the reactor trip report 1-
KK-R6-1/94.
Means of detection and the situation in
which the incident was discovered:
• 24.05.94. Tripping of reactor scram SS10 oc-
curred at 28,6 % reactor power before the
thermal power level specified for the steam
isolation valve capacity test was reached.
• 05.06.94: Neutron flux monitoring channel
alarms occurred at ca. 56 % power levels dur-
ing four successive start-up attempts after the
refuelling outage.
The course of events (event sequence from
the origin up to and including the recovery
actions in a chronological order):
1) In 1984, within the first power (108 % = 100%)
uprating of the reactor, the flow/flux trip limits
H3-H6 were added as a modification into the
reactor protection system.
2) The old trip conditions and limits were re-
named by the new names E41, E42, SS101,
SS102 and the changes were introduced in the
system documents, operating and testing in-
structions.
3) The corresponding changes were however omit-
ted in the Technical Specifications, e.g. in the
operation domain figures showing the scram
and power limitation trip limits.
4) In the 90’s, a second power uprating was
planned to be introduced in the near future.
5) A real plant level test was needed to ascertain
the main steam isolation valve’s closing capa-
bility at a high steam flow value of 360 kg/s.
6) 04.05.1994: The earlier commissioning test pro-
gram for the steam isolation valve capacity test
was changed to correspond the new operational
conditions for valve testing.
7) The test program defined the lowering of the
settings of the reactor trip conditions SS10 and
E4 (531K951-K954 H8 and H7) to facilitate an
exceptional protection function during the test
of the valve 311V004.
8) The confused definition of the neutron flux
limit resulted in the F/F trip limits of SS10 and
E4 to be calculated for the 60 % setting values
instead of calculating the needed limits of
SS101 and E41 for the test.
9) 14.5.1994–3.05.1994: In parallel to the han-
dling of the exception permit from the Techni-
cal Specifications for the trip limit lowering,
the related operation order 1-KK-Y-6/94 and
work order TL 1941183 were prepared.
10) Refuelling outage R194 was just beginning
and in the evening of 24.05.1994 the plant was
in the start-up state and the power was raised
for the steam bypass operation to be conduct-
ed as part of the programmed isolation valve
test.
11) 24.05.1994 at 20.04 o’clock: The reactor scram
on SS10 F/F broke off the test as the reactor
power increased to ca. 25 %.
12) The incorrect trip limits were restored and the
correct reactor protection trip limits SS101/
E41 were selected for lowering to 60 % prior to
the new attempt to perform the special valve
test.
13) No changed work order was prepared after the
reactor scram although the functional objects
of the setpoint lowering actions were changed
to the SS101/E41 limits. The test supervisor
did not consider changed trip limits, either.
14) The reactor power was raised again and the
testing was performed on 24.05.1994 accord-
ing to the 311-valve test program require-
ments.
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15) 25.05.1994: After the successful valve testing,
two restoration attempts of the setpoints
(SS101) were done by the instrument techni-
cian. The attempts were prevented by the
control room due to disturbance risks in the
following reactor pressure vessel test, and
secondly to the following shutdown procedure
to the cold shutdown state.
16) 25.05.1994–05.06.1994: The SS101 and E41
trip limits were left too low (at 60 % of the
basic levels) and they remained unrestored
during the refuelling outage R194.
17) 05.6.1994: During the plant start-up after
R194 the channel A 531K981H8 of the scram
condition SS101 trips at 11.13 o’clock.
The tripping of the A channel occurred at
altogether 4 successive power raising attempts
to ca. 56 % until the alarms were found to be
not inadvertent.
18) The tripping relays of the neutron flux A
channel of 531 H6 SS10 was blocked, the
unrestored limits were set to the correct high-
er values and the blocks were removed as the
reactor power had been reduced to ca 60%.
Problems encountered in managing and con-
trolling the operational situation:
25.05.1994: The attempts to restore the trip
limits after the successful valve testing had to be
prevented by the shift supervisor due to reactor
scram risks in the ongoing reactor pressure vessel
test. Secondly, the aim was to prevent disturbances
in the following plant shutdown procedure to the
cold shutdown (R194 work activities starting).
Use and adequacy of approved procedures
and instructions:
No clear practice or procedure was used for
making or approving changes in the work order
(permit).
Direct and root causes of the incident (the
cause-effect chains explaining the case):
A part of the documentation changes (e.g. in the
Technical Specifications) was omitted as the tech-
nical modification of the flow/flux trip limits in
the reactor protection system was done in 1984.
The functional objects of the protection limits to
be exceptionally changed during the capacity test-
ing of 311V4 were not correctly identified in the
definition and preparation of the test program.
Preparation of a renewed work order and per-
mit was omitted in the stressed disturbance situa-
tion after the erroneous testing and reactor scram.
The restoration of the SS101 and E41 trip
limits was forgotten during the refuelling outage
R194.
In case of a human failure, the work task in
which the error occurred (the failure ori-
gin):
Obs. The primary causes of the incident, which
significantly contributed to the initiation and
propagation of the event sequence, were not suffi-
ciently enough established in the corresponding
MTO root cause analysis report at the end of 1994.
The event and cause diagram (TSA) of the MTO
method structures and clarifies the error sequence.
However, in this case the TSA does not indicate
well the deviations from the normal procedure
(deviation analysis), nor broken organisational
defensive barriers (barrier analysis of reviews)
thoroughly enough. In general, TSA diagrams, or
simpler diagrams of similar purpose, are usable
tools for organising,clarifying and structuring
event sequences.
Obs. The ASSET follow up event analysis sum-
maries performed by TVO during 1998 identified
the direct and root causes better than the narrative
MTO root cause analysis report in this case. How-
ever, in the completed ASSET analysis reports
(ERCAF) the number of occurrences to be thor-
oughly studied was limited to only one per inci-
dent.
Common cause failure (CCF) mechanisms,
origin and interconnections to other sys-
tems:
Both the incidents (24.5.94) and (5.6.94) are
classified as human common cause failures
(HCCF) of safety related equipment.
Efficiency and adequacy of both technical
and administrative barriers...
Deficient review and approval testing programs
(The confused definition of the trip conditions and
limits passed through the whole organisation from
the preparation of the test program to the prepara-
tion of work orders and permits.
Checking and approval of changes in work
permits and work planning?
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...and in case of a technical failure, the ade-
quacy of operability verification activities:
Deficiencies in operability verification prior to
the plant start-up from the refuelling outage (no
periodic testing of the relevant neutron flux trip
limits) were identified.
Evaluation of historical recurrence (incl.
local repairs, inspections etc.):
The root cause analysis report considers anoth-
er event (special report 1-KK-R7-1/84), where dur-
ing the maintenance outage R184 the restoration
of the blocked reactor protection conditions SS13
in channels B and C were forgotten and were not
identified in operability tests after the outage
work.
Obs. The possible additional recurrence cannot
in this case be easily clarified.
TVO has recently subjected the bulk of those
incidents in 1993-1997 that were reported to the
regulator to their first comprehensive periodic op-
erating experience review (ASSET self assessment).
Periodic operating experience reviews for systemat-
ic identification of historical recurrence of the
causes and evaluation of the achieved effects to
prevent the recurrence are strongly encouraged.
Availability of important safety systems:
No functionally critical unavailability of safety
system.
Incident’s significance in terms of nuclear,
personnel and radiation safety:
The errors and omissions in the protection
limit settings did not have any effects on plant
safety. Because the exceptions in the protection
limit settings were not detected in the operability
verification tests at the end of R194, the utility
considers the incident exhibiting weaknesses in
the procedures.
Obs. The incapability to identify the confusion
in the definition of the reactor protection condi-
tions/limits that were subjected to exceptions ex-
hibits also a weakness in the organisational per-
formance.
Necessary immediate and long term correc-
tive actions and their expected effects:
Obs. The allowed operation domain figure in
the Technical specifications is updated to show the
changed limits and names for the trip conditions
516 SS101/ E41 and SS102/ E42.
The checking and approval quality of changes
in testing programs should be enhanced.
The procedure to change work permits and
work documents shall be agreed.
The checks of neutron flux trip limit setpoints
were added to the operability verification pro-
grams to be done before starting-up from the
refuelling outage.
Obs. The good ASSET follow-up event analysis
summaries performed during 1998 clearly identify
the corrective action needs in testing programs/
orders compared to the MTO root cause analysis
report.
Event recording and classification system
(the event report is completed with classifi-
cation for searches and periodic event data
analysis purposes):
Obs. The incident reports do not include any
classification codes which could help in searching
for and pinpointing specific and recurrent event
types and recurrent problems, failure modes and
causes. (Find searches from WORD documented
report texts can however be done.)
Obs. Such data and trend analyses are today
possible. This requires sound classifications and
event descriptions (i.a. narratives in writing) and
an ability to take advantage of existing informa-
tion technology based tools and data analysis
methods. TVO failure history reports stored in
their Work Order System (TTJ) present an exam-
ple of a good classification system. The Swedish
ERFNOVA and STAGBAS incident information
systems contain examples of classification models
for “RO and SS” incident data.
Reference to other related investigations,
such as work orders and failure reports:
A good list of references is given in the root
cause analysis report.
Obs. A recommendation is made to include the
related work order titles and numbers in the refer-
ence list to enhance data integration and to facili-
tate further co-ordination of activities between
different organisational branches.
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7.2 Fortum Power and Heat Oy
The first case study comprises a latent failure to
be inspected. The evaluators’ detailed comments,
improvement proposals or questions are given in
italics in the following analysis.
Case: Loviisa 1. Common cause failure of TL
22 air fans to start due to incorrect connec-
tion diagram.
FORTUM reports:
KT 47/97, iv4797, Work nr 255395A
ID information: unit, date, time, descriptive
title, inspectors, report date:
• Unit: LO1;
• Date of detection: 23.09.1997;
• Time: 01.40;
• Title: Common cause failure of TL22 fans (no
start);
• Inspector: JIA;
• Report date: 15.10.1997
STUK TAPREK report (the incident data
base of the regulatory body):
No TAPREK report available.
Immediate consequences of the incident:
The technical specifications (TS) require plant
to be brought into a shutdown state without delay
(when both TL22 fans are found inoperable during
power operation).
Affected systems, equipment and structures:
KZ: TL22D001, TL22D002; Lno: LIZ = other
instrumentation equipment.
Operational conditions and major process
parameters prior to the incident:
Power operation.
...and explanatory process and computer re-
cordings to illustrate its progression:
Not applicable.
Means of detection and the situation in
which the incident was discovered:
At fan start-up attempt after fans had stopped
during the periodic testing of the YZ36 protection
system (performed every four weeks).
The course of events (event sequence from
the origin up to and including the recovery
actions in a chronological order):
1) A plant protection system test (YZ36) was
performed in which case the containment isola-
tion valves must close and the TL22 fans must
stop.
2) After the YZ36 test both supply air fans of the
containment vacuum and the purification sys-
tem (TL22) failed to start on the following
start-up attempt.
3) According to the TS requirements, the prepara-
tions for the plant-shutdown were started at
01.40 o’clock.
4) Parallelly, the instrumentation technician on
duty was called to the plant and the repair
work started at 02.50 o’clock. One fan
(TL22D001) was made operable at 03.00
o’clock.
5) Whereupon the TS requirement on plant shut-
down without delay revoked.
Problems encountered in managing and con-
trolling the operational situation:
Not applicable?
Use and adequacy of approved procedures
and instructions:
The limiting condition rules for operation were
applied according to the TS. It was however decid-
ed that the possible excessive requirements of the
TS are checked because the exhaust air fans and
the TL22 system were capable of maintaining the
containment under negative pressure.
Direct and root causes of the incident (the
cause-effect chains explaining the case):
The failure origin was an incorrectly designed
connection diagram used on 17.9.1997 for repair-
ing the limit switch of a single closing damper
SO1, causing a latent CCF preventing the start of
the fans D001 and D002.
Obs. In order to steer the event investigation
and to ameliorate the outlining of the event report,
a field on Causes should be added to the KT report
in addition to the fields of Event Description and
Corrective Actions.
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In case of a human failure, the work task in
which the error occurred (the failure ori-
gin):
The incorrect connection diagram had accord-
ing to LOTI (the Loviisa Power Plant Information
System) search possibly been designed as part of
the modification work on the object performed on
05.07.1997?
Obs. The origin and cause of the incorrect
design work resulting in the “crosswise” connection
diagram were not included in the KT report.
Common cause failure (CCF) mechanisms,
origin and interconnections to other sys-
tems:
The repair work done according to an incorrect-
ly designed connection diagram of the limit switch
of the closing damper SO1 caused the latent CCF
of the fans D001 and D002.
This event originates thus from a dependent
human shared equipment fault (HSEF) of the
change-over switch of the fans that has caused
multiple components not to start?
Efficiency and adequacy of both technical
and administrative barriers...
Obs. Analysis of the possible ineffectiveness of
the defensive barriers is not included in the KT or
Human Failure (iv) reports.
...and in case of a technical failure, the ade-
quacy of operability verification activities:
Obs. Not included in the KT or iv-reports, but
should preferably be covered in them. E.g. plan-
ning of a better automation installation check and
functional test could in a similar case prevent
failures to remain latent after modifications!
Evaluation of historical recurrence (incl.
local repairs, inspections etc.):
Seems neither to be included in the KT or iv-
reports: no systematic treatment of the bulk of
these reports exists!
Availability of important safety systems :
Inoperabilities qualitatively treated in the KT
report. Unavailability time given as 1 h in the iv-
report.
Obs. According to the LOTI work order history
classifications and calculations for the work No.
255395A, the unavailability times given for the
fans TL22D001 & D002 were however 2629,6 and
2659,2 hours respectively.
Incident’s significance in terms of nuclear,
personnel and radiation safety:
The INES classification was 0 (below scale).
The justification for the INES classification given
by the plant was that the TL22 system does not
cause initiating events or have any impact on
identified accident sequences.
In the KT report 47/97 the event significance
has been classified as not requiring other or deep-
er inspection reporting.
Necessary immediate and long term correc-
tive actions and their expected effects:
Provisional repairs for restoring the first TL22
fan’s operability were done 23.09.1997.
An additional work order for the second fan
D002 was prepared (255397).
After the 23.9.97 repairs, the crosswise connec-
tions in the connection diagrams and functions
were checked and tested, and the original design
documents were corrected.
A work order for the coming 1998 maintenance
outage was prepared in order to recheck the
problematic connections.
Event recording and classification system
(the event report is completed with classifi-
cation for searches and periodic event data
analysis purposes):
KT reporting is a good and systematic event
reporting practice available for the users of the
plant computer network. An exemplary classifica-
tion in the KT reports is made with respect to the
reporting requirements.
However, KT reports are not completed by any
classification to support periodic operational expe-
rience reviews, systematic identification of recur-
rent events, causes, or their consequences, or rank-
ing of pending corrective action programs.
Obs. A systematic classification should prefera-
bly be introduced in the KT reports for clarifying
the significance of the event and outlining the
event information, too.
The portion of the KT reports involving human
errors is complemented by Human Error (iv)-re-
ports which are registered in LOTI and used as
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human reliability and CCF data for PSA studies.
Obs. The classification scheme for human er-
rors and their causes is generally good but should
be complemented by introducing options for De-
sign Deficiency and Work Planning Deficiency. In
addition, the classification of involved working
groups should be completed by introducing options
for Design branch and Work Planning branch
(lacking work order step?) .
Obs. In addition, the search of recurrent error
causes and problems should be facilitated by the
classification codes and the study of underlying
KT and iv-information.
Reference to other related investigations,
such as work orders and failure reports:
The work orders on corrective actions performed
in connection with the concerned event should
preferably be referenced, too (work numbers).
The second case study on Loviisa NPP incidents is
also a latent failure.
Case. Loviisa 2,1. Unallowed disconnection
of back-up emergency feedwater pump for
preventive maintenance during power
operation.
FORTUM reports:
Root cause analysis LO1-K863-6, LO2 special re-
port 1/97, KT 01/97, iv0197, Work nr 232176A.
ID information: unit, date, time, descriptive
title, inspectors, report date:
• Unit: LO 2 ,1;
• Date of detection: 14.01.1997;
• Daily report, Preventive maintenance of back-
up emergency feed-water pump in violation of
the technical specifications;
• Inspectors: JIA, PIR;
• Root cause report date: 09.06.1997
STUK TAPREK report (the incident data
base of the regulatory body):
134/11.06.1997
Immediate consequences of the incident:
The erroneous violation of the technical specifi-
cations (TS) rules did not result in operational
consequences.
However, the violation resulted in a decision to
prepare a special report and a root cause analysis
report for identification of necessary measures to
prevent recurrence and to facilitate organisation-
al learning.
Affected systems, equipment and structures:
KZ: 22RL97D001.
Operational conditions and major process
parameters prior to the incident:
Power operation, Thermal power 99,9 %.
...and explanatory process and computer re-
cordings to illustrate its progression:
Not applicable.
Means of detection and the situation in
which the incident was discovered:
The safety engineer observed from the daily
report 14.1.1997 the ongoing work on RL97D001
and questioned its work provisions.
He pinpointed that preventive maintenance
during power operation is not allowed without an
exception of some equipment specifically listed in
the technical specifications.
The course of events (event sequence from
the origin up to and including the recovery
actions in a chronological order):
1) The planned maintenance work 232176A “Peri-
odic inspection of the back-up emergency feed-
water pump diesel” included in the RL970
package was omitted due to a lost work order
during the LO2 maintenance outage (LO1:
20.7.96–21.9.96 and LO2: 21.9.96-14.10.96).
The maintenance work to be done during the
LO2 maintenance outage (96LAT 16) did get
the start permit from the shift supervisor on
25.9.1997.
2) The safety measures of the package had been
restored and the pump operability test prior to
plant start-up was done on 9.10.1997 without
calling back the lacking work permit 232176A.
3) On Friday 11.10.1997, the LO2 plant start-up
from refuelling state to hot standby was going
on. The lost work order appeared and it was
detected that the work 232176A had not been
done.
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4) A need of forced transfer of the work from the
outage to the power operation period was dis-
cussed in an evening meeting between the
control room work planner, the shift engineer
and the maintenance foreman.
5) A note on the transfer of the work order was
entered into the LOTI Work Order subsystem
and the existing work order (paper) document
was hand-corrected immediately, but without
any formal approval. The omitted work was
then not entered into ”the list of works trans-
ferred from outage”, maintained by the control
room work planner function.
6) Due to these work planning and management
failures, the transfer was not treated or decid-
ed in the next day’s (12.10.1997) outage meet-
ing.
7) The original work order document (i.e. the one
relating to the transferred task) wandered af-
ter the LO2 start-up into the “post box” of the
maintenance foreman instead of the work plan-
ners’ box (where it should have been submitted).
8) The undone and “transferred” work order did
thus not undergo the necessary safety review
circulation (TMT). Instead, the “outage
number” on the LOTI/TMY display was
changed by the work planning on 09.01.97 to
“operation period number 97KÄY17”.
9) The maintenance foreman sent the work order
document to the control room with an adjoining
message to start the work on Monday morning
13.1.1997.
10) The check of the 22RL97D001 work provisions
done by the shift supervisor showed their con-
nection to the outage work provisions.
The shift supervisor misinterpreted the limit-
ing conditions for operation specified in the TS
by assuming that the exception list allows
preventive maintenance for 22RL97D001 dur-
ing power operation, and consequently gave
the permit to start the maintenance work.
11)The safety engineer observed from the daily
report of 14.1.1997 that his work provisions
from the outage period 1996 and the ongoing
work on RL97D001 were found violating the
TS limiting conditions for operation.
This observation resulted in immediate recov-
ery actions of equipment operability, informing
the regulatory body (STUK) and decisions on
the preparation of special and root cause analy-
sis reports to investigate the event.
Problems encountered in managing and con-
trolling the operational situation:
Not identified.
Use and adequacy of approved procedures
and instructions:
Ineffective procedures for detection and follow-
up of unfinished work orders prior to restoring the
work packages to operable subsystems ?
No clear procedure for the use of the control
room maintenance planner’ diary, although the
control room maintenance planner per se is a good
practice.
No clear procedure existed for the checking and
treatment of possible transfers or cancellations of
outage works.
No effective routines for the treatment and
acceptance of possible changes in work orders and
permits?
Direct and root causes of the incident (the
cause-effect chains explaining the case):
Forgetting the planned work order for the
periodic check of the pump diesel 22RLD001 dur-
ing outage.
Registrating the work order transfer in LOTI/
TMY prior to an approval for a change in work
plans.
Work order did not undergo a new safety re-
view (circulation) after the change.
In case of a human failure, the work task in
which the error occurred (the failure origin):
An outage maintenance work package was re-
stored operable by the control room although an
underlying work order was unfinished.
The knowledge of limiting conditions for opera-
tion (LCOs) of the TS was insufficient among
work planning branch, maintenance foremen and
shift supervisor.
Unclear responsibilities in relation to decisions
and approval of work planning and work permit
changes within the maintenance department.
Obs. The causes of human errors and organisa-
tional weaknesses including their origin should be
more deeply clarified. E.g. in the root cause analy-
sis report, the maintenance management of the
plant comments on the need of clarification and
prevention of causes of undone works and missing
detection in the event as the outage work package
was restored operable.
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Obs. The cause-effect chain diagram clarifies
the error sequence, but does not illustrate the
organisational (and partly operative) defensive
barriers that were broken.
Obs. Generally the originating errors and their
causes should be better clarified and/or classified
in order to identify the necessary remedial meas-
ures instead of local corrective actions only, espe-
cially in case incidents when a root cause analysis
is needed.
Common cause failure (CCF) mechanisms,
origin and interconnections to other sys-
tems:
Not CCF, but another type of dependent failure?
Obs. The work on 22RL97001 affected two
units. It caused inoperability (?) and complicated
(?) work planning activities at both units because
the pump diesels 22RL97D001 and 11RL94D001
are common for both units LO1 and LO2.
This incident and the work permission since
25.9.1997 was thus a dependent human shared
equipment fault (HSEF) mechanism that affected
also the LCOs of the LO unit 1 after its start-up to
power operation on 21.9.1997?
Efficiency and adequacy of both technical
and administrative barriers...
An outage maintenance work order package
was restored operable by the control room al-
though a related outage work was not returned.
Obs. Checking and approval of changes in work
planning?
Obs. A thorough analysis of the ineffectiveness
of the defensive barriers is not included in the root
cause analysis report. A good way to structure and
present the whole analysis of lacking or broken
barriers is shown in the MTO event, cause and
barrier analysis diagrams (see e.g. in HPES inves-
tigators training manual or root cause analysis
reports compiled in the year 1994 at Olkiluoto
NPP). They provide the reader with a well struc-
tured picture of the case in a single glance.
...and in case of a technical failure, the ade-
quacy of operability verification activities:
A subsystem test was carried out by the control
room before one outage work permit was returned
to the control room.
Evaluation of historical recurrence (incl.
local repairs, inspections etc.):
The root cause analysis report considers anoth-
er event (KT 58/96), where a maintenance outage
work on repair of an 11FL transmitter was trans-
ferred 17.9.1997 due to a lacking spare part at the
end of the LO1 maintenance outage.
The work order was returned to the work
planning branch and the work 237193A was car-
ried out on 18.11.1997 by using outage work
provisions although the plant was in the state of
power operation. The work order did not undergo
any previous safety review circulation, either.
Obs. A possible additional recurrence cannot be
easily assessed since the bulk of KT and iv-reports
is not subject to any specific periodic, statistical or
qualitative, review based on a formal classifica-
tion of causes etc?
Availability of important safety systems:
Unavailability time 13.-14.01.1997 of the pump
diesel 22RL97D001 due to preventive mainte-
nance during power operation given as 38 h in
LO2 the special report 1/97.
Obs. The work permit on the preventive mainte-
nance 22RL97D001 during the LO2 maintenance
outage caused a “complex LCO” for LO unit 1
when the unit was restarted from its maintenance
outage and brought to the power operation state on
21.9.1997? (It should be noted that LCOs allow one
inoperable redundant subsystem out of two, up to
and including the plant operational state of hot
readiness. AOT for single subsystem repair is 21
days?)
Incident’s significance in terms of nuclear,
personnel and radiation safety:
The follow up evaluations of temporary and
integrated risk increases due to the unallowed
preventive maintenance 13.1.1997-14.1.1997 dur-
ing power operation of LO2 were done by using
PSA in the LO2 special report 1/97.
Based on their evaluation, the plant considered
the incident’s safety significance as minor.
Obs. This Loviisa risk follow-up approach of
safety related incidents is considered as an exem-
plary approach and well complements the “deter-
ministic” FSAR, TS and INES based safety evalu-
ations.
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Obs. From the employees’ safety point of view it
should have been evaluated how an outage mainte-
nance work package was restored operable by the
control room although an underlying work order
was unfinished.
Necessary immediate and long term correc-
tive actions and their expected effects:
1) The work order transfers from the outages will
be handled within the maintenance branches
and the activities will be described in approved
maintenance activity procedures (done in the
“work order and planning routines” 82-07-001/
M4/6.5.1998)
2) The formal responsibilities concerning changes
in work orders and permits (e.g. transfers) in
the maintenance activity procedure 82-07-001
should be defined and training arranged (The
root cause analysis group considers the proce-
dure as a very large one and recommends its
division into parts).
The evaluators recommend additionally that
the large and complicated guide on work order
and planning routines should be formally mod-
elled as a process in order describe the mainte-
nance routine in a more understandable, struc-
tured and simpler way. This could also facili-
tate a better identification of the possible need
of additional defensive barriers as well as
smoothing up the maintenance planning, work
order and operability verification process.
3) No work permits shall be given for work orders
corrected by hand notes. Transferred work or-
ders shall be deleted and new ones done. The
list of works transferred from the maintenance
outage shall be reviewed by the safety engineer.
Obs. The evaluators recommend additional-
ly that the routines for safety and correctness
checking and approval of changes in the work
planning and work orders are evaluated and
enhanced on demand.
Obs. The evaluators recommend additional-
ly that the routines for work completion inspec-
tion prior to operability testing are checked and
enhanced if need be.
4) The evaluators recommend additionally that
additional training on technical specification
rules and their understanding of the work plan-
ning personnel and maintenance foremen
should be considered, if need be.
Obs. Corrective Actions proposed in the in-
spection report(s) should be completed with
expected effects and structured to correspond
the list of identified Causes in order to help
understanding and the prevention of recur-
rence.
Event recording and classification system
(the event report is completed with classifi-
cation for searches and periodic event data
analysis purposes):
Obs. The special reports submitted to the regu-
latory body include a number of classification
codes which could facilitate a later search of
specific event types and possible recurrent causes.
Obs. In the classification list, several causes
could be given, especially in case of a complicated
event sequence. The cause action classification list
in the Human Failure Report should preferably be
refined to include options for Design Deficiencies
and Changes, and Work Planning Deficiencies and
Changes.
Reference to other related investigations,
such as work orders and failure reports:
An exemplary list of references is in the root
cause analysis report.
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8.1 Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority
8.1.1 Evaluation of the organisational
framework and investigation
practices
The goals of Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority’s (STUK) investigation practice were
only partly documented and of rather general na-
ture. In addition, a clear policy statement and ac-
tion plan on how to proceed in practice were mis-
sing. On the one hand, licensees were encouraged
to enhance and develop their practices on a volun-
tary basis. But on the other hand, a pre-scriptive
approach towards regulation was nevertheless
considered necessary. It was concluded that alt-
hough the present policy has contributed to the
introduction and use of more elaborate event
inspection methods at Finnish nuclear power
plants, it has also resulted in a situation in which
power companies have expected STUK to be able
to identify possible deficiencies in their investiga-
tion methods or practices (on the grounds that
their reporting arrangements appear to have been
geared to satisfy STUK’s requirements rather
than their own reporting needs. Under the last
few years Fortum and TVO have nevertheless as-
sumed a more active role in this respect). STUK’s
area of responsibility and main duties as well as
the division of liabilities between STUK and the
licensees were anyway clear to all parties.
STUK did not have any explicit performance
indicators for measuring the effectiveness of its
investigation practice. Effectiveness was of course
being assessed on a more qualitative basis, e.g. on
ground of the degree to which STUK had managed
to contribute to significant improvements at
plants. How this information was being used re-
mained an open question, however. Liabilities in
relation to STUK’s own investigation activities
appeared to be clearly defined.
STUK has a good access to plant information
through its resident site inspectors and the formal
reporting system described in YVL 1.5. Criteria
for initiating an investigation have been explicitly
defined but there seems to be no formal procedure
for the initial assessment of new events and
observations. The reliability of the assessment
process seems to be dependent on the individual
know-how and experience of a relatively small
number of senior officials.
The event classification model included in the
data collection form was considered to be well
developed. It was evaluated that the form provid-
ed a good framework and guidance for inspections,
although employees of other branches did not
always utilise the form in an appropriate manner.
Since the form is to be completed on the computer,
the event data was also automatically stored in
STUK’s Event Register Database, TAPREK.
TAPREK appeared to be easy to use and to pro-
vide good support for various data retrieval opera-
tions. In this respect STUK was clearly ahead of
TVO and Fortum (TVO and Fortum had well
developed information systems for the treatment
of failure data but their operational events were
usually registered as separate text files and were
not usually entered into any plant level database
to contain all events and failures).
STUK did not conduct systematic or regular
reviews of the existing operational event data. In
connection with the inspection of a particular
case, the case officer is however supposed to pay
attention to indications of corresponding events
and failure mechanisms in the past, which are to
be itemised in the TAPREK report. There is no
procedure for such a task, however. In conse-
quence, it is very much up to the inspection team
members and the case officer to what extent and
8 EVALUATION RESULTS
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how TAPREK is utilised. STUK has nevertheless
purchased research services from other research
institutions e.g. for identification and analysis of
common cause failure mechanisms in the mainte-
nance data and in some special reports.
STUK appeared to have enough competent
personnel to run the event investigation practice.
Interested employees are encouraged to join in the
practice, and training was provided on-the-job. It
was noted, however, that the practice was suffer-
ing from lack of focus and inadequate allocation of
work and resources. For instance, inspectors find
it difficult to concentrate on their work because of
increased number of other assignments and du-
ties for inspection of operational safety. It was
estimated that such fragmentation is likely to
decrease efficiency and motivation as well. How-
ever, in this study no signs of deteriorating per-
formance were identified. Development activities
were not supported by regular reviews or audits
at the time of this study.
8.1.2 Evaluation of applied inspection
methods and selected inspection
reports
The event classification model included in the data
collection form provided a good framework for the
evaluation of STUK’ methods for the inspection of
new events and the follow-up analysis of signifi-
cant incidents.
Based on the case specific evaluation, it can be
noticed that the inspection reports have a clear
outlining format and structure, the describing
text is usually of good clarity, and the event
classification model has potential to outline what,
how and why had happened. The report format
and its classification scheme were suitable for
periodic data analysis needs, and adequate refer-
ences to the utility reports sent to STUK were
given.
A more detailed analysis of the TAPREK in-
spection and reporting practice resulted in the
identification of the following deficiencies and
improvement proposals:
• The original parts of the event sequences, the
originating failures and causes should be bet-
ter studied in the case of latent failures.
• A distinction between preliminary and final
inspection reports from the utilities to STUK
should be considered (“similar” to the Swedish
reporting routine of safety related occurrences,
i.e. the RO reporting routine).
• In the description and follow-up of the correc-
tive actions taken by the utilities more atten-
tion should be paid to expected and achieved
effects of those actions.
• Work planning deficiencies (not only design
deficiencies) should be itemised in the classifi-
cation model of corrective actions, failure
events and error causes.
• Lacking or broken defensive barriers (technical
and organisational) should be surveyed more
thoroughly in the inspection reports, more at-
tention should be given to the potential barrier
options given in the classification model.
• Pilot data retrieval operations on grounds of a
selected combination of classification codes and
free text information on the TAPREK forms
are recommended for enhancing the identifica-
tion of recurrence and trends of safety signifi-
cant failure modes, problems and events, and
facilitating benchmarking between the units
(Objective: periodic TAPREK experience re-
ports?).
• Categorisation of events and their reporting
ambition into different classes according to
their relative importance could be considered
(compare with SKIFS 1998:1 or precursor stud-
ies). In this respect the INES classification
system appears to be too general.
8.2 Teollisuuden Voima Oy
8.2.1 Evaluation of the organisational
framework and investigation
practices
It was evaluated that the goals of Olkiluoto power
plant’s (TVO) event investigation practice were in
general clearly and explicitly defined and docu-
mented. A pro-active approach towards safety was
being emphasized and the prevention of the recur-
rence of events was generally regarded as a very
important objective for the practice. However, it
was not quite clear to what extent TVO’s key per-
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sonnel did share a common view of what kind of
operating experience feedback policy they should
adhere to in the future.
TVO did not have any particular indicators for
the effectiveness of its event investigation prac-
tice. Nevertheless, it was concluded that the ma-
jor problems of the practice had been identified
and that in general people tended to be well aware
of what was going on at the plant. An overall
impression is that TVO is clearly in the process of
strengthening its event investigation competence.
Liabilities appeared to be clearly defined but
very decentralised. It can be said that until re-
cently TVO’s event investigation practice had not
been organised nor understood as a process with
one process owner (i.e. responsible person and/or
unit) clearly in charge of all related activities at
the plant. Instead, the investigation practice con-
sisted of a set of distinct activities to be carried
out in different offices, branches and informal
groups without firm co-ordination. That was re-
garded as an obvious deficiency. According to the
authors’ impression the situation made it rather
difficult to manage cross-functional activities and
to fully utilise existing knowledge. In addition, the
Group for Operating Experience (KÄKRY) did not
appear to command much formal authority in the
organisation and could not therefore influence the
implementation of proposed corrective actions in
an efficient way. However, during the execution of
this study TVO carried out changes in its organi-
sation which are likely to alleviate these prob-
lems. For instance, there was an obvious intention
to establish the process ownership concept into
practice and to provide the Chairman of KÄKRY
with a larger overall responsibility for TVO’s event
investigation activities.
TVO had several procedures for the threat-
ment of operational events, technical failures and
other deviations depending on their characteris-
tics and safety significance. It was evaluated that
in general the assessment of both internal and
external operational event reports, major techni-
cal failures and other events that were brought to
KÄKRY’s consideration did work well. Moreover,
the procedure for the treatment of technical fail-
ure data was evaluated to be relatively good
although it did not contain specific instructions to
support recurrence and common cause failure
detection, and although decentralised liabilities
and consequential difficulties in task co-ordina-
tion posed a challenge to its implementation.
There was no common plant level document to
provide a comprehensive overview of the existing
event and failure recording, assessment and in-
vestigation activities at TVO. In consequence, for
an outsider it was rather difficult to figure out
how different assessment procedures actually re-
lated to each other, and what usually happens (or
is supposed to happen) before the event ends up
on KÄKRY’a agenda (especially if the event is of
non-technical nature and if its safety importance
is uncertain). It is worth emphasizing that al-
though KÄKRY’s sphere of responsibilities was
very well documented, KÄKRY did not concen-
trate on the assessments of new internal events
and observations. KÄKRY’s focus was on the as-
sessment of event reports, i.e. cases that have
already been inspected to some extent. This led to
a conclusion that TVO’s practices in relation to the
recording and initial assessment of events and
observations were not as explicit and transparent
as they could possibly have been. For instance, the
process near-miss reporting practice introduced
during the carrying-out of this study in 1999 was
not referred to in other event investigation in-
structions.
TVO’s root cause analysis method is MTO and
it was well documented. However, many inter-
viewees were of the opinion that the MTO proce-
dure was heavy and rather “displeasing” to the
plant personnel. This was reckoned to be one
reason behind the fact that the number of com-
pleted MTO reports had remained low and some-
times delayed during the recent years.
Maybe the most difficult part of this study
related to assessing how the treatment of recur-
rent failures and common cause failure (CCF)
mechanisms was organised at TVO. This difficulty
was in part related to complex and non-transpar-
ent procedures as noted above, and in part the fact
that TVO’s personnel had different and sometimes
conflicting views on the issue. The authors’ con-
clusion is that TVO did not have regular and
systematic procedures for the identification and
analysis of recurrence or CCF mechanisms in the
operational event data.
The conclusion was based on the following
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observations: First, many of the representatives of
TVO were of the opinion that their recurrence and
CCF detection activities lacked systematisation
and that in the absence of a systematic practice
such events were mainly identified randomly in
particular situations. Secondly, the deputy Chair-
man of KÄKRY stated that they did not analyse
historical or concurrent recurrence on a regular
basis. Thirdly, recurrence or CCF mechanisms
were not explicitly mentioned in TVO’s instruc-
tions for internal event reporting (0-KC-00-47/8)
or treatment of operational event reports (0-S-O-
16/2). In consequence, it was concluded that exist-
ing measures to identify recurrence or CCF mech-
anisms in the operational event data had to be
based more on situation specific needs and cam-
paigns or individual initiative rather than on a
well established and regular practice. This is a
clear deficiency that ought to be paid more atten-
tion to at TVO.
However, the situation is not that straighfor-
ward. At TVO the main responsibility for the
assessment of recurrence and CCF mechanisms
belongs to the case officer in charge of the con-
cerned event report. The Head of TVO’s Opera-
tional Safety Branch assured that the system
worked sufficiently well. It appeared, too, that
KÄKRY had addressed recurrence in connection
with particular case studies, and that concise
summary reports on reactor trips and special
reported cases had been occasionally prepared for
internal use. In addition, the recent ASSET mis-
sion in 1998 covered all operational events report-
ed to the regulator between 1993 and 1997, and
resulted in a comprehensive analysis, classifica-
tion and ranking of pending safety and operability
performance problems. TVO also had a procedure
for a systematic treatment of failure data stored
by means of notices of defects, work orders and
failure reports in the computerised Work Order
System. That procedure obliged responsible main-
tenance foremen together with technical experts
to search for signs of recurrent and multiple
failures from the system and to process their
findings into summary reports and proposals for
corrective measures. Therefore it is fair to say
that TVO had invested time and efforts in this
area, too.
Prior to the recent ASSET self-assessment and
peer review conducted in 1998, TVO has not had a
systematic practice for the follow-up analysis of
completed event reports. Provided that the AS-
SET system will be introduced into regular use at
TVO, that it will be used for the follow-up analysis
of completed event reports on a regular basis, and
that the analyses will also cover such “minor
events” as process and labour protection near-
misses that are not normally reported to the
regulator, the event investigation process as a
whole will become more organised. Such an ar-
rangement would also facilitate the carrying-out
of comprehensive periodic operating experience
reviews in the future.
Apart from the identification and treatment of
recurrent failures it was evaluated that KÄKRY
does good work in assessing both internal and
external inspection reports, requesting state-
ments, recommending corrective actions and su-
pervising their implementation. KÄKRY has an
important role in conveying the lessons learned to
the rest of the organisation e.g. by carrying out
development campaigns in particular problem ar-
eas.
In connection with the analysis of operational
preconditions it was noticed that at least from the
interviewees’ point of view the event investigation
practice lacked focus and resourcing. People ap-
peared to have many simultaneous assignments
of which many were to be conducted more or less
like “side-line” duties. Instructions were usually
clear and easy-to-read but they did not provide the
reader with an overall view of the practice. In
addition, there seemed to be discrepancies be-
tween the written word and the actual operating
procedures. On the other hand, it can be conclud-
ed that TVO was progressing in the fields of
training, reviews and development activities. TVO
had no academically trained behavioural scien-
tists on its payroll but it had invested in its own
human factors training. In addition, TVO pur-
chased related consulting services which in part
alleviated lacking resources.
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8.2.2 Evaluation of applied inspection
methods and selected inspection
reports
The ASSET self assessment and peer review of 5
years’ operating experience performed at TVO du-
ring 1998 provided a good possibility to compare
its analyses and results with the evaluation re-
sults of this study.
Follow-up analysis of incidents
The ASSET follow-up analyses of reported events
conducted by TVO exhibit a high quality. The met-
hod and format for doing ASSET event analysis
report summaries on single events is systematic
and good. However, additional improvement pro-
posals and needs appear:
• The ASSET format facilitates event description
with a chronological list of occurrences, but
only one of these occurrences per event analy-
sis was selected for further scrutiny, i.e. the
analysis of direct and root causes. However, in
many cases, several significant causes in the
event sequence can be identified and analysed
by the method.
Periodic review of operating experience and
identification of recurrence
TVO ASSET self assessment comprised a good and
systematic review of 132 events occurred/reported
to the regulator during 1993-97.
• In addition, the entire population of events (not
only those that have been reported to the
regulator) should be systematically identified
(incl. other important events identified during
refuelling outages and failures entered into the
Work Order (TTJ) system) and analysed in
order to identify new significant “latent” events
and to further enhance the safety and operabil-
ity of the plant. Ordinary “single failures” may
involve common failure modes, recurrent and
multiple defects building up “organisational
problem events or nearby failures”. Thus they
should undergo a systematic analysis for the
prevention of recurrence (Laakso, Pyy & Rei-
man, 1998). One reference of periodic operat-
ing experience review on reactor trips was
already in use for self assessment at TVO.
Besides, the systematic analysis of the operating
experience of motor operated valve drives showed
that symptomatic repairs were usually directed to
individual equipment, and that root causes were
not well corrected on either them or similarly af-
fected equipment (Hänninen & Laakso, 1993). In
this study some of these remedial needs are justi-
fied, and they can be recognised from the ASSET
self assessment results, too.
• Starting up the collection and analysis of fail-
ure data according to the TVO guide (0-KC-U3-
21/2) on grounds of the TTJ information sys-
tem is strongly encouraged. In addition, the
utilisation of modern data analysis tools to
retrieve and compile selected data by using
classification codes or free descriptive text
searches would be beneficial in a similar way
as already demonstrated for the TUD data.
• Periodic operating experience assessments
should also be directed to human and organisa-
tion related problems and not limited to the
technically oriented way of analysing problems
(Bento 1997).
• Now the ASSET self assessment report
presents only a ranking of pending problems at
general level and a list of several remaining
actions. However, the ranking (priorisation) of
the actions which compete for the same re-
sources and personnel attention has been miss-
ing. The newly introduced a ranking list “10 at
top” may help the resource allocation at the
plant meeting and implementation.
The ASSET self assessment showed how well re-
pairs to eliminate the pending local problems
(symptoms) and the remedies to prevent recurren-
ce were implemented. The recurrence of failures
was too high.
• It is recommended that in addition to problems
and action programs, also the expected and
achieved operability effects of proposed and
implemented actions should be more closely
addressed by e.g. KÄKRY.
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Root cause analysis and other event reports
relating to the selected cases
Following deficiencies and improvement proposals
of the incident inspection methods and reporting
could be still identified:
• The threshold between root cause analysis and
other operational event reports should be es-
tablished and more clearly based on their sig-
nificance.
• The initiating parts of the event sequences, the
originating failures and causes should be bet-
ter studied in case of significant initiating
events and latent failures. Analysis of primary
causes and errors committed in originating
work tasks, with respect to possible common
causes such as deficiencies in work planning or
engineering specification, should be pinpoint-
ed.
• The analysis criteria on activity, procedure and
human related problems causing incidents are
not comprehensive. The root cause analysis
should include human and organisation related
problems and should not be limited to the
technically oriented way of analysing the prob-
lems.
• Failed or broken defensive barriers (technical
and organisational) should be surveyed in root
cause reports more thoroughly and illustrated
by simple and informative block diagrams (In
the recent years’ root cause analyses, i.e. MTO
analyses, the useful but resource demanding
task of preparing event and cause analysis
diagrams seem to lack in many cases).
• Thus a systematic method for root cause analy-
sis (e.g. based on MTO and ASSET philoso-
phies) should be established into routine use at
TVO. Additional training is necessary for an
efficient use and understanding of advanced
root cause analysis methods, if they are not
used by event analysis specialist only.
It is important to learn an incident inspection and
reporting methodology capable of dealing with a
large number of events with a relative ease. TVO
plans to continue internal reassessment of opera-
ting events using the ASSET methodology which
should be encouraged.
• The evaluators recommend TVO to start to
apply the ASSET event analysis format to
analyse the inoperability failures in the sys-
tems and components, involving LCO require-
ments of the technical specifications, in addi-
tion to those events that have been described
in the quarterly reports. Identification and
monitoring of possible trends and recurrent
failures in safety systems should be facilitated,
and the recognition and implementation of
remedial actions should be emphasised, too.
• The same or a simplified version of the ASSET
analysis routine, taking into account the sever-
al causes approach, could also support / pro-
vide a feasible framework and methodology for
follow-up analyses of other internally reported
noteworthy events which mainly originate from
the refuelling and maintenance outages.
• Complementing of internal classification codes
into the incident inspection reports is recom-
mended to enhance understanding of the safe-
ty and operability significant failure modes,
problems and events, and to support better
identification of their recurrence or multiplici-
ty.
8.3 Fortum Power and Heat Oy
8.3.1 Evaluation of the organisational
framework and investigation
practices
It was evaluated that the goals of Loviisa power
plant’s (LPP) event investigation practice were in
general clearly and explicitly defined and docu-
mented. A pro-active approach towards safety was
being emphasized and the prevention of the recur-
rence of events was generally regarded as a very
important objective for the practice. In addition,
the main investigation policy alignments e.g. in
relation to the role of the Plant Safety Branch
(PSB) and other units were well articulated and
evidently applied in practice, too, although not al-
ways documented. It appeared that quantitative
indicators had not been developed or sufficiently
used for assessing the effectiveness of LPP’s event
investigation practice. Like in case of TVO, pre-
vailing performance measurement systems were
mostly too general to provide the practice with
precise and useful feedback. It was assumed, ho-
wever, that the application of regular quality
assurance reviews as well as the annual internal
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operating experience feedback reports partly com-
pensated that deficiency.
Liabilities were clearly defined. In addition,
the event investigation practice was partly organ-
ised in a form of process, including a nominated
process owner and a documented procedure on
how to proceed from event recognition through
assessment and reporting to the implementation
of corrective measures and their evaluation. This
was regarded as a big plus and a definitive advan-
tage for the practice. Certain amount of redundan-
cy in work was detected mainly because of the
overlapping responsibilities of the PSB and the
Quality Assurance Branch (QAB). Although it was
speculated that the situation was likely to make it
more difficult to utilise the existing operating
experience data, the Safety Engineer in charge of
the event investigation practice (SEE) assured
that the feedback loop was functioning well and
that he could take the full advantage of existing
results.
In general, PSB appeared to have a firm status
at LPP as well as enough integrity and independ-
ence to adhere to an operating policy of its choice.
PSB seemed to be proficient in managing cross-
departmental activities, too, e.g. in mobilising the
line organisation in the investigation practice.
The recording and assessment of new events
and observations was relatively well organised at
LPP, thanks to the Operational Event (KT) report-
ing practice. It appeared to provide a feasible tool
for the treatment of all kinds of deviations, includ-
ing those that cannot be necessarily attributed to
any particular systems or equipment failure. KT
reports lay good foundations for a systematic
assessment and classification of operational
events as well, but at the time of this study the
assessment procedure itself was rather informal
and highly dependent on the SEE’s personal
know-how and judgement. It was concluded, too,
that the compilation of Human Failure Reports
was not closely related to the mainstream inspec-
tion and development activities.
At LPP root cause analysis tools and methods
can be chosen on the basis of case specific needs.
In principle that’s OK, provided that the neces-
sary methods expertise is available. In addition, it
can be presumed that there is a documented and
approved procedure for each method that the
licensee has used or may use. It was noted,
however, that LPP’s current root cause analysis
method, a modified version of HPES, was not
documented. A reference was given to HPES train-
ing material but it was not in Finnish, nor includ-
ed a precise description of the prevailing practice,
either. Moreover, LPP’s root cause analysis re-
ports reviewed as part of this study did not
include references to any method, although they
should have included according to LPP’s existing
root cause analysis instruction. These are clear
procedural deficiencies to be corrected irrespec-
tive of the adequacy of achieved inspection re-
sults.
Another procedural deficiency has to do with
the identification of common cause failure (CCF)
mechanisms. There are no instructions in writing
to specify concrete procedures or arrangements
for CCF detection, although some attention has
been paid to the treatment of already identified
CCFs. However, the SEE seems to invests a lot of
his time in (manual) screening of existing opera-
tional event data. On the other hand, “ordinary”
technical failures entered into the Loviisa power
plant information system (LOTI) were not subject
to any systematic CCF screening activities al-
though LOTI itself could provide a good support
for them. Nevertheless, by means of the regular
quality assurance reviews LPP seemed to have a
possibility to gather information on the historical
recurrence of failures relating to particular func-
tions or organisational branches.
It was concluded that LPP was relatively
strong in the area of investigation result utilisa-
tion. According to the authors’ evaluation LPP had
adequate arrangements for assessing the safety
implications of inspection results, for processing
proposed enhancements and supervising the im-
plementation of recommended actions, and for
evaluating the effectiveness of enhancements in
particular functions, systems and equipment. This
is largely based on the active role, clear agenda
and decisive authority of the LPP Quality Assur-
ance and Safety Meeting, but also on the fluent co-
operation of safety and QA functions. Accordingly,
a big plus to LPP.
There seemed to be enough competent people
to take care of investigations, and their average
workload did not seem to be too high. On-the-job
type of training appeared work quite well, too, on
the grounds that the SEE was visibly proud of
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their achievements in that area. However, LPP
had not considered it necessary to recruit any
academically trained behavioural scientists so far.
As a result, and like in the case of TVO, a selected
group of engineers took care of human factors
related issues on the basis of practical experience,
training, and the use of common sense. It must be
emphasized, however, that this study did not give
rise to any particular doubts about LPP’s capabili-
ty to address those issues in an appropriate way.
In the area of information technology there were
nevertheless much more to be done. Current sys-
tems were not very well integrated and they did
not provide the event investigation practice with
sufficient support especially when it comes to data
analyses.
8.3.2 Evaluation of applied inspection
methods and selected inspection
reports
The KT (Operational Event) reporting system pro-
vides a good and standardised structure for scree-
ning and identification of significant events at the
Loviisa NPP (see Appendices). KT reports define
the further reporting needs e.g. by indicating
whether a special or root cause analysis report
has to be prepared. Until the end of 1998, a KT
report had been prepared for altogether 207
events. Most of the KT reports fall below the offi-
cial reporting threshold specified by the regulator.
For instance, less than 20 % of the KT reports
completed in 1998 related to such events that re-
quired official reporting to STUK.
Follow-up analysis of incidents
The PSA Human Failure Reports (in the analysis
also referred to as iv-reports) are follow-up analy-
ses of those KT reported events that exhibit hu-
man failures. In the recent years about half of the
KT reports have resulted in a Human Failure Re-
port. It appeared, too, that an increasing portion
of all KT reported events also result in a Human
Failure Report (which is a good thing). Human
Failure Reports include a detailed classification of
identified errors, and information on their disco-
very, causes, impact on safety systems including
the redundancies, and preventive actions (see Ap-
pendices).
The Human Failure Reports are aimed at iden-
tification of human errors and CCFs for the PSA
studies (Jänkälä, Vaurio & Vuorio, 1987). They are
stored in the LOTI information system, but were
not used for any periodic, human error related,
operating experience review at the time of this
study. Some recommendations for consideration:
• The search of recurrent error causes and prob-
lems could be facilitated by the help of the
existing human failure classification codes and
their underlying KT event report information.
The next step could be a trend analysis of
dominant human failure related events and an
evaluation of the effects of the corrective ac-
tions and remedies to prevent recurrence.
• The present human failure classification model
of error causes should be complemented by
introducing options for Design Deficiency and
Work Planning Deficiency. The classification of
involved working groups should consequently
be completed by introducing options for the
Design branch and Work Planning branch.
Periodic review of operating experience and
identification of recurrence
The Olkiluoto ASSET self assessment comprised a
good and systematic review of 132 events’ popula-
tion occurred during 1993-97. There was no cor-
responding method or practice at the Loviisa NPP.
It is important to learn an incident inspection met-
hodology capable of dealing with a large number
of events for identification of recurrence with a
relative ease.
• FORTUM should consider to perform a similar
or corresponding periodic self-assessment of
operating experience when a population of five
years’ KT reports is available,
• In addition to KT reported events, also selected
work orders should be analysed in order to
identify new significant “latent” events and to
further enhance the safety and operability of
the plant.
• Continuing and further developing the ways of
collection, classification, analysis and utilisa-
tion of failure data according to the Loviisa
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power plant maintenance planning, mainte-
nance optimisation and plant lifetime manage-
ment routines, and periodic maintenance re-
porting are strongly encouraged. The utilisa-
tion of modern data analysis tools together
with the application of adequate classification
codes and event descriptions is in this respect
necessary.
• Periodic operating experience assessments
should also be directed to human and organisa-
tion related problems and not be limited to the
technically oriented way of analysing problems
(Bento, 1997).
• It is recommended that in addition to problems
and action programs, also the expected and
achieved effects of proposed and implemented
actions should be more closely addressed.
Operational Event Reports and root cause
analyses relating to the selected cases
• KT reports: a field on Causes should be added
to the KT report to steer further event investi-
gations and reporting.
• The KT report does not include any formal
classification model to support periodic opera-
tional experience reviews, systematic identifi-
cation of recurrent events or their causes, or
ranking of corrective action programs.
• A systematic classification of event’s relative
significance (a more detailed one than in the
INES scale) should be considered for the KT
reporting for outlining the event significance,
information and facilitating further data
searches.
Remark: The special reports submitted to the
regulatory body include a number of classifica-
tion codes which could facilitate searches of
specific event types and possible recurrent
causes.
• Root cause reports: The initiating parts of
event sequences, the originating failures, and
causes should be better studied in case of
latent failures. Analysis of primary causes and
errors committed in tasks in which the errors
were committed, with respect to possible com-
mon causes such as deficiencies in work plan-
ning or engineering specification, should be
pinpointed.
• The analysis criteria on activity, procedure and
human performance related problems are not
comprehensive enough. In general, human and
organisational factors should be more clearly
addressed in the root cause analysis reports.
• Failed or broken defensive barriers (technical
as well as organisational) should be more thor-
oughly surveyed, and could be illustrated by
informative block (event sequence, cause and
barrier) diagrams.
• Thus a more systematic method for root cause
analyses and reports (e.g. based on HPES/
MTO and ASSET philosophies) should be es-
tablished, documented and implemented for
routine use.
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9.1 Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority
Major advantages and good practices
The Finnish regulator, STUK, has contributed to
the introduction and use of more elaborated event
inspection methods and practices in the Finnish
nuclear industry, especially in the 90’s as STUK’s
own event investigations started. STUK has a
good access to plant information and operational
event data. STUK has established a good frame-
work for its own investigation practice through
clear and well documented inspection and event
classification criteria. The TAPREK database is a
good and usable information system and provides
substantial support for the practice. Generally
there are enough competent personnel for the car-
rying-out of own selective incident investigations,
reviewing utilities’s inspection practises and re-
porting, and motivating them to further develop
their incident analysis methods and practises.
Major deficiencies and their consequences
1. A clear policy statement and an action plan for
STUK’s own event investigation practice was
missing. From the licensee’s point of view this
means difficulties in anticipating STUK’s ex-
pectations, reactions and demands in advance
although YVL 1.5, i.e. the guide that deter-
mines the official reporting requirements, had
established its position in the Finnish nuclear
power community. When it comes to STUK
itself, it seems probable that this deficiency
has at least partly contributed to their prob-
lems in task allocation and internal develop-
ment campaigns in general.
2. It was concluded that STUK’s stringent and
prescriptive supervisory approach with only
minor common R&D efforts with power compa-
nies does not encourage initiatives at plants. In
addition, the development and introduction of
new (voluntary) practices at plants easily re-
sult in excessive paperwork and/or in a situa-
tion in which the plant should be prepared to
run several overlapping and resource-consum-
ing processes at the same time to meet its own
inspection needs and to fulfil the formal report-
ing requirements issued by the regulator.
3. STUK did not have any explicit performance
indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of its
investigation practices. As a result, it is diffi-
cult to gain reliable information on the degree
to which the practice reaches its goals. On the
other hand, since STUK’s goals were only gen-
erally specified at the time of this study the
introduction of a developed performance meas-
urement system would anyhow have been a
very difficult task to accomplish.
4. STUK did not conduct regular and systematic
reviews of the bulk of existing operating event
data in addition to some limited efforts done
earlier by the senior officials. Given the fact
that also the licensees’ data analysis activities
were lacking systemisation, it is quite obvious
that a number of important recurrent, common
cause and latent failure mechanisms are yet to
be identified at Finnish nuclear power plants.
5. The event investigation practice lacked focus
and the inspectors suffered from fragmented
job descriptions. It is estimated that this is
likely to have a negative impact on the cover-
age, thoroughness and methodicalness of
STUK’s event investigation practice. However,
this study did not indicate any concrete signs of
such negative developments so far.
6. There were no regular audits or R&D projects.
This means that the success of various devel-
opment activities is very much dependent on
senior officials’ personal views and engage-
ment.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Recommendations
1. Reconsider and document the main goals of the
practice in a more precise way, evaluate the
adequacy of the current prescriptive approach
and issue an open policy statement and action
plan to specify the main operating principles of
the practice.
2. Consider together with the utilities to conduct
an independent analysis of occurred human
and organisational related incidents. This
could yield interesting results from the task
performance, procedure or defensive barrier
failure point of view.
3. Develop performance measurement of the prac-
tise, pay more attention to periodic and sys-
tematic data analyses and utilise the potential
of the TAPREK system more efficiently.
4. Ensure that inspectors can concentrate on their
work in accordance with the prevailing and
also future policy alignments.
5. Introduce a regular auditing practice and en-
gage in benchmarking excercises with other
regulators, and establish joint R&D (i.e. not
only assessment) projects with utilities and
researchers.
9.2 Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Major advantages and good practices
TVO’s goals were clearly defined and documented.
KÄKRY has an important role in conveying the
lessons learned to the organisation and campaig-
ning in particular problem areas. Co-operation
with Swedish utilities and research organisations
has potential for sharing useful information. A no-
blame investigation atmosphere contributes to the
quality of inspection results. The new process
near-miss reporting practice provides a sound fra-
mework for the recording and assessment of novel
events and observations of non-technical nature.
There is a clear emphasis on personnel training,
reviews and development activities.
These advantages are demonstrated by the
progressive ASSET self assessments and plans for
a systematic collection and analysis of failure
data. TVO is clearly in the process of strengthen-
ing its event investigation and identification com-
petence.
Major deficiencies and their consequences
1. TVO has no particular performance indicators
for evaluating the effectiveness of its event
investigation practice. In consequence, it has
been difficult to gain reliable information on
the degree to which the practice reaches its
goals (which were precisely defined and docu-
mented).
Remark: The recently performed ASSET self
assessment of operating experience indicates a
high recurrence of failures and presents there-
fore both a kind of indicator of the overall
effectivess of TVO’s operating experience utili-
sation process and an extensive list of remain-
ing actions.
2. The event investigation practice lacked process
qualities which was characterised by the dis-
persion of responsibilities into different offices,
branches and informal groups. This in turn
had resulted in various problems of task co-
ordination and co-operation. In consequence,
existing information and available resources
were not utilised as efficiently as they could
have been utilised.
Remark: As a result of a recent organisational
change, the Chairman of KÄKRY has a larger
overall responsibility for TVO’s event investi-
gation practice and related activities. The proc-
ess ownership concept is now being empha-
sised.
3. The recording and assessment of new internal
events lacked systematisation and clear oper-
ating principles. There were various possible
reporting channels but no common plant level
document to clarify their mutual interconnec-
tions to provide a big picture of the system. It
was evaluated that due to this complexity
there is an increased probability that events
and observations with uncertain technical ori-
gin and of minor immediate safety significance
will remain unrecorded and/or without proper
further assessment.
Remark: The new process near-miss reporting
practice is aimed to reach such events that do
not necessarily require official event reporting
to the regulator or relate to any particular
equipment failure. This is an obvious improve-
ment. However, still more work is required to
enhance the transparency of TVO’s event re-
cording and assessment system in general.
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4. There were no regular and systematic practices
for identifying recurrence or common cause
failure (CCF) mechanisms in the operational
event data. Manifestations of such mechanisms
were therefore likely to be treated as single
events or failures, and the probability of not
identifying the actual root causes of those
events was consequently estimated to be rela-
tively high.
Remark: Recurrent faults and CCFs have been
addressed in the procedure for the collection
and analysis of failure and maintenance histo-
ry data. In addition, both operational event
and technical failure data have been subject to
several data analysis campaigns with varying
scope and intent.
5. KÄKRY, the Group for Operating Experience,
did not command much formal authority nor
decisive position in the organisation, and the
event investigation practice as a whole ap-
peared to lack focus and adequate resourcing.
The key personnel seemed to suffer from their
fragmented job description, characterised by a
large number of various additional assign-
ments of which many directly related to the
investigation practice itself. Lack of formal
authority made it difficult to influence the
processing and implementation of requested
clarifications or corrective actions in responsi-
ble organisational units.
6. In general, a clear distinction between the
formal procedures and the actual practice was
detected. In the long run such a situation will
eventually decrease the stature of existing in-
structions in general which in turn is likely to
increase risk levels in other safety significant
operations.
Remark: This is especially true with regard to
the application of the current MTO root cause
analysis procedure. The procedure itself was
comprehensive and well written but deficient
implementation and lack of well trained per-
sonnel have resulted in signs of degradation of
the inspection quality as well as delays in root
cause reporting.
Recommendations
1. Assume a process view to developing the inves-
tigation practice. Provide the Chairman of
KÄKRY with necessary resources and authori-
ty to enhance task co-ordination and exchange
of information. Define and develop TVO’s core
processes by establishing stronger links be-
tween single tasks and more general objectives
of operation.
2. Develop performance measurement. With re-
gard to this objective try to specify and opera-
tionalise the existing goals of the practice.
3. Proceed with the recent process near-miss re-
porting practice. Give more emphasis to sim-
plyfying event recording and assessment pro-
cedures. Document their mutual interconnec-
tions e.g. by means of a general plant level
procedure to cover all event investigation and
reporting activities at TVO.
4. Create a more systematic procedure for the
identification of recurrent failures and common
cause failure mechanisms, especially when it
comes to the failure event data.
5. Develop information technology based tools to
support greater data integration. Take a tai-
lored ASSET method and related computerised
tools into regular use so that they meet both
TVO’s and STUK’s needs concerning event in-
spections and reporting, follow-up analyses and
periodic operating experience reviews.
6. Make sure that the results and recommenda-
tions of inspection reports, reviews and audits
are taken into account, that approved enhance-
ments are implemented and that their effects
are followed up. In this respect consider pro-
viding KÄKRY with greater authority to influ-
ence implementation.
7. Pay attention to task allocation and try to
reduce the amount of “side-line” duties. Get rid
of instructions that do not work in practice and
develop instructions together with practices.
These problem areas can, and should, be ad-
dressed in connection with more general proc-
ess development activities.
8. Create a strategy document for the operating
experience feedback process (including goals,
acceptance criteria, action plan etc.). In gener-
al, the incident analyses have well identified
the means to eliminate the direct causes by
repairs, but still more emphasis should be
given to prevent recurrence by implementing
remedies. A more effective feedback can be
achieved by focusing the root cause analyses on
significant events, the work tasks in which the
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originating errors occurred, and the weakness-
es of defensive barriers, and by implementing
periodic operational experience reviews (such
as ASSET self-assessment).
9.3 Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Major advantages and good practices
Fortum’s goals were clearly defined and docu-
mented, and the main investigation policy align-
ments were well articulated and apparently app-
lied in practice, too, although not always docu-
mented. The practice possessed process characte-
ristics including a nominated process owner and a
clear action plan resulting in a practical distri-
bution of tasks and co-ordination of activities. The
event investigation practice appeared to have
enough independence and integrity.
The prevailing Operational Event (KT) report-
ing practice provided a sound framework for the
recording and assessment of novel events and
observations. The Human Failure Reports con-
tained a fairly comprehensive event classification
model that could be tailored for analysing all
significant operational events. A no-blame investi-
gation atmosphere contributes to the quality of
inspection results and the line organisation was
successfully mobilised to contribute to the event
investigation practice. Personnel training ap-
peared to have been successful, and enough re-
sources had been allocated to the practice.
The regular quality assurance audits provided
information on the historical recurrence of fail-
ures and made it possible to monitor performance
in specific organisational branches and functions.
In addition, investigation results were assessed
and utilised in a fairly systematic and authorised
manner.
Major deficiencies and their consequences
1. Fortum has no particular performance indica-
tor system for evaluating the effectiveness of
its event investigation practice. In conse-
quence, it is difficult to gain reliable informa-
tion on the degree to which the practice reach-
es its goals (which were precisely defined and
documented).
Remark: However, the recent annual reports of
internal operating experience feedback provide
valid summary and trend information, i.a. on
the number of internal operating event reports,
and the relative ratios of the official reporting
to the regulator, to help assess effectiveness on
a more general level.
2. Although the KT reporting practice provides a
good support for the initial assessment of oper-
ational events, the assessment process itself is
rather informal and very dependent on the
responsible person’s expertise and judgement.
There is no explicit definition of an operational
event, either, nor explicit criteria for their
classification apart from the formal reporting
requirements issued by the regulator. In conse-
quence, a number of interesting events may
remain unrecorded and consequently beyond
further assessment. Nevertheless, the KT re-
porting practice as a whole works reasonably
well and is certainly of significant benefit to
the plant.
3. There is no detailed document in Finnish to
describe how to conduct root cause analyses.
This means that the coverage of completed
reports as well as the treatment of cases may
significantly depend on the person or team in
charge of the inspection. This in turn is likely
to have a negative impact on the average
quality of the reports. In addition, reports
compiled without any firm method or structure
are more often difficult to understand, espe-
cially when one is searching for a particular
piece of information or certain kind of phenom-
ena from a larger ensemble of reports.
4. There are no instructions in writing to specify
concrete procedures or arrangements for the
detection of common cause failure mechanisms.
This task is taken care of by a nominated
person in charge of the event investigation
practice. Any change in his position in the
organisation may therefore change the situa-
tion as well.
5. Current information systems do not support
comprehensive data analyses. The mainte-
nance and operational event data are stored in
different systems and the integration of exist-
ing information requires manual work. In such
a situation the threshold for conducting time-
consuming and laborious data analyses is obvi-
ously high-and again-dependent on the individ-
ual initiative.
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Recommendations
1. Develop the performance measurement of the
practise to further increase its effectiveness.
2. Develop the KT reporting practice to include a
written procedure for an initial classification of
recorded events and observations according to
the characteristics of their consequences and
immediate contributing factors. Itemise the
Causes in the KT report form. Engage more
people into the KT reporting practice, integrate
the Human Failure reporting practice to the
mainstream investigation activities and utilise
that information more efficiently.
3. In general, the incident analyses have identi-
fied well the ways to eliminate the direct caus-
es by repairs, but still more emphasis should
be given to prevent recurrence by implement-
ing remedies. A more effective feedback can be
achieved by focusing on the root cause analyses
of significant events, the work tasks in which
the originating events occurred, such as design
or work planning, and the weaknesses of de-
fensive barriers, and by implementing periodic
operational experience reviews.
4. Establish a formal procedure and computer
aided tools for conducting and reporting root
cause analyses to meet both Fortum’s and
STUK’s needs and requirements.
5. Endeavour to alleviate the existing data inte-
gration problems. Take practical steps to re-
new the plant information system.
6. Establish a systematic procedure for the iden-
tification of common cause failure mechanisms.
7. Carry out a periodic plant level operating expe-
rience review by ASSET or some other feasible
method and extend it to the KT reports, other
underlying inspection reports as well as to
screening of other applicable events to be iden-
tified from the present plant information sys-
tem (LOTI).
8. Develop further the strategy document and
include an action plan for the operating experi-
ence feedback process to support and direct
prevailing data analysis and reviewing activi-
ties. This can be done e.g. on the basis of
Chapter 12 (Utilisation of operating experi-
ence, treatment of deviations and corrective
actions) of the current Quality Assurance
Handbook.
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APPENDIX 1 KEY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT
ACCORDING TO THE UK HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE
Source: HSG65 (1998)
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a. The incident was caused by or it related
to a violation of the technical
specifications which resulted from:
a1.Error or slip in following the regulations
a2.Wrong interpretation
a3.Contradiction between the technical
specifications and other instructions
a4.Inadequate regulations
a5.Other reason: <itemise>
a6.Concerned articles in the technical
specifications: <itemise>
b. An erroneous assessment of incident’s
safety significance which related to:
b1.Conflicting safety and availability goals
b2.Underestimation of safety significance
b3.Other: <itemise>
c. The incident was caused by or it related
to a measure that was in conflict with the
rules and regulations of the quality
assurance system or other administrative
processes:
c1. Error or carelessness in following the
instructions
c2. Compliance with instructions was not
supervised
c3. Instructions were not known
c4. Instructions were inadequate
c5. Conflicting instructions
c6. Missing instructions
c7. Other: <itemise>
c8. Concerned instructions: <itemise>
d. The incident related to deficiencies in the
practice of maintaining instructions
characterised by:
d1.Missing instruction
d2.Instructions were not up to date
* Translation from Finnish into English by the authors.
PARAGRAPH 24.5 OF STUK’S DATA COLLECTION FORM APPENDIX 2
ORGANISATIONAL DEFICIENCIES*
d3.Unclear responsibilities in developing
instructions
d4.Inadequate distribution of instructions
d5.Deficiencies in issuing and assuring the
quality of instructions
d6.Other: <itemise>
e. Deficiencies related to operations:
e1.Insufficient resources in work planning or
execution
e2.Work planned or done by an inexperienced
subcontractor or a temporary employee
e3.Deficiencies in operational management
e4.Inadequate superintendence
e5.Inadequate or insufficient training
e6.Lack of adequate work experience
e7.Other: <itemise>
f. Deficiencies related to the co-operation
between separate organisational units:
f1. Unclear definition of liabilities
f2. Deficiencies in mutual exchange of
information
f3. Conflicting objectives
f4. Neglect of common objectives and schedules
f5. Other: <itemise>
g. Deficiencies related to the reporting of
the incident:
g1.The performer did not report to his or her
foreman adequately
g2.Plant management was not adequately
informed
g3.STUK was not adequately informed
g4.Other: <itemise>
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LO1 x          OPERATIONAL EVENT No. 9/96
LO2 Writer/date JIA 10.4.96
Distribution
Event date 14.3.96 Classification
inspected by
dates & signatures
Event Overheating of a fuse switch
Operational
conditions
Power operation Code (KZ) 12EW04C, TF13D001
Contact persons EIM
Event x No further clarifications Special report
classification Report Report on turbine trip
Separate clarification Report on reactor trip
Disturbance report Root cause analysis
Description of
the event
An internal, S-stage contact of a fuse switch overheated and, as a consequence, an
insulation burned a little causing some smoke. Smell of smoke revealed the malfunc-
tion in a fuse switch. A fuse switch has been made up of four parallel contacts.
No clear cause for the overheating was found. The contacts had evidently darkened
and some normal burning marks could be seen on them. The common spring of the
contacts had been clearly slackened but the loosening of the spring can be caused by
the overheating, i.e. it is not the reason but the consequence.
The fuse switch was totally renewed (work number 227819).
Corrective
actions
Some fuse switches, carrying corresponding load or more, will be inspected during the
1996 annual outage.
APPENDIX 3 LOVIISA POWER PLANT OPERATIONAL EVENT REPORT (KT REPORT)
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LOVIISA POWER PLANT HUMAN FAILURE REPORT APPENDIX 4
PSALO1  HUMAN FAILURE REPORT
A 1. Object (KZ)
2. LO1 3. LO2 4. KT report number
5. Event date 6. Writer, date
B Erroneous action   __________________________________________________________
                                __________________________________________________________
                                __________________________________________________________
C Situation in which the error was made
1. Periodic testing or return ...............................................................................................
2. Preventive maintenance .................................................................................................
3. Failure search ................................................................................................................
4. Equipment removal/return .............................................................................................
5. Failure repair .................................................................................................................
6. Response to a transient not initiated by a human failure ...............................................
    6.1 Erroneous diagnosis .................................................................................................
    6.2 Erroneous measure ..................................................................................................
7. Other: ______________________________________________________________
8. Normal operation ..........................................................................................................
9. Startup ...........................................................................................................................
10. Shutdown ....................................................................................................................
11. Outage .........................................................................................................................
12. Remarks: ___________________________________________________________
D Working group(s) involved
1. Operators ......................... 4. Mechanical maint. ........
2. Instrumentation maint. .... 5. Outside contractor ........
3. electrical maint. ............... 6. Other: ______________
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APPENDIX 4 LOVIISA POWER PLANT HUMAN FAILURE REPORT
E Impact of the error
1. Reactor trip ....................................................................................................................
2. Turbine TG1 trip ...........................................................................................................
3. Turbine TG2 trip ...........................................................................................................
4. Loss of power, _____ % ................................................................................................
5. Other: ______________________________________________________________
E Impact on safety systems
6. Red. 1 ______________________________________________________________
7. Red. 2 ______________________________________________________________
8. Red. 1 ______________________________________________________________
9. Red. 2 ______________________________________________________________
10. Unavailability time _______________________
11. Remarks: ___________________________________________________________
F Means of detection/discovery of the error
1. Alarm/trip ......................................................................................................................
2. Symptoms (immediately) ..............................................................................................
3. Shift inspection ..............................................................................................................
4. Periodic testing ..............................................................................................................
5. Preventive maintenance ................................................................................................
6. On demand ....................................................................................................................
7. Quality control ..............................................................................................................
8. Repair or functional test after the repair .......................................................................
9. Random casual inspection ............................................................................................
10. Inspection before startup .............................................................................................
11. Other: _____________________________________________________________
G Probable causes of the erroneous action
1. Written procedure exists ................................................................................................
2. Performed according to the procedure ..........................................................................
3. Erroneous or defectice procedure ..................................................................................
4. Procedure misunderstood ..............................................................................................
5. Procedure not followed .................................................................................................
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LOVIISA POWER PLANT HUMAN FAILURE REPORT APPENDIX 4
6. Wrong procedure selected .............................................................................................
7. Performed according to oral instructions .......................................................................
8. Oral instructions not followed .......................................................................................
9. Oral instructions misunderstood ....................................................................................
10. No written procedure available ...................................................................................
11. Task too difficult .........................................................................................................
12. Situation misunderstood ..............................................................................................
13. Carelessness, mistake ..................................................................................................
14. Hurry, stress ................................................................................................................
15. Inadequate or insufficient training ..............................................................................
16. Missing communications channel to the field ............................................................
17. Inadequate control room displays ...............................................................................
18. Insufficient control means in the control room ...........................................................
19. Delayed, although an appropriate measure .................................................................
20. Other: _____________________________________________________________
H Preventive actions taken
1. Modification of a procedure 4. Addition of inspections
2. Modified training ................. 5. None .............................
3. Plant modification ................ 6. Other: ______________
Description: _________________________________________________________________
I Recommendation  ____________________________________________________________
                                ____________________________________________________________
                                ____________________________________________________________
J Source of information
1. Operational transient report 4. Root cause report ..........
2. Reactor or turbine trip report 5. Separate clarification ....
3. Special report ....................... 6. Other: ______________
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APPENDIX 5 AN EXAMPLE OF A DETAILED ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS FORM
Title: POWER CABLES CUT TO THE SUPPLY
PUMPS OF THE DIESEL FUEL TANKS
I.          INFORMATION IN THE FAILURE REPORT/WORK ORDER OF THE PLANT
(Identification of the plant, equipment, fault, date and repair time):
TVO  I   II  Equipment place identification number: 656 T003 Work number: 45738, (45739, 45740)
Year: 1992  Date (fault detected): 26.08.92  Time: 11.15  Date (repair started): 26.08.92  Time: 13.00
Date (work finished): 26.08.92  Time: 17.36
The written text in the failure report of the plant (description of fault and corrective
actions):
1. 656 K433 L2 T3 low level alarm. T3 will not be filled.
2. The power cabling to the outdoor pump cut at the erection work place of  start-up transformers.
3. Failure reports 1245739 and 1245740 done.
The cause classification in the failure report (1-2 types):      A  B(F)  C   D   W 
The information under this line was prepared by follow-up analysis of the reporting.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II.         IDENTIFICATION OF  THE ERROR TYPE
Type of direct human error (1-2 types) : omission (incl. restoration errors)  mistake among
alternatives  wrong setting   other erroneous action (incl. installation errors)   dependent failure
(deeper analysis) 
Type of root cause to human error if identified: design deficiency   poor work planning or
management   deficient information transfer or co-operation   rule based error  knowledge based
error 
Type of equipment involved: Process valves, ventilation dampers or channel hatchces   block or
primary valves in instrument lines   other mechanical equipment   instrumentation, control or
software   electrical  equipment 
The human error was introduced within: refuelling outage period  power operation  period   not
clear  (if cannot be directed to the periods as above).
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AN EXAMPLE OF A DETAILED ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS FORM APPENDIX 5
The  error  was detected in (1-2 types):  independent check or test   otherwise  plant shutdown
period prior to start-up  plant start-up  power operation   plant shut-down   plant disturbance 
otherwise 
Candidates for dependent failures (based on time relation or functional connections of
“single failures”) are:
1. 656 P031 / failure report 45739 / 26.08.92 and 656 P011 / failure report 45740 /26.08.92.
2. The power supply cables cut to the fuel supply pumps 656 P031 and 656 P011 of the two day fuel     
tanks of the emergency  diesel generators (report).
Terminate the analysis of single failures over this line. Continue the analysis under this line
for the candidate dependent failures only.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III.                 INFORMATION ON THE  TASK BY WHICH THE FAULT WAS DETECTED
Detection method unclear   Fault possibly detected in   certainly detected in   the task:
1. Periodic loading and running test of the diesel generator.
The detection method was: alarm   operation supervision in control rooms, how
___________________   functional testing after maintenance   periodic testing (e.g acc. to technical
specifications)   scheduled preventive maintenance  repair  shift walk-around or alignment) 
equipment worked not on demand  other authority inspection (e.g.NDT)  other check or test ,
which ___________________________   Date: 26.08.94 Interval: 4 weeks
Operational state and situation at detection (1-2 types): cold shutdown of reactor   refuelling  hot
shutdown of reactor  nuclear heating  hot standby of reactor  power operation  start-up 
shutting down   plant disturbance  other   which __________________________
Complementary information (e.g. identification number of techspec test or preventive
maintenance action):
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IV.                  INFORMATION ON THE WORK TASK WHERE THE ERROR OCCURRED
Cause of the fault unclear   Fault possibly caused in   Fault certainly caused in  the action:
1. Cable charts outside the wall of the plant not kept up to date during the construction period of        
the plant.
2. Own maintenance worker cut as ordered the “extra” 380 V cables at the erection work place of            
the  additional  start-up transformers  (612).
3. The cut was done in order to facilitate the erection of the additional 110 kV cabling.
The action was (1-2 types): preventive maintenance   repair  modification   periodic test
 interval _______weeks functional test   other   date (possible or certain): 19.08.1992
Complementary description:
1. The power cables were encapsulated but not documented and the cables thus thought to be             
“out of use”  cables needed during the earlier plant construction period only.
2. The “unexpectedly” found cables had no voltage due to standstill of the related fuel supply.
The causing action occurred during (1-2  types): cold shutdown of reactor   refuelling   hot shutdown
of reactor  nuclear heating  hot standby of reactor   power operation   starting up   shutting
down 
Complementary information (e.g. description of how the fault occurrence could have been
avoided):
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AN EXAMPLE OF A DETAILED ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS FORM APPENDIX 5
V.                                          THE ORIGIN  AND DEPENDENCE OF THE FAULT
Type of human error (1-2 types): omission (also restoration errors)  mistake among alternatives
 wrong setting  other  erroneous action (carelessness errors etc.)   dependent failure 
The originating mechanism of the error and dependence is  (1-2 types): (design deficiency e.g.
documentation not updated ) (rule based error, e.g. deficient procedure) or order or rules not followed
, insufficient knowledge, e.g. due to lacking training , poor work planning or management, e.g. in
definition of work scope or supervision of subcontractors   poor information transfer  (e.g.  due to
organizational changes or poor experience feedback) , poor tools (selection, maintenance or QC) 
other , ______________________________ (or complementary information on which organizational unit
or personnel category):
The  error  was additionally caused by:  equipment close to each other (e.g. same room) 
administrative easiness (e.g. sequential tasks feasible soon after each other)   same group (e.g. similar
tasks on similar components   deficient preventive maintenance (e.g. the effects of ageing not avoided
by prompt inspection or replacement of degrading components)  heavy work load or tight time
schedule  equipment not uniquely identified (e.g. due to poor identification or name plate) 
Explanatory description:
1. Cable charts outside the plant walls were not kept up to date.
2. In addition, unnecessary cables from the plant construction period were known to lie under the earth
level.
Consequences of the error (e.g. unavailability time of equipment or system):
Consequence classification in failure report: A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I 
Delay time (from originating work task until fault detection): about 168  hours.
Total unavailability time: about 174 hours.
Complementary information (e.g description of consequences):
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VI.                  NOTES ON POSSIBLE INEFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSIVE BARRIERS
Error  not detected in the operative check (check following after the work action, 1-2 types):
preventive maintenance  adjusting   functional test   alignment  start-up test   periodic test 
interval ____________ (other check   poor installation check-up which was ineffective _____
date__________  plant state, which ___________
Complementary information (e.g. identification number of TechSpec test or preventive
maintenance task or explanation, if checking task existed):
Error was not detected in organizational check (independent QA and QC, performed prior,
during or after the work task): Deficient review of design  work planning  start-up testing
program   deficient acceptance inspection  other review or inspection ,
which_________________________________________
Complementary information (e.g. which possible other  review or check actions could have
detected the error):
VII.                PROPOSAL OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIAL MEASURES
The problem can be corrected (or already corrected and the success possibly evaluated) by:
1. Cable charts concerning areas outside the plant walls were prepared to an up to date status.
2. Procedures were prepared for identification of cables found during digging work and for cutting
off power cables. The procedures are  in use (e.g. cable radar, cutting needs work order.)
3. An increase of the fuel margins in the day tanks for the diesels was implemented by making the
tank level L2 higher. 
Source: Laakso (1998).
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THE KSU MODEL FOR A PERIODIC OPERATING EXPERIENCE APPENDIX 6
REVIEW OF MTO RELATED EVENTS
Source: Bento (1997)
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